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The rapid evolution of quantum technologies is likely to cause major shifts in the
mainstream computing landscape. In order to fully reach their potential in a wide base
accessible to any user, remote access of quantum computers and manipulation of data
with strong privacy and integrity guarantees are essential.
Consider a setting where a client having a fully classical computer wants to de-
termine the result of some quantum computation, but lacks the necessary resources
to perform the computation herself. She has access to a more powerful server which
has quantum resources and can solve the problem and send the outcome back to the
client. However, the client does not trust the powerful server, so she needs to find a
way to hide her data. Therefore, the main question that arises is how can we guaran-
tee the client’s privacy of the input and even the computation itself against the server
possessing quantum computational capabilities.
In the present thesis, we study this problem, denoted here as classical secure dele-
gation of quantum computations (CSDQC) between a fully classical honest client and
a quantum untrusted server. We focus on different models of security, analyzing the
limitations and potential of each of the settings. Concretely, we first study the CSDQC
problem under information-theoretic security. We analyse two categories of quantum
computations, decision and sampling problems and in both cases we provide evidence
indicating the impossibility of achieving information-theoretic security. Subsequently,
we consider relaxing the security framework and specifically, we will analyze this task
in the computational security setting (against quantum polynomial-time adversaries).
As a result, in the second part of the thesis we put forward the remote state prepara-
tion as a key component that would allow us to achieve classical secure delegation of
universal quantum computations. We present two protocols realizing the remote state
preparation primitive assuming only a classical channel between client and server. The
first candidate is shown to be secure in the honest-but-curious model, while the second
candidate is proven secure against the server in the malicious setting. The security of
both constructions relies on the hardness of the learning with errors problem. Finally,
given the important role the remote state preparation plays not only in CSDQC, but also
in other quantum communication protocols, we analyze its composable security to de-
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The evolution of traditional computers is challenged by a series of technological limi-
tations. Since the power of these machines is proportional to the number of transistors
they have, the trend has been to construct smaller and more efficient components, until
reaching computer constituents of size no bigger than an atom. The most important
aspect that emerges is that at this scale we cannot use anymore the laws of classical
physics to describe the behaviour of these devices. Instead, we need to use the theo-
ries which govern the microscopic world. Quantum computers arose from the idea of
modelling any natural phenomena using the laws of quantum mechanics. Therefore,
in order to develop more powerful computing devices, comes the requirement to har-
ness quantum properties of atoms, which would provide the basis for the memory and
processor of the new machine.
The rapid development of quantum technologies has increased the computational
capacity of quantum servers. We can expect to see quantum devices with high vari-
ability in terms of architectures and capacities, the so-called noisy, intermediate-scale
quantum (NISQ) devices [Pre18] (e.g. superconducting such as the devices devel-
oped by IBM, Rigetti, Google, IonQ) that are currently available to users via classical
cloud platforms. Quantum computers will tackle problems in fields such as medical
research, data analytics, machine learning, where the protection of sensitive data is a
must. Therefore, in order to be able to proceed to the next milestone for the utility of
these devices in a wider industrial base, the issues of privacy and integrity of the data
manipulation must be addressed.
This raised the necessity of privacy preserving functionalities such as the research
developed around quantum computing on encrypted data. Clients, with devices as light
as mobile phones, will want to use the services offered by quantum computation and
2
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communication protocols, in a way that their privacy is guaranteed.
Importantly, the devices of clients willing to use these services may not have the
capacity to support quantum communications. This can be either because their devices
are fully classical or they are not connected to the newly developed, and still in its first
stages, quantum communications network.
This technological challenge has lead to the formation of an entirely new research
field on developing classical client - quantum server protocols for delegated computing.
1.1 Secure Delegated Computing
Secure delegated quantum computing is a two-party cryptographic primitive, where
a computationally weak client wishes to delegate an arbitrary quantum computation
to an untrusted quantum server in a privacy-preserving manner. Specifically, the two
main properties that need to be satisfied are correctness: after the interaction with the
quantum server, the weak client obtains the result of the desired quantum computation
and blindness: a malicious server learns no information about the client’s input, output
and possibly even the computation itself, irrespective of how he deviates from the
protocol specifications. For this reason the problem is also known as blind quantum
computing.
In the classical world, this task has been studied for decades. The problem of se-
cure delegation of computations was introduced by Feigenbaum in [Fei86], where we
consider that the client has an input x and would like to use the power of an untrusted
powerful server to obtain the outcome of a function f applied on his data x. To solve
this task, the client transforms x into another instance x′, while server computes f (x′)
and sends it back to client. The instance x′ must satisfy the following properties. The
client can efficiently compute f (x) from f (x′) while x′ does not reveal any informa-
tion about x to the server. It was shown that such a scheme can be constructed for the
discrete logarithm problem, but cannot be extended in a straightforward manner to a
general class of problems (for instance, the author conjectures there cannot exist this
type of encryption for the integer factoring problem). Secure delegated computation
was further studied by Abadi et al [AFK87]. The authors defined a general frame-
work for this problem called Generalised Encryption Scheme (GES), which can be
described at a high level as follows. Client and server interact for polynomially (in the
size of input) many rounds and at the end, the client applies a decryption function and
obtains the correct result f (x) with a probability which is inverse polynomially in the
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input size better than a random guess. These family of protocols are required to be
information-theoretically secure, such that the server would learn at most the size of
the input from the interaction with the client. Using this framework, they proved that
any problem must belong to a certain advice complexity class and furthermore they
showed that no NP−Hard problem can be securely delegated, unless the polynomial
hierarchy collapses at the third level. In our work, in Chapter 3, we will use this frame-
work to study the possibility of classical information-theoretically secure delegation of
quantum computations.
A very important step in the study of delegated computation is represented by the
introduction of homomorphic encryption (initially called privacy homomorphisms) in
the seminal work of [RAD78]. This is a type of encryption allowing for function eval-
uation on top of the encrypted input, without using the secret key, which results in an
encryption of the function evaluated on the plaintext. The homomorphic terminology
comes from the fact that the encryption and decryption functions act as algebraic ho-
momorphisms between the plaintext and ciphertext domains. Then, what the client
needs to do is to generate a pair of public and secret key and encrypt using the pub-
lic key her message x and send the encryption to the server. Then server will run the
evaluation procedure for this function f on top of the encrypted input. Finally, the
server sends the evaluation outcome to the client who decrypts the message using her
secret key and obtains the desired f (x). In the first stages, partially homomorphic
encryptions that could evaluate only one type of operations (such as addition or mul-
tiplication) were constructed. Then, the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme
(FHE), which allows for the evaluation of both additions and multiplications on top of
ciphertexts, and hence for arbitrary circuits, was developed in the breakthrough result
of Gentry [Gen09]. It is important to emphasize that the approaches of GES and FHE
differ in two main aspects: i) FHE is a non-interactive protocol (after one round of
communication, the client can obtain f (x)), while the GES allows for a polynomial (in
the input size) number of messages exchanged between the 2 parties, ii) while GES re-
quires information-theoretic security most of the FHE candidates are using only com-
putational security, meaning that the privacy against the server is based on hardness
assumptions (e.g. intractability of solving certain lattice problems).
The capabilities of the emerging quantum technologies, brought a raising interest in
studying the secure delegation of computations problem when the server owns a quan-
tum computer. On one hand, this brings the possibility of evaluating complex problems
in a shorter time on the server side. On the other hand, quantum computing, which
1.1. Secure Delegated Computing 5
equips attackers with unprecedented power, is changing the landscape of cryptogra-
phy, with the known devastating consequences: Shor’s quantum algorithm [Sho97],
for example, solves factorization and discrete logarithm efficiently, and hence breaks
the popular public-key cryptosystems based on them.
1.1.1 Semi-classical Client and Quantum Server
The problem of delegating quantum computations to an untrusted quantum server is
also known as blind quantum computing, where, as explained above, the blindness
refers to the privacy of the protocol, imposing that the server cannot infer anything
about client’s input, output and the underlying computation. Apart from the blindness,
other desired properties are: universality - the protocol allows the delegation of any ar-
bitrary quantum computation, efficient interaction - the client and server must interact
for at most a polynomial (in the input size) number of messages (that can be either clas-
sical or quantum). Moreover, the blindness condition can also have different flavours:
information-theoretic (or unconditional security) - the privacy of the input and com-
putation holds irrespective of the power of the adversary, computational - the privacy
holds only against quantum polynomial-time adversaries. As an additional property on
top of either of these two blindness notions, the security can be composable - referring
to the ability to use the delegated computation protocol in a secure manner as part of
a larger context (which can be as simple as running in parallel two instances of the
protocol).
The first-generation of blind quantum computation protocols are considering that
the client is also quantum, but usually has only a small quantum device that gives her
limited quantum capabilities, while the computation burden is still on server’s side.
The first proposal of a secure delegated quantum computation protocol was intro-
duced in [Chi05]. This construction can delegate universal quantum computations and
achieves unconditional security against the quantum server, but assumes the client has
a quantum memory (the capacity to store quantum states) and can apply a specific
subset of quantum gates. Additionally, the protocol requires bidirectional quantum
communication.
After this, there has been a large body of research exploiting the client-server set-
ting defined in [Chi05], in order to relax the quantum computation and communication
complexity of the client. In a following work of [AS03], the authors present a protocol
for unconditional secure delegation for a subset of quantum computations denoted as
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random verifiable functions (which are problems for which there exists an efficient al-
gorithm to produce random input-output pairs). This protocol also requires quite heavy
quantum abilities on client’s side: client must sent multi-qubit states to the server and
must be able to perform quantum measurements. The first proposal of a protocol that
achieved blind quantum computations for universal computations, under unconditional
security, while reducing significantly the quantum burden at a minimum for the client is
the Universal Blind Quantum Computation protocol (UBQC) [BFK09]. This protocol
is based on the measurement based quantum computation model [Joz05] and requires
no quantum memory for the client, but just assumes that she has the ability to prepare
and send single qubit states to the server in the first stage of the protocol, the rest of
the communication being classical. Using the same computational model and same
assumption for the client, the protocol proposed in [MF12] improves the efficiency of
the UBQC scheme. Subsequently, a different type of relaxation of the client’s quan-
tum requirements was considered in [MF13], where instead of preparing and sending
qubits, the client only needs to be able to measure the single qubit states sent by the
server.
The composable security of general delegated quantum computation protocols,
including the two previously mentioned protocols, was studied in [DFPR14] using
the Constructive Cryptography (also known as Abstract Cryptography) framework
[MR11], in order to analyse the security of this primitive in an arbitrary environ-
ment. The authors model the task of delegated quantum computation in a generic
fashion independent of protocol requirements, specifications and universality of com-
putations and provide a definition of blindness in the composable framework. More-
over, they show that the protocols of [BFK09] and [MF13] already satisfy the defi-
nition of composable blindness. In a following work in [MK13a], it is also studied
the composable security of the protocol of [MF13], showing that this construction
achieves a stronger notion of composable blindness. The efficiency of blind quan-
tum computation protocols in terms of quantum communication has been studied in
[MPDF13, GMMR13, PDF15], where these works also provide optimized blind quan-
tum computing schemes by using different encodings on the client side in order to
reduce the quantum communication. Delegated quantum computing has also been
analysed using different physical systems in [DKL11, Mor12, LDT+18] and using dif-
ferent quantum resources [MDK15]. Furthermore, given the relatively small quantum
requirements for the client, protocols such as the ones in [BFK09] and [MF12] re-
spectively, have also been experimentally realized in optics experiments in [BKB+12]
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and in [GRB+16] respectively. Additional different proposals towards minimising the
requirements on the client side from a quantum computation or communication per-
spective have been studied. In [Bro15a] a secure delegation quantum computing with
information-theoretic security (based on quantum one-time pad) is constructed which
requires quantum communication only for a subset of gates (non-Clifford gates) from
the quantum circuit representing the target quantum computation. Another approach
considered in [DK16], uses as a starting point the UBQC protocol [BFK09] and aims
at determining the least conditions needed to establish the required correlations be-
tween client and server in UBQC. Through a series of reductions they show using the
composable security framework [MR11], that composable blind quantum computation
can be achieved while only requiring the client to prepare and send two pure states,
with an arbitrarily high overlap. In the recent work of [Zha20], the author proposes
a construction in which the quantum communication is now independent of the size
of the computation and depends only (polynomially) on the security parameter (and
where the size of the quantum circuit the client has to perform, is also polynomial in
the security parameter). This property referred here as “succint” complexity for the
client is achieved in a protocol whose security is proven in the quantum random ora-
cle model. For more details on the topic of blind quantum computation we refer the
readers to the review of this field in [Fit17].
Given the extensive research focusing on the practicality aspect of quantum dele-
gated computation protocols (and related functionalities), another important direction
considered was reducing the required communications by exploiting classical fully-
homomorphic-encryption schemes [BJ15, DSS16], or by defining quantum fully ho-
momorphic encryptions (QFHE) as quantum analogues of the FHE [Lia15, OTF15,
TKO+16, TOR18, LC18]. In more details, [BJ15] presents a quantum homomorphic
encryption scheme with a quantum client, that is efficient for a class of quantum com-
putations (containing Clifford gates), but where the complexity of the decryption scales
with the number of non-Clifford gates. The security of this scheme is computational as
the construction relies on using as a sub-module a classical post-quantum secure FHE.
In a subsequent work of [DSS16], building on the ideas of [BJ15], the authors propose
an alternative quantum client QFHE with computational security (as it also relies on a
classical post-quantum FHE), that is efficient even for circuits with non-Clifford gates.
This comes at the cost of requiring the evaluation key (sent by client to the server) to
contain one quantum gadget per non-Clifford gate, where the size of the gadget scales
with the space complexity of the decryption function of the classical FHE primitive.
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On the other hand, there has also been a broad research on information-theoretic se-
cure QFHE. In [OTF15], using quantum error correction codes, it is constructed an
information-theoretic QFHE scheme for quantum circuits having only a constant num-
ber of non-Clifford gates and where the computational complexity is similar to [BJ15].
Alongside these positive results, limitations towards achieving information-theoretic
QFHE for universal quantum computations have also been proven. Specifically, the
work of [YPDF14] showed that achieving deterministic QFHE with perfect security
for an arbitrary quantum computation, would imply that the size of the encryption is
exponential in the input size, hence efficient deterministic QFHE cannot exist. This im-
possibility result was further strengthen in [LC18], where it was shown that the no-go
holds also for more general information-theoretic security (even when some security
error is allowed). On the positive side, the authors propose a QHE scheme for a non-
universal class of computations (known as IQP). Independently, through a different
proof technique based on quantum error correction codes this impossibility result was
also shown in [NS18].
However, in all these approaches, the users and providers do have access to quan-
tum resources to achieve their goals, in particular to quantum channels in addition to
classical communication channels. This requirement might prove to be challenging as
it allows the access for quantum cloud services only to users with suitable quantum
devices.
1.1.2 Fully-classical Client and Quantum Server
As all the families of schemes enumerated above require a reliable long-distance quan-
tum communication network, connecting all the interested parties remains a challeng-
ing task. Communication via quantum channels is typically assumed such that the
client can establish the necessary correlations with the server to securely delegate a
quantum computation. This has the downside that all these protocols cannot be put to
work for the average user unless a reliable quantum network is deployed. This lead to
the main open problem in the field of whether classical client secure delegated quantum
computation (CSDQC) can be achieved.
1.1.2.1 Information-Theoretic Security
Roughly speaking, a protocol is information-theoretic secure when its security holds
against an adversary with unlimited computational power. The reason is that this no-
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tion of security is based on the fundamental theorems of quantum physics instead of
difficult mathematical computations, which is the case for computational security.
Answering the question of whether information-theoretic secure delegation of quan-
tum computations from a fully classical client can be achieved has very non-trivial
consequences in complexity theory.
In the information-theoretic setting (where the leakage to the adversary is at most
the input size), the problem of CSDQC was first considered in [MK14]. The authors
showed a negative result for a particular class of protocols. Namely, they show that if
the protocol contains a single round of communication, where both the encryption and
decryption are deterministic algorithms, then the existence of such a scheme achiev-
ing correctness and perfect blindness would imply that BQP is included in NP. This
question has also been posed in [DK16], where it was suggested the use of the above
described classical Generalied Encryption Sheme (GES), in order to analyse the com-
plexity theoretic implications of this task. In Chapter 3 ([ACGK19]) we show that the
existence of general protocols achieving information-theoretic classical delegation is
unlikely, by presenting an oracle separation between BQP and the class of problems
that can be solved using a GES ([AFK87]).
While these results indicate restrictions on which of the above properties are jointly
achievable for classical clients, completing the picture of CSDQC remains an open
problem. In the light of these evidences, the natural direction would be exploring
the task of classical delegation under a weaker security notion, namely computational
security.
1.1.2.2 Computational Security
The above described results indicate restrictions on the task of classical secure delega-
tion of quantum computations in the information-theoretic secure setting. Therefore,
the expected path would be to consider fully-classical client solutions ensuring more
restricted levels of security.
The first procedure exploring the possibility of CSDQC was proposed in [MDMF17].
The authors introduce a protocol in the measurement based quantum computing (MBQC)
model, where the idea is to exploit the fact that in this computational model there can
exist different computations requiring the same classical communication and having
the same outcome. This property denoted as “flow ambiguity” results in some weaker
notion of blindness (not for universal computations), allowing to partially hide the de-
scription of the computation from the server.
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Until now the most promising solution for CSDQC is represented by protocols
offering post-quantum computational security (security against quantum polynomial-
time adversaries). These solutions can be categorized in two families: FHE-based
candidates and protocols relying on the remote state preparation primitive, and we will
describe both in details below.
1.1.2.2.1 FHE approach Following this path, classical client non-interactive blind
delegated computing can be achieved for universal quantum computations. In a recent
breakthrough of [Mah18], it was presented the first such classical client FHE proce-
dure for quantum computations achieving computational security against the remote
untrusted server. It was shown that solving this problem reduces to the server per-
forming a controlled-CNOT gate given a classical encryption of the control bit. Then,
this task can be achieved using a pair of post-quantum trapdoor claw-free functions
(pair of injective functions having the same image, which are easy to invert using some
secret key, but without this key it is hard even for a quantum computer to find a pair
of inputs - known as claw - mapped by the two functions to the same value) requir-
ing with some additional properties (e.g. the xor of the last bits of the elements of
each claw is equal to the aforementioned control bit). Additionally, in order for the
server to perform the quantum operations homomorphically, the classical encryption
(used for encrypting the control bit) is required to be “quantum capable”, meaning it
needs to be a homomorphic encryption with extra conditions (such as randomness re-
coverability and invariance of the ciphertext form). Finally, the author shows how all
these primitives can be realized, by giving a construction relying on a particular FHE
scheme. This classical FHE for quantum computations was later followed by the work
of [Bra18], where the construction achieved stronger security guarantee and relying on
more standard post-quantum cryptographic assumptions.
1.1.2.2.2 Remote State Preparation One of the central building blocks in remov-
ing the need for quantum communication in a delegated quantum computing proto-
col is secure remote state preparation (RSP). This notion was initially introduced in
[DKL11], in order to weaken the requirements on the client’s side in the UBQC pro-
tocol. More specifically, as the perfect generation of |+θ〉 := 1√2(|0〉+ e
iθ |1〉) states
is difficult from a practical point of view, they propose a single qubit preparation pro-
cedure where the client is using the polarization of weak coherent pulses sent over a
lossy quantum channel.
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At a high level, RSP resources allow a client to remotely prepare a quantum state on
the server and consequently, they can be seen as the natural toolbox to replace quantum
communication in a modular way. Moreover, from a security point of view, the RSP
resources appear to enable a large family of composable protocols [DKL11, DFPR14,
BFK09]. The importance of the classical RSP primitive used as a sub-module of larger
protocols, due to its role in replacing quantum channels, stems from their ability to
make quantum communication and computation protocols available to classical users,
in particular clients without quantum-capable infrastructure on their end.
Motivated by this practical constrain, we introduce the first protocol mimicking
this remote state preparation resource over a purely classical channel in Chapter 4
([CCKW18]) under the assumption that the Learning-With-Errors (LWE) problem is
computationally hard for quantum servers. This is a cryptographic primitive between
a fully classical client and a server owning a quantum computer. By the end of the pro-
tocol the client has “prepared” remotely on the server’s lab, a quantum state (typically
a single qubit |+θ〉). This protocol further enjoys some important privacy guarantees
with respect to the prepared state. Similar to the QFHE approaches of [Mah18] and
[Bra18], our independent work, is also achieving post-quantum computational secu-
rity, taking a different approach, more natural to measurement-based quantum com-
puting protocols. Then, it can be observed that classical secure delegation of quantum
computations can be obtained by combining for instance the UBQC protocol with
this remote state preparation primitive, whose purpose is to eliminate all the quantum
requirements of the client in the UBQC protocol. As a result, our solution for the
CSDQC problem is an interactive protocol, while the protocols of [Mah18], [Bra18]
are non-interactive. However, the approach we take is modular, while these construc-
tions, proved the desired properties in a monolithic way. Specifically, as mentioned
above, our RSP solution replaces the quantum channel (that is used in many different
protocol implementing blind quantum computation) with a computationally (but post-
quantum) secure generation of secret and random qubits (running between a classical
client and a quantum server). This can be used by classical clients to achieve blind
quantum computing but also, because of the modularity of the functionality, can be
used in a number of other applications or functionalities (such as multi-party quantum
computation [CCKM20]).
However, in [CCKW18] the security proof was shown in a weak “honest-but-
curious” model, and the full proof of security was left as an open question. In Chapter
5 ([CCKW19]) we manage to further simplify the classical RSP in terms of the core
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functionality (the set of produced states are the BB84 quantum states {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 :=
1/
√
2(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉 := 1/
√
2(|0〉− |1〉)}), while obtaining the security in the most
general adversarial setting (fully malicious adversary) at the module level. As before,
all our proofs are made using reductions to hardness assumptions (namely the LWE
problem), and the simplicity of the protocol indicates that it is possible to perform
an analysis of this module in a composable model such as Constructive Cryptography
(CC) [MR11]. Very importantly, in [BCC+20], it was proven that this classical RSP
called QFactory, when used as a subroutine of the UBQC protocol leads to classical
secure delegation of universal quantum computations.
Concurrently, [GV19] gave another protocol that offers the stronger notion of ver-
ifiable classical RSP (the basic primitive they derive is a verifiable version of the one
introduced in [CCKW18]) and proved the security of their primitive in the CC frame-
work. However, their security analysis relies on an assumption called “Measurement
Buffer” that forces the adversary to give the state that he is supposed to measure to the
simulator, enforcing (essentially) a trusted measurement. In more details, the Measure-
ment Buffer resource externalizes the measurement done by the distinguisher onto the
simulator. In practice, this allows the simulator to change the state on the distinguisher
side without letting him know. Intuitively, the Measurement Buffer recreates a quan-
tum channel between the simulator and the server: when the simulator is not testing
that the server is honest, the simulator replaces the state of the server with the quan-
tum state sent by the ideal resource. In addition to [GV19], in [CCKW19] we also
investigate the “abort” case of the protocol, which is related to the properties of the
functions required for the protocol implementation. Specifically, these properties can
only be achieved in a probabilistic fashion, causing the security of the protocol to fail
whenever the function properties are not satisfied. By completely avoiding the abort
scenario without changing the protocol, brings the downside of using less standard
security parameters for the LWE hardness against the server (as explained in [Bra18]).
Using the Constructive Cryptography framework [MR11] is a common approach
to analyze classical as well as quantum primitives and their composable security guar-
antees in general [DFPR14, DK16, MK13b].
Considering the importance of understanding the classical RSP primitive security
when composed in larger contexts, using the CC framework, we study in Chapter 6
([BCC+20]) the security loss incurred by using classical RSP as a sub-protocol in
quantum communication and computation protocols. One of the main results of this
work shows that any classical composable secure RSP will leak to the malicious server
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the classical description of the produced quantum state. Additionally, we also show
that some examples or RSP resources, such as verifiable RSP, are impossible to achieve
using a reduction to the no-cloning theorem. This no-go result does not contradict
the result of [GV19], but what our result shows is that it is impossible to realize this
Measurement Buffer resource with a protocol interacting purely classically.
Recently, our classical RSP [CCKW19] was also used as a sub-module by [Zha20]
to design a blind quantum computing scheme with a succinct quantum client.
In conclusion, all current solutions for classical RSP can replace the quantum chan-
nel in secure delegated quantum computing protocols (such as UBQC), but come at the
cost of going from information-theoretic security using quantum communication to
post-quantum computational security (and classical communication) via the described
modules. The ultimate vision would be to develop a hybrid network of classical and
quantum communication channels, depending on the desired security level and the
technology development of quantum devices [WEH18].
The present dissertation deals with the problem of classical secure delegation of
quantum computations (CSDQC). To briefly summarize the story of the thesis, we
take the following path:
• We first investigate the possibility of information-theoretic secure CSDQC and
provide complexity theoretic evidence that this is implausible to achieve;
• Next, we study this task under a weaker security notion, namely post-quantum
computational security. As a first step we provide a solution which is secure only
in the honest-but-curious security framework.
• Following, we present an improved solution which ensures security in the mali-
cious framework against the adversarial quantum server.
• Finally, we analyze the composability property of our solutions when used as
sub-protocols.
We expand more these contributions in the following section.
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1.2 Contributions
1.2.1 Information-Theoretic Secure CSDQC
In the first part of the thesis we study classical delegation of quantum computations
when the security guarantees that the quantum server learns nothing apart from the
size of the computation, in an information-theoretic sense, problem denoted as ITS-
CDQC. We perform this analysis using the Generalised Encryption Scheme (GES)
framework of Abadi et al [AFK87]. This framework gives a complexity theoretic char-
acterization of the class of problems that can be securely delegated, which allows us to
investigate the possibility of ITS-CDQC by analyzing whether quantum polynomial-
time computations can belong to this complexity class. We show that, provided certain
complexity-theoretic conjectures are true, the power of ITS-CDQC is impossible to
achieve.
Firstly, by considering that the interaction between client and server is bounded by
a polynomial of fixed degree, we present an oracle relative to which a classical client is
not able to information-theoretically secure delegate universal quantum decision prob-
lems. Specifically, if the client and the server exchange O(nd) bits of communication,
this would imply that the class of problems that a quantum computer can solve in poly-
nomial time (BQP) would be included in the advice complexity class MA/O(nd). We
provide evidence that this containment is unlikely by proving that there exists an ora-
cle relative to which BQP 6⊂MA/O(nd). The construction of the oracle providing this
separation is based on the complement of Simon’s problem and uses a diagonalisation
argument. Our proof is incremental, we first show how to construct an oracle separat-
ing BQP and NP, following by a separation between BQP and MA. Next, we advance
to the advice classes setting. We initially show how to construct an oracle relative to
which BQP is not included in the class of problems that can be solved by deterministic
polynomial-time algorithms receiving a bounded polynomial of advice, P/O(nd). Fi-
nally, through a reduction to this separation, we show that for any degree d there exists
an oracle with respect to which BQP is not a subset of MA/O(nd).
Secondly, we show that if an ITS-CDQC protocol exists which allows the client to
delegate quantum sampling problems, then there would exist circuits for computing the
permanent of a matrix more efficiently than what is believed to be possible given the
state of art for the complexity of solving the matrix permanent. Specifically, we prove
that if the Boson Sampling problem can be delegated using an ITS-CDQC protocol,
then there would exist circuits of size 2n−Ω(n/log(n)) making polynomially-sized queries
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to an NPNP oracle that can compute the permanent of an n×n matrix whose elements
are in the set {−1,0,1}.
1.2.2 Computationally Secure CDQC against honest-but-curious
server
In the second part we introduce the classical client remote state preparation primi-
tive where a fully classical client can instruct the preparation of a sequence of random
qubits at some distant party, i.e. untrusted quantum server. Their classical description
is (computationally) unknown to any other party (including the distant party prepar-
ing them) but known to the client. We emphasize the crucial feature that no quantum
communication is required to implement it. This primitive enables classical clients
to participate in a wide range of quantum communication and computation protocols
with only a public classical channel between the classical clients and the quantum
server. A key such example is the delegated universal blind quantum computing prob-
lem, for example using our functionality one could achieve a purely classical-client
computationally-secure delegated universal quantum computing.
We give a concrete protocol (HBC−QFactory) implementing classical client re-
mote state preparation, relying on the cryptographic primitive of trapdoor one-way
function with certain additional properties (quantum-safe, two-regular, collision-resistant).
The produced output states belong to the set {|+θ〉 |θ ∈ {0,π/4, · · · ,7π/4}}.
We then prove the security of HBC−QFactory in the Honest-But-Curious setting,
which is a security model assuming that the malicious server needs to follow the proto-
col specifications, but he can use his classical information obtained from the protocol,
in order to obtain any advantage in guessing the classical description of the quantum
output 1. Concretely, given that the produced state is of the form |+θ〉, the secret is
represented by the classical description of this state, θ, which is unknown to the server,
but known to the client using the trapdoor information. To show the security we prove
that the classical description is a hardcore function and we show this by developing a
similar reduction to the Goldreich-Levin Theorem.
Moreover, we provide methods for obtaining the required trapdoor functions from
weaker assumptions: trapdoor permutation functions or homomorphic trapdoor func-
tions. Then, to complete the construction of HBC−QFactory, we present a family of
1Stronger notions of honest-but-curious in the quantum setting have been defined, such as the ones
in [DNS10, SSS09].
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functions relying on the LWE problem.
Finally, we give a proof-of-principle implementation of HBC−QFactory using the
IBM quantum computer (IBM Quantum Experience). This experiment is completed
using a toy trapdoor function, as due to the limited number of available qubits, we
consider a simple function which cannot be post-quantum secure.
1.2.3 Computationally Secure CDQC against malicious server
After introducing the classical client remote state preparation primitive, in the third
part we define a simpler (basic) primitive consisting of only BB84 states, and give
a protocol called Malicious 4-states QFactory that implements this primitive and that
is secure against the strongest possible adversary (an arbitrarily deviating malicious
server).
The construction of Malicious 4-states QFactory relies on the following crypto-
graphic primitives: quantum-safe, two-regular, collision resistant trapdoor one-way
function and homomorphic hardcore predicate. The security of the protocol ensures
that the basis of the generated qubits are completely hidden from any adversary and is
based on the properties of the two families of functions.
The specific functions used are constructed based on known trapdoor one-way
functions, resulting in the security of our basic primitive being reduced to the hard-
ness of the Learning-With-Errors problem.
We then give a number of extensions of the Malicious 4-states QFactory protocol,
demonstrating its modular construction. Firstly, we show an efficient secure exten-
sion to a classical client remote state preparation producing the 8 states {|+θ〉}θ. The
security of this construction refers to the fact that the basis of the produced state is
completely hidden. Finally, we give proper consideration of the abort case occurring
when the properties of the trapdoor one-way functions are not satisfied.
1.2.4 Composable Security of CDQC
As indicated by the previous two protocols, remote state preparation realized using
only a classical channel is one of the promising candidates to eliminate the need for
quantum channels in several quantum communication and computation protocols. This
primitive allows to rely solely on classical channels between client and server and
yet benefit from its quantum capabilities while retaining privacy, because it enables
a client, using only classical communication resources, to remotely prepare a quan-
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tum state. In the fourth part, we analyze the security when employing classical-client
remote state preparation (RSPCC) as a sub-module in any protocol to avoid quantum
channels. In this part, we investigate this question using the Constructive Cryptogra-
phy framework [MR11] and we discover the security limitations of using RSPCC as a
general sub-module but also in the context of classical delegation of quantum compu-
tations, when used inside the UBQC protocol.
Firstly, we prove a limitation specific to any composable classical client RSP,
which stems from the following relation. If an RSP resource is realized by a RSPCC
protocol with security against QPT distinguishers, then the resource will leak an en-
coded, but complete description of the underlying produced state. This connection be-
tween the composability of RSPCC (computational notion) and the statistical leakage of
the ideal resource it is achieving (an information-theoretic notion) allows us to show
that some desirable RSP resources are impossible to classically realize. Concretely,
we show that if some specific verifiable RSP resource is computationally secure im-
plementable then this would imply the existence of a quantum cloner.
Secondly, despite these security limitations, we might still be able to use a clas-
sical client RSP protocol as a sub-module in other specific protocol and expect the
combined protocol as a whole to be composable secure. In this direction, we study
the composable security of UBQCCC, the family of protocols where an RSPCC is used
for replacing the quantum channel required for the UBQC protocol, hence enabling
fully classical clients. We prove that UBQCCC cannot be composable (even against
QPT distinguishers) and to show this impossibility result we proceed in the following
manner. Using a proof by contradiction we first show this task reduces to the existence
of a composable single-qubit UBQCCC protocol (where the computation is described
by a single qubit in the MBQC model). Then, we prove that the single-qubit UBQC
resource can be turned into an RSP resource, which allows us to use the characteriza-
tion we developed for RSP protocols. Finally, we show that the existence of such an
RSP resource would violate the no-signalling principle.
1.3 Outline
In Chapter 2 we present the required definitions from quantum computing, complexity
theory, security frameworks and cryptographic tools that we will use throughout the
dissertation. Chapter 3 introduces the notions of information-theoretic secure classical
delegation of quantum computations and the Generalised Encryption Scheme frame-
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work. We present evidence for the no-go of this task in the case of decision problems
in Chapter 3.1 and for sampling problems in Chapter 3.2.
In Chapter 4 we introduce the primitive remote state preparation constructed us-
ing a classical channel and we describe the protocol HBC−QFactory achieving this,
whose security is proven in the honest-but-curious model through a Goldreich-Levin
type of reduction in Chapter 4.4, assuming a certain family of post-quantum trapdoor
one-way functions exist. Then we construct such a family of functions based on the
Learning-With-Errors problem in Chapter 4.5 and finally we also present an imple-
mentation of this protocol using a toy function on the IBM quantum cloud service in
Chapter 4.6.
Next, in Chapter 5 we present our protocol Malicious QFactory for classical client
remote state preparation with enhanced security against any malicious server. The
standard protocol is presented in Chapter 5.2 and similarly, the required underlying
function construction is described Chapter 5.3. Additionally, the extension to a larger
set of produced states is given in Chapter 5.4 and finally a complete analysis of the
abort of the protocol caused by the probabilistic nature of the function properties re-
quired for the protocol construction is shown in Chapter 5.5.
In Chapter 6, we provide the characterization of classical-client remote state prepa-
ration resources through the lens of composable security framework. In Chapter 6.2
we show the impossibility of classically realizing remote state preparation, while in
Chapter 6.3 we also prove that even in the context when a classical-client remote state
preparation protocol is used to replace the quantum channel in a delegated quantum
computation protocol, the result cannot be composable secure.





We begin by introducing some quantum computing notions required for the under-
standing of our main results. For a more thorough description we recommend [NC00].
The central unit of quantum information and computation is the qubit, the quantum
analogue of a classical bit. As classical bits can take 2 possible values, 0 or 1, the
qubit analogous are the states |0〉 and |1〉. However, the qubit is more general, with the
crucial difference is that a qubit can also act as if it is in the |0〉 and |1〉 states at the
same time, more specifically as a linear combination of them. We can get a better intu-
ition by considering the physical representation of a qubit: for a particle, its spin state
can be aligned up (corresponding to state |1〉), down (corresponding to state |0〉) or be
arbitrarily aligned, in between these 2 states (a linear combination of the up and down
states). Therefore, a qubit, which we denote here as the state |ψ〉, can be expressed as:
|ψ〉 = a |0〉+ b |1〉, where the coefficients a,b ∈ C satisfy |a|2 + |b|2 = 1 and are also
known as amplitudes of the qubit |ψ〉.
Mathematically, we say that |ψ〉 is a vector in a complex Hilbert Space H of dimension































Moreover, |0〉 and |1〉 form an orthonormal basis, known as the computational ba-
sis. Another examples of basis are the Hadamard basis described by the 2 quan-









rotated Hadamard basis {|+θ〉 , |−θ〉}, where |+θ〉 = 1√2 |0〉+
1√
2
eiθ |1〉 and |−θ〉 =
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eiθ |1〉, and θ is an angle in [0,2π].
The evolution of quantum states can be described using unitary operators. An operator
U is called unitary if and only if UU† = I, where U† represents the hermitian conjugate
of U and I denotes the identity matrix.
In order to describe quantum systems containing more than 1 qubit we use tensor prod-
uct as a way to join multiple vector spaces. For instance if we have a composite system
consisting of 2 single-qubit components |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉, we denote the 2-qubit system
as: |ψ〉= |ψ1〉⊗ |ψ2〉. We will call |ψ〉 a product state.
However, not all composite quantum states can be represented as tensor products of
quantum states. In those cases, we say the quantum state is entangled. One such ex-
ample of state is the GHZ state: 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉).
In order to extract classical information from the quantum states we need to perform
quantum measurements. The result of a quantum measurement is fundamentally ran-
dom and to describe a measurement we use a collection measurement operators
{M1, ...,Mm} each corresponding to a possible measurement result m. If the quantum
system is described by the state |ψ〉, then by performing a quantum measurement, the
probability of each outcome m, denoted by p(m) is equal to: p(m)〈ψ|M†mMm |ψ〉. If
the measurement outcome was equal to m then after the measurement the state of the
system becomes 1√
p(m)
Mm |ψ〉. In order to ensure that the sum of the probabilities of
all measurement results is equal to 1, the measurements operator satisfy the complete-
ness condition: ∑m M†mMm = I.
An important class of quantum measurements are called projective measurements. In
this case the measurement operators satisfy the following 2 conditions: Mm are hermi-
tian (M†m = Mm) and MiM j = δi, jMi. For the examples the measurements described by
the sets of operators {|0〉〈0| , |1〉〈1|}, or {|+〉〈+| , |−〉〈−|} or {|+θ〉〈+θ| , |−θ〉〈−θ|} are
all projective measurements.
Another representation of quantum states can be done using density matrices. We say
a matrix ρ is a density matrix if it satisfies the following: Tr(ρ) = 1, it is hermitian
and positive semi-definite. Therefore, if the quantum system is in the state |ψ〉, then
we can represent it as the density operator ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|.
Until now, we have assumed that the state of a quantum system is always known to be
in some state |ψ〉. In this case, we say the system is in a pure state. If the state of the
system is however unknown, we say the system is in a mixed state. Specifically, if our
quantum state can be one of the states |ψi〉, each with probability pi, then these form
an ensemble of pure states {pi, |ψi〉}i and more importantly, we can represent the state
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of the quantum system as the density operator: ρ = ∑i pi |ψi〉〈ψi|.
Now using the density operator representation, we can also describe the before-mentioned
state transformations. Namely, for quantum measurements described by a collection
{Mi}i, the probability to obtain outcome m is p(m) = Tr(M†mMmρ) and the state af-
ter obtaining result m becomes 1p(m)MmρM
†
m. And the unitary evolution is defined as:
UρU†. However unitaries are not the most general way a quantum state can evolve.
The most general family of transformations that can be applied to density operators are
called CPTP maps (completely positive and trace preserving). We say a transformation
Φ is a CPTP map if it acts on a state ρ as: Φ(ρ) = ∑i KiρK
†
i , such that ∑i KiK
†
i = I. The
linear operators Ki are known as Kraus operators. Using the density operator repre-
sentation we can also describe the state of a subsystem of a composite state. Namely, if
we have a system composing of 2 components denoted as ρAB, then the first subsystem
can be described as ρA = TrB(ρAB) and the second subsystem as ρB = TrA(ρAB), where
TrB and TrA denote the partial trace over the second and respectively first component.
When studying the states of different quantum systems, in quantum cryptography we
would like to analyze how far one state is from the other one, or how easy is to distin-
guish one quantum state from the other. To quantify how distinct two quantum states
are we use the trace distance, which can be thought as a generalization of the total
variation distance.The total variation distance between 2 probability distributions D∞














The trace distance can also be interpreted as the maximum probability to distinguish
between ρ1 and ρ2. Another useful measure of distance between 2 states ρ1 and ρ2
is called fidelity. When ρ2 is a pure state ρ2 = |ψ2〉〈ψ2|, the fidelity is defined as:
F(ρ1, |ψ2〉〈ψ2|) = 〈ψ2|ρ1 |ψ2〉.
In order to describe quantum computations we use the quantum circuit model,
the quantum analogue of the classical circuit model. This model defines a mecha-
nism to implement any possible quantum computation and specifically defines quan-
tum gates that allow us to obtain quantum circuits manipulating quantum states. The






























, the 2-qubit CNOT gate: CNOT (|x〉⊗ |y〉) = |x〉⊗ |x⊕ y〉.
Additionally, we can also define a quantum transformation based on a classical func-
tion.
Definition 2.1.1 (Function Unitary). For any function f : A→ B that can be described
by a polynomially-sized classical circuit, we define the controlled-unitary U f , as acting
in the following way:
U f |x〉 |y〉= |x〉 |y⊕ f (x)〉 ∀ x ∈ A ∀ y ∈ B, (2.3)
where we name the first register |x〉 control and the second register |y〉 target. Given
the classical description of this function f , we can always define a QPT algorithm that
efficiently implements U f .
Definition 2.1.2 (Quantum Instrument). A map Λ : Cn×n→{0,1}m1×Cm2×m2 is said
to be a quantum instrument if there exists a collection {Ey}y∈{0,1}m1 of trace-non-
increasing completely positive maps such that the sum is trace-preserving (i.e. for




Pr [Λ(ρ) = (y,ρy)] = Tr(Ey(ρ)).
2.2 Complexity Theory Background
In this section we cover some necessary background in Complexity Theory, essential
for the understanding of the Chapter 3. For extended details, see [AB09, BDG12,
BDG90].
We proceed by defining the complexity classes, both classical and quantum, which are
going to be encountered in this thesis.
• P is the class of problems which can be solved efficiently in polynomial time by
a deterministic Turing Machine [AB09]. We say that a language L belongs to the
class P if we can build a deterministic Turing Machine M running in polynomial
time, such that:
– for every x ∈ L, M accepts x (returns 1)
– for every x 6∈ L, M rejects x (returns 0).
2.2. Complexity Theory Background 23
• NP is the class of problems which can be computed in polynomial time by a
nondeterministic Turing Machine [AB09]. Every NP algorithm has 2 stages:
the first in which he makes a guess for the result of the problem and the second
where he verifies in polynomial time if the guess was a correct answer. A useful
way to describe the behaviour of any NP algorithm is by looking at its compu-
tational tree [BDG12]. The computational tree indicates how does the algorithm
work given a specific input x to the problem. The initial configuration of the Tur-
ing Machine on the input x represents the root of the tree. Every internal node
corresponds to a computation performed by the algorithm and the children of the
node are the possible configurations which can be obtained in one computational
step. For each nonterminal node, the choice for the next computation is made in
a nondeterministic way. In a decision problem, the leaves of the computational
tree are either accepting or rejecting states. Then, we say that a string s is ac-
cepted by the language defined in the decision problem, if in the computational
tree generated for s there exists at least one path ending in an accepting state. On
the other hand, a string s is rejected if all possible paths of the tree end in a reject
state. A decision problem G belongs to the class coNP, if the complement of G,
obtained by switching the accepting answers with the rejecting answers and vice
versa, is in the NP class. In this way, we have that a string x is accepted if every
path of the computational tree ends in an accepting state and is rejected if there
exists one path ending in a rejecting state.
Another definition for the class NP, which is going to be used in Chapter 3 is the
following:
A language L is in NP if there exists a polynomial-time TM V and a polynomial
p such that for every x ∈ {0,1}∗, we have:
x ∈ L if and only if ∃ a witness w ∈ {0,1}p(|x|) such that M(x,w) = 1
Observation: The class of NP Turing Machines is countable.
• The BPP class (Bounded-error Probabilistic Polynomial Time) contains the prob-
lems which can be solved by probabilistic Turing Machines in polynomial time,
with the probability of giving a wrong answer being less than 1/3. We say a lan-
guage L is in the BPP class if we can construct a probabilistic Turing Machine
M running in polynomial time such that:
– If x ∈ L, then M accepts x with probability p≥ 2/3;
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– If x 6∈ L, then M accepts x with probability p≤ 1/3;
Notice that the choice of the constant 1/3 is arbitrary. In general, the error can
be as high as 12 − 1nc , for any positive constant c.
• The MA class (Merlin-Arthur) contains the problems that can be solved in poly-
nomial time by Merlin-Arthur protocols. These are protocols where Merlin who
is computationally unbounded sends to Arthur a polynomial-sized proof, while
Arthur must verify this proof by running a probabilistic polynomial-time com-
putation. We say a language L is in MA if there exists a polynomial time TM and
a polynomial p such that:
– If x∈ L, then there exists a witness w∈{0,1}p(|x|) such that M(x,w) accepts
with probability at least 2/3
– If x 6∈ L, then for all witnesses w ∈ {0,1}p(|x|), M(x,w) accepts with prob-
ability at most 1/3.
• The BQP class (Bounded-error Quantum Polynomial Time) is the quantum equiv-
alent of the BPP class. BQP consists of the problems which can be solved in
polynomial time by Quantum Turing Machines with the probability of giving a
wrong answer being less than 1/3 [NC00, Aar10]. We can prove that a decision
problem G belongs to BQP by showing that there exists a quantum circuit of
polynomial size (as defined in the quantum circuit model) that can solve G with
bounded-error.
Additionally, BQP is closed under complement, meaning that the complement of
any problem in BQP also belongs to the class BQP.
A very important problem belonging to the class BQP which we will make use of
in our work is the Simon’s problem.
The input of Simon’s problem is a function from n-bit strings to n-bit strings f , to
which we only have “black-box” access (meaning that we cannot see the description
of the function and we are only allowed to query it on elements of the domain and
receive the value of the function on those points).
The input function f : {0,1}n→{0,1}n is guaranteed to satisfy one of the following 2
properties:
1. f is 1-to-1: f is a permutation of the set {0,1}n.
2.2. Complexity Theory Background 25
2. f is 2-to-1: ∃s∈{0,1}n−{0} such that ∀x 6= x′ we have: f (x)= f (x′) if and only if x′=
x⊕ s. We call s the xor mask of f .
The task of the problem is to determine whether the input f is 1-to-1 or 2-to-1.
To solve this problem, the optimal classical algorithm uses O(2
n
2 ) queries.
However, quantumly we can solve Simon’s problem using O(n) queries using Simon’s
algorithm [Sim97]. Therefore, both Simon’s problem and its complement belong to
the class BQP.
Decision Problems versus Sampling Problems. All the complexity classes de-
scribed above refer to decision problems - problems in which the answer is either
“yes” or “no” depending on whether an input x belongs or not to a language L. In this
thesis, we also focus on sampling problems problems in which the answer is a sample
from particular probability distribution. Specifically, we define a sampling problem S
as a set of probability distributions {Dx}x each corresponding to an input x, such that
each Dx is a probability distribution over {0,1}p(|x|), for some polynomial p. Solving
the sampling problem S essentially means that when receiving the input x, the task is
to sample from the distribution Dx, whereas solving S approximately means sampling
from a distribution D ′x, such that ||D ′x−Dx|| ≤ 1q(|x|) , for some polynomial q. There-
fore, we can define SampBQP as the class of sampling problems for which there exists
a quantum polynomial time algorithm that given as input a tuple (x,ε) will output a
sample from a probability distribution D ′x satisfying ||D ′x−Dx|| ≤ ε. Such an example
of SampBQP problem that we will encounter later in our work is the Boson Sampling
problem.
Another class of problems which we will use in our work, is #P. This is neither a
decision nor a sampling class, but is the class of all functions f : {0,1}∗ → N that
take as input a description of a P algorithm and output the number of inputs which the
algorithm can accept.
Now, we need to focus on 2 particular categories of problems: problems which can
be solved by Turing Machines which receive an additional “help” called advice and
problems which can be solved by Turing Machines which have access to an oracle
that can correctly answer to particular questions. We are going to give a thorough
description of these two models of computation as they are directly connected with
our major results in Chapter 3.
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2.2.1 Advice Turing Machines
An advice function can be thought of as any function f : N→ Σ∗. Turing Machines
with an advice function f receive an additional help to solve problems, in the form of
an advice string f (n). The most important aspect of the advice function is that this
external information does not depend on the value of the input for a problem, but only
on the input size n:
That is, for a given input x, the received advice is f (|x|)
Definition 2.2.1. The class C/F of languages recognized by Turing Machines with
advice is the set of languages L associated with a language C from C together with an
advice function f from F such that:
A = {x ∈ Σ∗ | the pair (x, f (|x|)) ∈C,C ∈ C , f ∈ F } (2.4)
Intuitively, we say that there exists a function f from F , which gives the necessary
additional information to a machine from the class C in order to accept a more difficult
language belonging to the class C/F .
We will now indicate some commonly known classes of advice languages and their
interpretation:
1. F = log represents the set of functions f satisfying the property:
∀ n ∈ N ∃ c ∈ N such that | f (n)| ≤ c · log(n). We define P/ log as the class of
languages:
L = {x |(x, f (|x|)) ∈ A,A ∈ P, f ∈ log} (2.5)
We say that for any language L∈ P/ log we can determine if a string x belongs to
L by using a deterministic polynomial time algorithm with the help of an external
information s, where |s|= log(|x|).
2. F = poly represents the family of functions f satisfying the property:
∀ n,∃ p a polynomial such that | f (n)| ≤ p(n). We define P/poly as the class of
languages L = {x |(x, f (|x|)) ∈ A,A ∈ P, f ∈ poly}.
3. NP/poly is represented by the set of languages:
L = {x |(x, f (|x|)) ∈ A,A ∈ NP, f ∈ poly} (2.6)
Advice Turing Machines are known as non-uniform models, where we have a differ-
ent algorithm for every possible size of the input, as opposed to the standard Turing
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Machines known as uniform models where the same algorithm is used for all possible
input lengths.
Another family of non-uniform models are Boolean circuits. A Boolean circuit
computes a binary function by sequentially applying logical gates AND, OR, NOT on
a given input.
We say a language L has polynomial circuits if there exists a family of circuits {Cn}n
and a polynomial p such that:
1. The number of gates in the circuit is bounded by p: |Cm| ≤ p(m)
2. For any x ∈ {0,1}m Cm receives m input bits and returns 1 if x ∈ L and 0 other-
wise.
The connection between Advice TM and Boolean circuits can be described in the fol-
lowing way. We say that a Boolean circuit family {Cn}n is f -size bounded if the
number of gates of Cn is at most f (n) for any n. And we will denote by Size( f (n)) the
class of languages decided by O( f (n))-size bounded Boolean circuit family.
Then, the class P/poly of determininstic TM that receive polynomial size advice, can
also be described as: P/poly = ∪d≥1Size(nd). In other words, we say a language L
belongs to P/poly if it can be solved by a polynomially-sized Boolean circuit family.
2.2.2 Oracle Turing Machines
Definition 2.2.2. An oracle TM is a machine with access to an oracle that can decide
if a string is in a language O⊆ Σ∗.
In addition to the standard TM, an oracle TM has an oracle tape which can be used
to query for an extra input and the machine will receive in a single computational step
an answer specifying whether that input belongs to the language O or not.
Any standard TM can be considered an oracle TM by setting the empty set /0 as the
oracle’s language.
For any oracle machine MO we are able to describe its computational tree in the
following way. Let MO run on input m. Then, we set the configuration of MO on input
m as the root of the computational tree. Next, every inner node of the tree represents a
query made by MO to the oracle O. For every such node we have 2 branches defining
2 different sets of computations which MO might perform depending on the result of
the query. Namely, if the queried string belongs to the language O, then we proceed to
the computations specified in the left branch, otherwise to the computations indicated
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by the right branch. In the nodes where no more queries are made (the leaves of the
tree), MO will take a decision, if it is an accepting state or not.
Now, we define the language L corresponding to the oracle O. For each input, we
will obtain a single path π in the computation tree starting from the root and ending in
an accept or reject node. For every node i the path goes to its left child if the string
labelled at node i is inside the language L and goes to its right child otherwise. Finally,
we conclude that the initial input m is in the language accepted by the oracle TM MO
if this resulting path π terminates in an accepting state.
Now, we will present 2 very important advice classes which we will also make use of
in Chapter 3.
Definition 2.2.3. We define PO as the set of problems which can be solved by a deter-
ministic polynomial-time TM which has access to the oracle O.
Similarly, we define NPO as the set of problems solved by a nondeterministic polynomial-
time TM with access to the oracle O.
Whenever O is a language which cannot be decided by M, the oracle adds more
computational power to M. For instance, the PSAT represents the set of problems solved
by a deterministic TM which also has access to an oracle capable of solving the SAT
problem. This oracle will obviously help compute more functions.
Using oracles we can also define the polynomial hierarchy (PH). We define the 0th level
of the polynomial hierarchy as: ΣP0 =P and Π
P
0 = P. we can define recursively the next
levels of PH, in the following way: the kth level can be computed as ΣPk = NP
ΣPk−1 and
ΠPk = coNP
ΣPk−1 . And the PH is defined as: PH = ∪k≥0ΣPk . Additionally, we say the
PH collapses at the level k if ΣPk = Π
P
k .
A very important role of oracle classes, is that they allows us to identify relations
between different complexity classes. Therefore, proving separations between classes
of problem with respect to a given fixed oracle represents a strong evidence that those
separations would also hold in the lack of the oracle.
2.3 Cryptographic Primitives
In this section, we are considering cryptographic primitives secure against quantum
adversaries, so we assume that all the properties of our functions hold for a general
Quantum Polynomial Time (QPT) adversary, rather than the usual Probabilistic Poly-
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nomial Time (PPT) one. We will denote D the domain of the functions, while D(n) is
the subset of strings of length n.
Definition 2.3.1 (Quantum-Safe (informal)). A protocol or a function is quantum-safe
(also known as post-quantum secure), if all its properties remain valid when the ad-
versaries are QPT (instead of PPT).
The following definitions are for PPT adversaries, however in this paper we will gen-
erally use quantum-safe versions of those definitions and thus security is guaranteed
against QPT adversaries.
Definition 2.3.2 (One-way). A family of functions { fk : D→ R}k∈K is one-way if:
• There exists a PPT algorithm that can compute fk(x) for any index function k,
outcome of the PPT parameter-generation algorithm Gen and any input x ∈ D;






[ f (A(k, fk(x)) = f (x)]≤ negl (n)
where rc represents the randomness used by A
Definition 2.3.3 (Second preimage resistant). A family of functions { fk : D→ R}k∈K
is second preimage resistant if:
• There exists a PPT algorithm that can compute fk(x) for any index function k,
outcome of the PPT parameter-generation algorithm Gen and any input x ∈ D;
• For any PPT algorithm A , given an input x, it can find a different input x′ such





[A(k,x) = x′such that x 6= x′ and fk(x) = fk(x′)]≤ negl (n)
where rc is the randomness of A;
Definition 2.3.4 (Collision resistant). A family of functions { fk : D→ R}k∈K is colli-
sion resistant if:
• There exists a PPT algorithm that can compute fk(x) for any index function k,
outcome of the PPT parameter-generation algorithm Gen and any input x ∈ D;
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• Any PPT algorithm A can find two inputs x 6= x′ such that fk(x) = fk(x′) with at




[A(k) = (x,x′)such that x 6= x′ and fk(x) = fk(x′)]≤ negl (n)
where rc is the randomness of A (rc will be omitted from now).
Theorem 2.3.5. [KL14] Any function that is collision resistant is also second preimage
resistant.
Definition 2.3.6 (k-regular). A deterministic function f : D→ R is k-regular if ∀y ∈
Im( f ), we have | f−1(y)|= k.
Definition 2.3.7 (Trapdoor Function). A family of functions { fk : D→ R} is a trapdoor
function if:
• There exists a PPT algorithm Gen which on input 1n outputs (k, tk), where k
represents the index of the function;
• { fk : D→ R}k∈K is a family of one-way functions;
• There exists a PPT algorithm Inv, which on input tk (which is called the trap-
door information) output by Gen(1n) and y = fk(x) can invert y (by returning all
preimages of y1) with non-negligible probability over the choice of (k, tk) and
uniform choice of x.
Definition 2.3.8 (Hard-core Predicate). A function hc : D→{0,1} is a hard-core pred-
icate for a function f if:
• There exists a QPT algorithm that for any input x can compute hc(x);





[A( f (x),1n) = hc(x)] ≤ 12 +negl (n), where rc represents the random-
ness used by A;
Definition 2.3.9 (Hard-core Function). A function h : D→ E is a hard-core function
for a function f if:
1While in the standard definition of trapdoor functions it suffices for the inversion algorithm Inv to
return one of the preimages of any output of the function, in our case we require a two-regular tradpdoor
function where the inversion procedure returns both preimages for any function output.
2.4. Learning-With-Errors 31
• There exists a QPT algorithm that can compute h(x) for any input x
• For any PPT algorithm A when given f (x), A can distinguish between h(x) and
a uniformly distributed element in E with at most negligible probability:
∣∣ Pr
x←D(n)
[A( f (x),h(x)) = 1]− Pr
x←D(n)
r←E(|h(x)|)
[A( f (x),r) = 1]
∣∣≤ negl (n)
The intuition behind this definition is that as far as a QPT adversary is concerned,
the hard-core function appears indistinguishable from a randomly chosen element of
the same length.
Theorem 2.3.10 (Goldreich-Levin [GL89]). From any one-way function f : D→R, we
can construct another one-way function g : D×D→ R×D and a hard-core predicate
for g. If f is a one-way function, then:
• g(x,r) = ( f (x),r) is a one-way function, where |x|= |r|.
• hc(x,r) = 〈x,r〉 mod 2 is a hard-core predicate for g
Informally, the Goldreich-Levin theorem is proving that when f is a one-way func-
tion, then f (x) is hiding the xor of a random subset of bits of x from any PPT adver-
sary2.
Theorem 2.3.11 (Vazirani-Vazirani XOR-Condition Theorem [VV85]). Function h is
hard-core function for f if and only if the xor of any non-empty subset of h’s bits is a
hard-core predicate for f .
2.4 Learning-With-Errors
The Learning-With-Errors problem (LWE) is described in the following way:
Definition 2.4.1 (LWE problem (informal)). Given s, an n dimensional vector with
elements in Zq, for some modulus q, the task is to distinguish between a set of poly-
nomially many noisy random linear combinations of the elements of s and a set of
polynomially many random numbers from Zq.
2The Goldreich-Levin proof is using a reduction from breaking the hard-core predicate hc(x,r) to
breaking the one-wayness of h. In this thesis the functions we consider are one-way against quantum
adversaries, and using the same reduction we conclude that hc(x,r) is a hard-core predicate against QPT
adversaries.
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Regev [Reg05] and Peikert [Pei09] have given quantum and classical reductions
from the average case of LWE to problems such as approximating the length of the
shortest vector or the shortest independent vectors problem in the worst case, problems
which are conjectured to be hard even for quantum computers.
Theorem 2.4.2 (Reduction LWE, from [Reg05, Therem 1.1]). Let n, q be integers and
α ∈ (0,1) be such that αq > 2√n. If there exists an efficient algorithm that solves
LWEq,Ψ̄α , then there exists an efficient quantum algorithm that approximates the de-
cision version of the shortest vector problem GAPSVP and the shortest independent
vectors problem SIVP to within Õ(n/α) in the worst case.
2.5 Constructive Cryptography Framework
The Constructive Cryptography (CC) framework (also sometimes referred to as the
Abstract Cryptography (AC) framework) introduced by Maurer and Renner [MR11]
is a top-down and axiomatic approach, where the desired functionality is described as
an (ideal) resource S with a certain input-output behavior independent of any partic-
ular implementation scheme. A resource has some interfaces I corresponding to the
different parties that could use the resource. In our case, we will have only two inter-
faces corresponding to Alice (the client) and Bob (the server), therefore I = {A,B}.
Resources are not just used to describe the desired functionality (such as a perfect state
preparation resource), but also to model the assumed resources of a protocol (for ex-
ample a communication channel). The second important notion is the converter which
is used to define a protocol. Converters always have two interfaces, an inner and an
outer one, and the inner interface can be connected to the interface of a resource. For
instance, if R is a resource and πA, πB ∈ Σ are two converters (corresponding to a
given protocol making use of resource R ) we can connect these two converters to
the interface A and B, respectively, (the resulting object being a resource as well) us-
ing the following notation: πAR πB. Furthermore, in this thesis we consider that any
converter interacting classically on its inner interface and outputting a single quantum
message on its outer interface can be represented as a sequence of quantum instru-
ments (which is a generalization of CPTP maps taking into account both quantum and
classical outputs, see Definition 2.1.2) and constitutes the most general expression of
allowed quantum operations. More precisely, this model takes into account interactive
converters (and models the computation in sequential dependent stages). This is sim-
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ilar to the classical world where we would instantiate the converter by a sequence of
classical Turing machines (passing states to each other) [Gol01].
A filter (usually denoted `) is a special converter used to force a honest behaviour
on a given interface of a resource. They are usually used to prove the correctness of a
protocol, as they describe what can be done in an honest run. They are removed when
we want to provide full power to a cheating adversary or to a simulator. Usually, in
order to keep the filter simple, the functionality accepts as a first message a bit c which
says if the party wants to behave honestly (c = 0) or maliciously (c = 1). That way,
the filter `c=0 (or simply `) just sends c = 0 to the resource, and then forwards all the
messages between it’s inner and outer interface.
In order to characterize the distance between two resources (and therefore the se-
curity), we use the so-called distinguishers. We then say that two resources S1 and
S2 are indistinguishable (within ε), and denote it as S1 ≈ε S2, if no distinguisher can
distinguish between S1 and S2 with an advantage greater than ε. In this thesis, we will
mostly focus on quantum-polynomial-time (QPT) distinguishers.
Central to Constructive Cryptography is the notion of a secure construction of an
(ideal) resource S from an assumed resource R by a protocol (specified as a pair of
converters). We directly state the definition for the special case we are interested in,
namely in two-party protocols between a client A and a server B, where A is always
considered to be honest. The definition can therefore be simplified as follows:
Definition 2.5.1 (See [Mau11, MR11]). Let I = {A,B} be a set of two interfaces (A
being the left interface and B the right one), and let R ,S be two resources. Then, we
say that for the two converters πA,πB, the protocol π := (πA,πB) (securely) constructs




if the following two conditions are satisfied:
• Availability (i.e. correctness):
πAR πB ≈ε S ` (2.8)
(where ` represents a filter, i.e. a trivial converter that enforces honest/correct
behavior 3, and A≈ε B means that no polynomial quantum distinguisher can dis-
3Usually, a filter simply sends a bit c = 0 and then forwards all communications between its two
interfaces (this filter will be denoted by `c=0), but it could be a more general converter. When the filter
is not clear from the context, we need to specify also which filter we consider.
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tinguish between A and B (given black-box access to A or B) with an advantage
better than ε)
• Security: there exists σ ∈ Σ (called a simulator) such that:
πAR ≈ε Sσ (2.9)
We also extend this definition when ε is a function ε : N→ R: we say that S is ε-
realizable if for any n ∈ N, S is ε(n)-realizable.
The intuition behind this definition is that if no distinguisher can know whether
he is interacting with an ideal resource or with the real protocol, then it means that
any attack done in the “real world” can also be done in the “ideal world”. Because
the ideal world is secure by definition, so is the real world. Using such a definition is
particularly useful to capture the “leakage” of information to the server. This is quite
to capture in the real world, but very natural in the ideal world.
Lemma 2.5.2 ([MR11, Thm. 1][Mau11, Thm. 3]). The construction→ is (generally)
composable, i.e. for all (ε,ε′) ∈ R+, (R ,S ,T ) ∈Φ3, π ∈ Σ2:











• we have parallel composability: (R π−→
ε












where | (resp. ◦) represents the parallel (respectively serial) composition of protocols,
‖ is the merging of resources, and id is the identity converter.
Chapter 3
Complexity Limitations of Classical
Client Delegated Quantum Computing
One of the main questions that arises in secure delegated computations is whether it is
possible to delegate a computation to a server in such a way that he learns nothing, in
an information-theoretic sense, about the input of the computation.
More precisely, we address this question in the setting where the client is entirely clas-
sical and the server has a quantum computer. Therefore, we want to study whether
the client can securely delegate any efficient quantum computation to the server. We
emphasize here that as the client is entirely classical, this also implies that the commu-
nication between client and server must also be entirely classical. In the remaining of
the chapter we will denote any protocol achieving information-theoretic secure classi-
cal delegation of quantum computations an an ITS-CDQC protocol.
In this chapter we focus on 2 main results: secure delegation of decision BQP
problems and secure delegation of sampling BQP problems.
For the secure delegation of decision problems we show that if the client-server com-
munication consists of O(nd) bits, then the existence of such an ITS-CDQC protocol
would imply the following complexity theory result: BQP⊂MA/O(nd). We then give
strong evidence that this complexity relation is unlikely by constructing an oracle O
with respect to which this relation does not hold: BQP 6⊂MA/O(nd).
For our second result, we prove that if there exists a secure delegation protocol for
quantum sampling problems (such as Boson Sampling), then there exist non-uniform





, making polynomially queries to an NPNP that can compute
the permanent of an n×n matrix, where n refers to the size of the client’s input. While
this result does not directly imply an impossibility of delegating sampling problems, it
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reveals a connection between this task and the complexity of computing the permanent
of a matrix. Even though the latter problem has been studied for a very long time, there
are still very few algorithms (Ryser’s algorithm from 1963 is still considered one of
the most promising candidates) and very few results on the complexity analysis for the
computation of a matrix permanent.
The problem of classical delegation from a classical client to an unbounded server
has been studied for many decades. Our starting point represents the work of Abadi,
Feigenbaum and Kilian who gave a characterization of what complexity classes of
problems can be computed in this classical secure delegation setting, by first defin-
ing a framework that would encompass these families of protocols that achieve this
task, framework called Generalised Encryption Scheme (GES). In our work, in order
to analyse the complexity theoretic implications of (information-theoretical) secure
delegation of quantum computations, we use the GES framework introduced by Abadi
et al [AFK87]. Essentially, a GES is a protocol between a probabilistic polynomial-
time (BPP) classical Client and a computationally unbounded Server, in which the
Server computes on encrypted data. The Client would like to compute some predicate
f : {0,1}n→{0,1}, but as she is computationally bounded, she would like to achieve
this by taking advantage of the power of the untrusted Server. In the GES, the Client
would first send to the Server a description of f . Then she would encrypt her private
input x ∈ {0,1}n using a BPP algorithm Enc and would send the result Enc(x) to the
Server. After this, the Client and the Server are allowed to interact for a number of
rounds which is at most polynomial in n. After the interaction takes place, in the last
stage of the GES, the Client uses a BPP algorithm Dec and applies to the entire tran-





But, very crucially, from a security point of view, after the GES protocol the Server
should be able to learn nothing about the Client’s input x, apart from its length n. As
we considered the Server to be unbounded, the GES requires information-theoretic se-
curity. In the work of Abadi et al, they give a complexity theoretic characterization of
all the predicates f that can be securely delegated in a GES protocol. More precisely,
they showed that any predicate f that can be computed in a GES, while leaking to the
Server only the size of the input must belong to the class NP/poly∩ coNP/poly. We
show an alternative proof of this result in the next section. This result additionally, im-
plies that no NP-Hard functions can be securely delegated in a GES scheme, by using
the result that if NP-Hard problems would be included in NP/poly∩ coNP/poly then
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the polynomial hierarchy would collapse.
Therefore, the two main questions that we address in this work can be rephrased as:
can BQP computations be information-theoretically secure delegated using a GES
scheme? Following the previously mentioned result this would be equivalent to study-
ing the relation between the quantum class BQP and the classical complexity class
NP/poly∩ coNP/poly.
because we are both interested in delegating decision and sampling BQP problems, we
study two variants of the GES framework: 1) delegating decision problems when the
total communication between Client and Server is bounded by a polynomial O(|x|d),
for an arbitrary but known constant d, and 2) delegating arbitrary sampling problems.
For the first result, knowing a bound on the (polynomial) size of the communication,
we show that it implies that: BQP is a subset of MA/O(nd). Then, we prove that this
relation is unlikely by providing an oracle separation between these 2 classes.
For the second category, we prove that having a GES for BQP sampling problems
(SampBQP) implies that there exist circuits for computing the permanent of a matrix
more efficiently than it is believed to be possible. Regarding the first main result, it
can be argued that oracle results do not represent the strongest evidence for relations
between complexity classes. As an example, there exists oracles relative to which we
both have that P and NP are equal and distinct. Nevertheless, using oracles we can
study the query complexity of problems in different computational models. Further-
more, oracle results have also lead to important progress in complexity theory and
developing new algorithms [GGH+13, Aar10].
3.1 Classical Delegation of Decision Problems
In this section we address the question of securely delegating BQP decision problems.
As already discussed, Abadi et al showed that any function f that can be computed in
a GES must satisfy:
Lemma 3.1.1. [From [AFK87]] If f can be computed in a GES which leaks only the
size of the input, then f ∈ NP/poly∩ coNP/poly.
Additionally, they proved that if NP - Complete problems would be securely del-
egated using a GES protocol, then this would imply that NP - Complete ⊆ NP/poly∩
coNP/poly. This in turn would lead to a collapse of the polynomial hierarchy at the
third level, as showed by Yap [Yap83]. Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that NP-
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Complete problems can be information-theoretically secure delegated by a classical
Client.
Then, to answer our question, whether BQP-Hard problems can be classically secure
delegated, then the characterization of GES implies that this task would be possible
only if any BQP-Hard problem can be computed in NP/poly∩ coNP/poly.
While ideally, we would like to have that similarly such a complexity relation would
imply a collapse of the polynomial hierarchy, even the containment BQP ⊆ P is not
known to lead to a collapse of the PH.
To indicate an impossibility of delegating securely BQP computations, we instead con-
sider a variant of GES where, we know in advance a bound on the size of the commu-
nication between Client and Server, in other words, considering their communication
is upper bounded by a polynomial of fixed degree d in the size of the input. The rest
of the GES remains exactly the same, with no restriction on the polynomial running
time of the Client. As a consequence, we show that having such a GES for efficient
quantum computations would imply: BQP⊆MA/O(nd)∩ coMA/O(nd).
Then, to indicate that this relation is unlikely we show an oracle separation between
the classes BQP and MA/O(nd)∩ coMA/O(nd):
Theorem 3.1.2. For any d ∈ N, there exists an oracle Od such that:
BQPOd 6⊆MA/O(nd)Od (3.1)
We remark that an interesting further question would be if the same separation
between BQP and MA/O(nd) can be achieved assuming an oracle that can be only
accessed through classical queries by both the quantum and the classical algorithms.
However, achieving this extension does not follow directly from our proof techniques
and it would be non-trivial to deduce such an oracle separation.
Our result shows that relative to an oracle Od , there exist BQP problems that can-
not be securely delegated by a classical Client in a GES with known bound on the
communication.
We give a constructive proof for the family of oracles {Od}d , which will be based on
a version of the complement of Simon’s problem [Sim97].
Specifically, for Simon’s problem we have black-box access to a function f : {0,1}n→
{0,1}n, that is promised to be either a permutation or a 2-to-1 function: there exists a
non-zero string s such that if f (x) = f (y) for x 6= y then y = x⊕s. To solve the problem
we need to decide which is the type of the function f .
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The problem is known to be in BQP (relative to the function oracle) due to Simon’s al-
gorithm that requires only O(n) queries to the function f [Sim97]. For the complement
of this problem, called coSimon, in which we accept the input if the function f is 2-to-
1, it can be shown that coSimon cannot be solved by an NP algorithm (and not even
by a MA algorithm). Therefore, coSimon shows us an oracle separation (relative to the
function f oracle) between the classes BQP and MA. Now, to use Simon’s problem as
a problem that cannot be solved by a GES, we would have to analyze its complexity
relative to advice classes (such as NP/poly). As recalled from subsection 2.2.1, for
advice classes the algorithm receives an additional advice string which is the same for
all inputs of same size. However, for Simon’s problem, for all inputs of size n, we have
a unique underlying oracle function f : {0,1}n. Therefore, Simon’s problem (or its
complement) can be solved by a polynomial time algorithm with a single bit of advice:
for any input of size n the advice would be 0 if the function is a permutation and 1
otherwise. For this reason, we need to modify the structure of Simon’s problem.
Essentially, to show our first main result, we consider that the black-box function is
input-dependent. And to solve the problem, one needs as before, to determine whether
the function specified by the input is a permutation or 2-to-1. In this case we can
show by considering that our black-box functions are defined on a larger domain,
f : {0,1}nD → {0,1}nD , then the problem, called D-coSimon can still be solved in
BQP, but very importantly it cannot be solved in MA/O(nd)Od , for any constant d and
a suitably chosen D > d (as explained later). To show this separation, we will use a
diagonalisation argument.
Unfortunately, we cannot use the same oracle to show the separation between BQP
and NP/poly (or MA/poly) as D must depend on d and we would need to first know a
bound on the size of the advice (the degree of the polynomial) in order to fix the size
of the domain of our functions.
Next we describe formally the Generalised Encryption Scheme framework and we
give an alternative proof for Lemma 3.1.1.
3.1.1 Generalised Encryption Scheme
A Generalised Encryption Scheme describes a 2-party protocol between an honest clas-
sical Client C and a malicious unbounded Server S, where the aim of C is to delegate a
hard computation to S.
Formally, the components of the GES are the following:
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• A predicate function f : {0,1}∗→{0,1};
• A plaintext input x ∈ {0,1}∗, for which C wants to learn the outcome f (x);
• A BPP algorithm for key generation K, such that for any input x ∈ {0,1}∗, K(x)
outputs (k,success) with probability at least 12 +
1
poly(|x|) , where k∈ {0,1}poly(|x|).
If the algorithm does not succeed, then it outputs (k′, fail), where k′ ∈{0,1}poly(|x|);
• A polynomial-time deterministic algorithm E such that for any input x∈ {0,1}∗,
any key k ∈ {0,1}poly(|x|) and any message s ∈ {0,1}poly(|x|), E(x,k,s) outputs
an encryption y ∈ {0,1}poly(|x|);
• A polynomial-time deterministic algorithm D such that for any input x∈ {0,1}∗,
any key k ∈ {0,1}poly(|x|) and any message s ∈ {0,1}poly(|x|), D(s,k,x) outputs a
decryption z ∈ {0,1}poly(|x|)
And they satisfy the following properties:
1. The rounds of communication between C and S are m = poly(|x|). We will
denote with ci the message that C sends in round i, and with si the message sent
by S at round i;
2. Given input x, C runs the key generation algorithm K(x) until it succeeds - out-
puts (k,success). This step can be thought as preprocessing, taking place before
the communication between C and S starts, and the same key k will be used in
all the remaining stages of the protocol;
3. In round i, C will compute the encryption ci := E(x,k, s̄i−1), where s̄i−1 repre-
sents the transcript of messages received by C from S until round i. Then C sends
the encryption ci to S;
4. In round i, after receiving ci, S will respond with a message si;
5. After the communication between C and S ends, as a last step C uses algorithm
D to compute z := D(s̄m,k,x). With probability at least 12 +
1
poly(|x|) , z is equal to
the target computation f (x).
Roughly speaking, the purpose of a GES scheme is to allow a computationally bounded
Client to obtain an outcome f (x) for an input of her own choice x, which she cannot
compute using her limited computational resources. To obtain this desired computation
she interacts with a computationally unbounded, but malicious Server, for a number of
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rounds which is polynomial in the length of the input.
But very importantly, the GES also ensures security against the malicious Server, more
precisely the privacy for the Client’s input. As the Server is unbounded, the privacy
must hold an information theoretic sense, and we define it formally in the following
manner:
Definition 3.1.3. Let X be the random variable denoting the input of C in a GES, T (X)
be the random variable for the transcript during the protocol running on input X and
L(X) a function of X, which we will call leakage. We say that the GES protocol leaks
at most L(X) if and only if:
X and T (X) are independent given L(X).
Before showing the alternative proof of Lemma 3.1.1, we must first introduce the
notion of randomized advice. Apart from the standard advice classes introduced in
subsection 2.2.1, where the advice is a fixed deterministic function of the size of the
input, we also introduce here an advice complexity class, where the advice is random-
ized, meaning that for each input length n, the advice is sampled according to some
distribution Dn (distribution parametrized by size of input). A very important rela-
tion regarding randomized advice class, which we will also use in our work, is the
following:
Lemma 3.1.4. [From [Aar06]] MA/rpoly =MA/poly = NP/poly
Now, we can present the simplified proof of Lemma 3.1.1, by first showing that
any function computable in a GES belongs to the class MA/rpoly.
Lemma 3.1.5. If a function f admits a GES leaking at most the size of the input,
namely L(X) = |X |, then f ∈MA/rpoly.
Proof. Consider a predicate f which admits a GES leaking at most the size of the
input.
To begin with, we consider a simplified GES, in which the communication consists of
a single round between Client C and Server S. As a result, the GES protocol running
on input x can be described in the following steps:
1. C runs K(x) until it successfully outputs an encryption key k;
2. C computes the encryption c := E(x,k,′ ′) and sends y to S;
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3. C receives a response s from S;
4. C runs the decryption algorithm D(s,k,x) and obtains z, such that with probabil-
ity 12 +
1
poly(|x|) satisfies: z = f (x).
Based on this GES that leaks at most the size of x, we will construct a MA/rpoly algo-
rithm for f . In other words, we will give a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that
receives a checkable witness w and a randomized polynomial-sized advice (sampled
from a distribution which is the same for inputs of equal length) which can compute
f (x).
The algorithm is described in the following way.
Consider an input x of length n. Then the randomized advice r for all inputs of length
n is constructed in the following way:
1. We sample at random xn in {0,1}n;
2. We compute a successful key in a GES for input xn: kn := E(xn);
3. We compute the encryption: yn := E(xn,kn,′ ′) and send it to S;
4. We receive sn as response from S;
5. The advice is rn = (xn,kn,yn,sn).
We consider two cases. If xn = x, then the MA algorithm uses the decryption algorithm
D on input (rn,kn,xn) and will obtain f (x) with probability 12 +
1
poly(n) and we are done.
Now consider xn 6= x. From the security condition, we know that the GES leaks about
x at most n. This implies that there must exist some key k such that yn = E(x,k,′ ′).
To see this, suppose by contradiction that for any possible key k we would have
E(x,k,′ ′) 6= yn. Then if in the GES described above, S receives from C the message
yn and as a result he knows that the Client’s input cannot be equal to x, and therefore
he learned more about the input of C, than he is allowed to (the size of input). More
formally, this would imply that the input and the transcript of the protocol are not in-
dependent given the size of the input, as some certain transcripts (containing yn) can
only take place for certain input (different than x).
Now that we made sure that there exists a key k such that yn = E(x,k,′ ′), we will use
k as the witness for the MA algorithm. Namely, the polynomial-time verifier given the
witness k will check that the yn from the advice verifies the equality: yn = E(x,k,′ ′).
Finally, the algorithm will run the GES decryption algorithm D, D(rn,k,x) and from the
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correctness of the GES, the result would be equal to f (x) with probability 12 +
1
poly(n) .
This shows the MA algorithm receiving a randomized advice that computes f (x) which
concludes our proof.
Therefore, f ∈MA/rpoly and using Lemma 3.1.4, we also have that f ∈ NP/poly.
Furthermore, as the key k must exist independent of the value of the predicate f (x),
then the algorithm we presented above holds for both cases f (x) = 0 and f (x) = 1 and
hence the same algorithm works both when x is a yes instance and a no instance. As a
result, we also have that f ∈ coNP/poly and consequently f ∈ NP/poly∩ coNP/poly.
To finish our proof, we need to show that this result holds also in the case when the
GES consists of multiple rounds of communication. For the general case, we follow
the previous strategy which generalizes in a straightforward way.
From the privacy condition of the GES, we know that any transcript consisting of poly-
nomially in n number of rounds can depend only on n.
Therefore, we will make the advice for inputs of length n to be the entire transcript
of a GES protocol, drawn from the distributions of possible GES transcripts for inputs
of length n. This distribution will correspond to the parametrized distribution corre-
sponding to the randomized advice.
Similarly as before, the witness the MA algorithm will receive is a key k which will
make the input x compatible with the transcript from the advice. And from the security
condition, we know such a key k must exist. Finally, the MA procedure will run the
GES decryption for k, x and the advice transcript and from the correctness condition
will obtain the desired outcome f (x) with probability 12 +
1
poly(n) .
Interestingly, we observe that if the communication between C and S consists of
O(nd) messages, for some constant d, then we can also characterize to which com-
plexity class f belongs. Namely, following the above proof we notice that the advice
is exactly a GES transcript, therefore O(nd) bits of advice would suffice to compute f .
As a result we have that:
Corollary 3.1.6. If a function f admits a GES with communication bounded by O(nd),
then f ∈MA/O(nd).
In the next section we present our main result about the delegation of BQP decision
problems in a GES with a known bound on the communication. To give evidence
that BQP computations cannot be information-theoretically secure delegated in such a
GES, we will show an oracle separation between the classes BQP and MA/O(nd), as
stated in Theorem 3.1.2.
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3.1.2 Oracle separation between BQP and MA/O(nd)
In order to show the separation between the classes BQP and MA/O(nd) we will con-
struct an oracle based on the complement of Simon’s problem.
We recall that for Simon’s problem, the input is a function f : {0,1}n → {0,1}n, to
which we only have black-box access and such that f is promised to be either 1-
to-1 (permutation) or 2-to-1 (there exists s ∈ {0,1}n−{0}, such that for any x 6= y,
f (x) = f (y) if and only if y = x⊕ s). To solve the problem we need to determine of
which type f is. Namely, for Simon’s problem the algorithm must accept if f is 2-to-1
and reject if it is 1-to-1. And thus, for the complement of Simon’s problem, an algo-
rithm must accept if f is 1-to-1 and reject otherwise.
As mentioned, for this problem we are not given an actual description of the underly-
ing function, but only oracle access to f . In this way, Simon’s problem offers an oracle
separation between the classes BPP and BQP, as a classical algorithm (with oracle ac-
cess to f ), requires O(2
n
2 ) queries to f , whereas a quantum algorithm only needs O(n)
queries to f .
More precisely, the oracle is a function O : {0,1}∗→ {0,1}∗ such that for any n ∈ N,
if we consider the restriction of O to the domain {0,1}n, and we denote it by On :
{0,1}n→{0,1}n, then On corresponds to either a 1-to-1 or a 2-to-1 function.
As a result, we can naturally define a language which lies in BQPO, but is not contained
in BPPO:
L(O) = {0n |On corresponds to a 2-to-1 function} (3.2)
Even more powerful, we can use the complement of this language, defined as: Lc(O) =
{0n |On corresponds to a 1-to-1 function} in order to show a separation between BQP
and NP with respect to the oracle O [Aar10]. Next we will also show a proof for this
separation for a modified version of the oracle, which will then help us construct our
main oracle for the separation between BQP and MA/O(nd).
A GES for securely delegating BQP problems would imply that BQP⊆NP/poly∩
coNP/poly. Therefore, ideally we would aim to show that there exists an oracle O for
which BQPO 6⊆ NP/polyO.
And the intuition behind constructing this oracle O would be the following: instead of
considering a single function On for each possible input length n, we would construct
instead a different oracle function Ox for any input x ∈ {0,1}n. As a result for an input
length n, we would have 2n functions that need to be decided whether they are 1-to-1
or 2-to-1.
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However a classical NP algorithm with oracle access to O will receive only a polyno-
mial (in n) bits of advice, which will be the same advice string for all these 2n functions.
And as a result, it seems that this amount of advice would be insufficient to make the
NPO algorithm decide correctly for all these inputs. However, we will see later that
formalizing this intuition for any polynomial advice is problematic.
For this reason, we consider that we know in advance a bound on the degree of the
polynomial advice. In other words, assuming that this degree is d, then we can con-
struct an oracle showing our oracle separation: BQPO 6⊆ (MA/O(nd))O.
To construct this oracle, we will show an incremental proof, starting from an oracle
separation between the classes BQP and NP. While separation of these 2 classes with
respect to an oracle are already known, including using the complement of Simon’s
problem, in our case we will show this separation for a different variant of Simon’s
problem, where instead of assigning a different function to each input size, we will
assign a different function for each different input.
Lemma 3.1.7. There exists an oracle O based on the complement of Simon’s problem
such that:
BQPO 6⊆ NPO (3.3)
Proof. We will define the oracle O, together with a language based on O, coSimon(O)
such that:
coSimon(O) ∈ BQPO and coSimon(O) 6∈ NPO (3.4)
Specifically, for each n we will consider a family of 2n functions:
F n = { f (n)i : {0,1}n→{0,1}n}i∈{0,1}n .
Then, we define the oracle O on input 1n, i ∈ {0,1}n and x ∈ {0,1}n as:
O(1n, i,x) := f (n)i (x)
O(1n, i) corresponds to the function f (n)i
(3.5)
Now, we define the language coSimon(O) as:
coSimon(O) = {(1n, i) | f (n)i is a 1-to-1 function } (3.6)
The problem we are constructing is a promise problem and the language coSimon(O)
is the set of “yes” instances of the problem, whereas the set of “no” instances is not the
complement of this set, but is the language: coSimonc(O)= {(1n, i) | f (n)i is a 2-to-1 function }.
From this definition we can see that the oracle O gives access to the functions for which
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we need to tell whether they are 1-to-1 or 2-to-1. The main point is that for this prob-
lem, as for the standard Simon’s problem, the algorithms only have black-box access
to these functions and the only way they can solve this problem is by querying the
oracle O.
We also know that given O, the language coSimon(O) belongs to the class BQPO, as
we can just run Simon’s algorithm on an input (1n, i) and then flip the acceptance and
rejection answers.
As standard in quantum query complexity, querying the quantum oracle O is realised
through the following unitary operation, and has the following form:
|1n〉 |i〉 |x〉 |y〉 O−→ |1n〉 |i〉 |x〉 |y⊕O(1n, i,x)〉 (3.7)
Therefore, O on input (1n, i,x) will output the value of the function f (n)i : {0,1}n →
{0,1}n evaluated on the point x, where f (n)i is either 1-to-1 or 2-to-1 . We can see that
the size of the input tuple is 3n as the first input specifying the domain size is given in
unary and the index of the function and the element on which we want to evaluate the
function are given in binary. Additionally, the oracle is defined for all n and for any
i,x ∈ {0,1}n.
Now that we defined abstractly how the oracle O works, we will now show how to
construct the adversarial oracle O, and more specifically, how to construct the family
of functions F n, for any n. By adversarial we mean that we will define F n in such
a way that every non-deterministic algorithm using the oracle O will fail to decide
correctly the language coSimon(O). The following proof will use a diagonalisation
argument.
Using the fact that the set of NP Turing Machines is countable, we consider an
enumeration of them and pick the k-th NP machine, denoted by Mk. Now we will
study its behaviour for input size n = k+n0, for some n0 > 0 defined later on.
Now suppose some function index i ∈ {0,1}n, and we fix a 1-to-1 function as f (n)i .
By simulating the behaviour of Mk on the input (1n, i), we can check to see whether
Mk accepts or not f
(n)
i . Recall that for coSimon(O) accepting means the input function
is 1-to-1 and rejecting means the input function is 2-to-1 .
If Mk rejects the input (1n, i), then Mk gave the wrong answer and we are done. On the
other hand, if Mk accepted the input, then from the definition of NP TM, we know that
there exist a polynomial-sized path in the non-deterministic computation tree of Mk,
which ends in an acceptance state. Let us denote this acceptance path with π and its
length with l′ = poly(n).
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Then we know that Mk can make at most l′ queries to the function oracle O, and we
will denote the list of l < l′ queries that Mk will make and the answers from O to these
queries as:
Q = [(x1, fi(x1)),(x2, fi(x2)), · · · ,(xl, fi(xl))] (3.8)
where x1, · · ·xl ∈ {0,1}n are the queried elements, chosen by Mk, during the path π, as
depicted in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Computational tree of Mk and the queries to O during the accepting path π
We now construct a new function gi, which will be a 2-to-1 function such that gi
will have the same values as fi in the queried points x1,x2, · · · ,xl , namely: gi(x1) =
fi(x1), · · · ,gi(xl) = fi(xl).
But first we need to show that we construct such a 2-to-1 function gi. Since gi is 2-to-1
, then there exists a non-zero string called xor-mask s such that gi(x) = gi(y) if and
only if x = y or y = x⊕ s. The number of xor-masks s is 2n−1.
Now as gi is equal to fi in l different points and as f is a permutation, then it must
be that gi also produces different images for each of those l = poly(n) inputs. This
implies that we need to choose the xor mask s for gi different than the xor of any 2





values for s. But the total number of possible s is 2n− 1 and as
l = poly(n), there exist sufficiently large n such that 2n−1≥ l(l−1)2 = poly(n).
Therefore, we choose n0 such that 2n−1 > poly(n) and as there exist such xor masks
s satisfying the above condition and we just need to pick one of them to construct the
2-to-1 function gi.
Finally, for the oracle O, we change the function at index i, by replacing the 1-to-1 fi
with the 2-to-1 gi. In this case, we are guaranteed that the path π of the computational
tree of Mk will remain an accepting path, and therefore Mk will decide incorrectly that
the input (1n, i) corresponds to a 1-to-1 function.
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Then using this construction, for any non-deterministic TM, we will construct an input
for which the machine will decide the language coSimon(O) incorrectly, hence:
coSimon(O) 6∈ NPO (3.9)
which concludes the proof.
Next, we can show a stronger oracle separation, between BQP and MA. Namely,
by using the proof technique from Lemma 3.1.7, we can show that even if the NP
algorithm receives additionally a polynomial amount of randomness, it cannot decide
correctly the language coSimon(O). As a result coSimon(O) lies outside the class MA
relative the oracle O.
Lemma 3.1.8. There exists an oracle O such that BQPO 6⊆MAO.
Proof. As opposed to the previous case, an MA TM is an NP machine that can also
use randomness and essentially can be thought as a probability distributions over NP
algorithms.
The main idea for this proof will be to pick an oracle at random and then reduce the
problem to the NP case. Suppose that the function oracle is 1-to-1 or 2-to-1 with equal
probability and that in both cases the specific function is chosen uniformly at random.
If the complement of Simon’s problem with respect to the random oracle lies in MA,
this implies that there must exist an NP algorithm that can decide the problem correctly
with probability at least 23 over the choice of the oracle function.
Now, we proceed with a proof by contradiction. Suppose there exists such a NP TM
Mk.
Then we pick an input which is accepted by Mk, and we denote it by (1n, i). As Mk
accepts (1n, i), then there must exist an accepting path in the computational tree of Mk
along which the machine makes l = poly(n) queries to the oracle function.
If the underlying function f (n)i is 2-to-1 (with xor-mask s), then from the proof of
Lemma 3.1.7, we know that the probability of distinguishing f (n)i from a 1-to-1 func-
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But l = poly(n), therefore Pr[collision] is exponentially small in n.
Then, as for any input (including (i,n)) the probability that the underlying function
( f (n)i ) is 1-to-1 or 2-to-1 is
1
2 , then we obtain that the probability that Mk accepts cor-
rectly the input (i,n) is at most: 12 +2
−Ωn < 23 (for sufficiently large n). This ends our
contradiction proof.
In the next part we move to classical advice classes. Namely, we first show an ora-
cle separation between the quantum polynomial time TM and the classical polynomial
time machines that receive a bounded polynomial of advice. The proof techniques re-
quired for this result, will also help us show our main oracle separation between BQP
and MA/O(nd).
Lemma 3.1.9. For any d ∈ N, there exist an oracle O such that: BQPO 6⊆ P/O(nd)O.
Proof. The class P/O(nd) refers to the class of problems which can be solved by a
deterministic polynomial-time TM which receives an additional advice of size O(nd),
where d is a constant and n specifies the size of the input (as we have seen, in our case
the input size is 2n, as n represents the size of the inputs for our oracle functions).
As opposed to the previous analysis, instead of having the ability to non-deterministically
choose one of exponentially many paths, we will deal with polynomial-time determin-
istic algorithm M that will receive some non-uniform information in order to decide
the language coSimon(O). Essentially, each possible advice will determine a new be-
haviour for M, which can even involve a different sequence of queries to the oracle
depending on the advice.
What we want to prove is that irrespective of what advice M will receive, M cannot
decide correctly coSimon(O) for all inputs. To show this, we first need to consider
functions over a larger domain than n-bit strings.
More specifically, for any d > 0, we will choose D > d such that the family of func-
tions F n will contain 2n 1-to-1 or 2-to-1 functions f defined on the domains:
f : {0,1}nD → {0,1}nD . Then for any d, the oracle denoted as Od will receive queries
of the form:
(1n, i,x) - where i ∈ {0,1}n is the index of the function within F n and x ∈ {0,1}nD is
an element from its domain.
In order to show that this oracle can be used to prove the separation, we first need to
argue that this modified problem can still be solved in BQPOd .
This is indeed the case, since by expanding the domains of the functions we just change
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the running time of Simon’s algorithm from O(n) to O(nD). But, as D is just a fixed
constant, then the algorithm still runs in polynomial time and therefore coSimon(Od)∈
BQPOd . What remains to be shown is that we also have: coSimon(Od) 6∈ P/O(nd)Od .
As in the previous oracle separations, we will prove this by diagonalisation, by consid-
ering an enumeration of the deterministic polynomial time machines and we will show
that no matter what advice the k-th polynomial time machine Mk receives, it cannot
correctly decide coSimon(Od).
However, the main challenge comes from the fact that each advice can induce a differ-
ent behaviour to Mk and therefore we need to construct the oracle in such a way that
all advice strings would lead to Mk failing to answer correctly for at least one input.
This is contrast to the previous case where we only had to analyze the behaviour of
one accepting paths on the non-deterministic computation tree.
Let us consider the behaviour of Mk for an input of size n = k+n0, where the constant
n0 will be specified later.
As the advice is a string of size O(nd), there are 2O(n
d) possible advice strings. Cru-
cially, whichever of these strings Mk will use, it will be the same for for all 2n inputs
of length n (all 2n functions from F n).
In order to construct the oracle for inputs of size n, we essentially need to construct the
family of functions F n.
Hence, let us consider the first index inside F n, namely 0n and assign to this index any
1-to-1 function f : {0,1}nD → {0,1}nD . We will now inspect the behaviour of Mk for
the index 0n and for each possible advice string.
If for more than half of all the advice strings Mk rejects f , then we keep f in its current
form for the index 0n. This is because in this case, we have that half of the advice
strings have been eliminated as they all lead to Mk giving a wrong answer.
If on the other hand, more than half of all the advice strings lead to Mk accepting f , we
will attempt to turn f into a 2-to-1 function while keeping acceptance for those advice
strings. As a result this would reduce to the previous case, and we would be able to
again eliminate half of the advice strings.
For each advice, denoted by a j, for j ∈ {0,1}O(n
d), the machine Mk will make a se-
quence of polynomially in n many queries to f .
We denote these sequences of queries together with their responses from the oracle as:
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where each l j is polynomial in n.
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We now consider a 2-to-1 function g : {0,1}nD →{0,1}nD such that:
For all j such that Mk with advice a j and querying σ j, accepts the function f :




2) = f (x
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2), · · · ,g(x
j
l j) = f (x
j
l j) (3.12)
In other words, if we place g on index 0n, then we will get identical responses to
the queries which make Mk accept this input. Since the number of queries inputs is
l j = poly(n) and the number of advice strings is 2O(n
d), then the maximum number of
different inputs which can be queried is l j ·2O(n
d), which is also of order 2O(n
d).
However, unlike the proofs for our previous results, this number of queried inputs is
exponential in the size of the input of Mk, so we first have to make sure that such a
2-to-1 function even exists.
The trick is that we chose the domain of our functions through the variable D, and
we can make it sufficiently large to accommodate for a 2-to-1 function satisfying the
2O(n
d) restrictions mentioned above.
As before, because f is a permutation then no two queried values will have the same
image. And therefore in order to construct the xor-mask s ∈ {0,1}nD for the function
g, we need to ensure that it is different from the xor of any 2 queried preimages. These
will be the restricted values of the xor-mask s. The total number of pairs of queried






2 , which is also of order 2
O(nd). But the total
number of possible xor masks is 2n
D
. Therefore, to make sure that such a xor mask s




As a result if we set D > d, then we have a 2-to-1 function g that matches the responses
of f for all 2O(n
d) possible queries.
Therefore, by placing g on the index 0n, we can eliminate half of the possible advice
strings. Then, no matter how Mk behaves, for the input 0n, we can eliminate half of the
advices.
And now, we can repeat this procedure for the other inputs (function indices). We are
effectively halving the number of possible advice strings with each index. Since in F n
there are exactly 2n functions, in order to eliminate all possible advice strings, we need
to ensure that: 2
O(nd )
22n < 1, or equivalently, O(n
d) < 2n. Then, to achieve this, we just
have to choose n0 (where n = n0 + k) large enough such that this inequality holds.
Finally, we have that for any k and for any advice that Mk can receive, there always
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which concludes our proof.
Remark: Note that the same proof technique cannot be used to show an oracle
separation between BQP and P/poly. The reason is that the trick in our proof was to
consider D - determining the size of the function domain to be larger than d - deter-
mining the size of the advice. This is clearly possible only when we know in advance a
bound on the degree of the advice polynomial. If the advice size could be any arbitrary
polynomial, then no matter how we would choose the oracle domain size parameter
D, there would always exist some degree d′ > D of the advice for which our proof
technique would not work.
A possible way to fix this issue, would to make D part of the input in some way such
that it can increase as well. Hence, if D was included in the input as unary string
h(n), where h is an increasing function, then for sufficiently large n, we will have
g(n) > d. But we can immediately notice the issue with this strategy. While through
this construction indeed the problem cannot decided by a P/poly algorithm, it is also
not solvable anymore in BQP. This is because in this case, the quantum query com-
plexity required to run Simon’s algorithm would become O(ng(n), which is no longer
polynomial, as g is an increasing function, and cannot be constant. As a result, prov-
ing an oracle separation between BQP and P/poly seems to require some non-trivial
modifications of our proof or a very different approach.
Finally, we are able to show our main result concerning the delegation of BQP
computations in a GES with a known bound on the communication.
Theorem 3.1.10. For each d ∈ N, there exists an oracle Od such that BQPOd 6⊆
MA/O(nd)
Od .
Proof. To begin with, we first show that there exists an oracle Od relative to which the
complement of Simon’s problem does not belong to the class NP/O(nd).
The oracle Od will be constructed in the same way as we did for the P/O(nd) case.
The same proof technique can be applied here. Namely, we consider the k-th non-
deterministic polynomial-time machine Mk and we will examine its behaviour for some
input (1n, i), where n = k+n0, with n0 chosen as in Lemma 3.1.9.
For which index we initially choose a permutation and examine what Mk will do given
any possible advice of length O(nd).
If more than half of the advice strings lead to Mk rejecting the input, then we keep
this permutation for this input and proceed to the next one. Otherwise we will replace
the permutation with a 2-to-1 function constructed in the following way. For each
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advice for which Mk accepts, there must exist a path in the computational tree of size
polynomial in n which leads to an accept node. We will pick one such accepting paths
for each advice leading Mk to an accept. Then when constructing the 2-to-1 function
we want to ensure that for every input queries along all these accepted paths, the 2-to-1
function will have the same images as the initial permutation function. This reduces
the problem to the proof of Lemma 3.1.9. As a result, we know that by picking D > d,
such a 2-to-1 function exists and therefore as before for each function index we are
able to eliminate half of the possible advice strings. Finally, by choosing n0 large
enough to ensure that all advice will be eliminate after we process all inputs (after 2n
steps), we consequently have that the language coSimon(Od) is decided incorrectly by
all non-deterministic polynomial-time algorithms that receive an extra advice of size
O(nd).
For the MA/O(nd) case, we can use the same proof technique as in Lemma 3.1.8 to
reduce the MA case to the NP setting. We therefore conclude that:
coSimon(Od) 6⊆MA/O(nd)
Od (3.14)
3.2 Classical Delegation of Sampling Problems
We now want to study what would happen if we can securely and classically delegate a
sampling problem, such as Boson Sampling to a quantum Server using a GES protocol.
Boson Sampling defined by Aaronson and Arkhipov [AA11] is the problem of simu-
lating the statistics of photons (bosons) passing through a linear optics network. In this
problem we have an initial configuration of identical photons placed in known loca-
tions (referred to as modes). The photons then pass through the linear optics network,
consisting of optical elements. Finally, we perform a measurement to determine the
new location of photons, in the output modes of the system. To illustrate this process,
we can think of the following example: imagine identical balls which are dropped se-
quentially from different initial locations, through a board containing pegs arranged as
depicted in Figure 3.2. Then, the input of the problem is the arrangement of the pegs
and the output is represented by the number of balls in each output location.
The main reason why this is referred to as a sampling problem is the fact that we
have defined a probability distribution over the different configurations of photons in
the output modes.
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Figure 3.2: Analogy of the Boson Sampling problem
In the exact sampling version of this problem, called Exact Boson Sampling, which
is the problem we will be considering for the GES delegation, the task is to output a
sample from this specific probability distribution.
Regarding the complexity of Boson Sampling, Aaronson and Arkhipov [AA11] showed
that the probability of observing a particular configuration of photons in this experi-
ment is proportional to the squared permanent of a matrix describing the optical net-
work. Moreover, they showed a separation between SampBQP and SampBPP by prov-
ing that no polynomial-time probabilistic algorithm can sample from this distribution,
unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses at the third level.
As a result, while a quantum computer can simulate the optical network and sample
from the underlying target distribution in polynomial time in the size of the network,
it is highly unlikely that classical computers can achieve this.
Now, in the context of delegating Exact Boson Sampling, in a GES the classical
Client’s input would be a description of the linear optics network. The Client’s tar-
get is to obtain after the interaction with the Server a sample from the Boson Sampling
distribution associated with the input network, but such that the description of this net-
work remains information-theoretically hidden from the Server, with the only leaked
information to the Server being the size of the network.
Our main result about the delegation of Exact Boson Sampling can be summarized as
follows:
If there exists a GES for exact Boson Sampling, then for any square n×n matrix X with






sized queries to an NPNP oracle for computing the permanent of the matrix X .
Regarding the hardness of computing the permanent of a matrix, this problem is known
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to be #P-Hard. By Toda’s theorem [Tod91], we know that this implies that if solving
this problem would be possible at any level of the polynomial hierarchy, then the hierar-
chy would collapse at that level. Furthermore, regarding the exact complexity, the best
known algorithm for computing the permanent of a matrix, developed by Björklund






. Prior to this, the leading algorithm for
computing the permanent of a matrix was Ryser’s algorithm [Rys63], developed over
50 years ago, which requires O(n2n) arithmetic operations.
For these reasons, we conjecture that the circuits C cannot exist, and as a result, the
Boson Sampling cannot be classically and securely delegated.
3.2.1 The Boson Sampling Problem
We recall from section 2.2 that for sampling problems, the input describes a probability
distribution and the output is a sample from this distribution either exactly or approxi-
mately (sample from a close distribution).
In this work we will be studying exact sampling and more specifically the Exact Boson
Sampling problem. In this problem identical bosons are sent through a linear optics
network and then non-adaptive quantum measurements are performed in order to count
the number of bosons in each output mode (output location).
In more details, if our quantum system has n bosons and m output modes, then any
computational basis state of this system has the form: |S〉 = |s1〉⊗ |s2〉⊗ · · · ⊗ |sm〉,
where for any i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}, si ∈ {0,1, · · · ,n} denotes the number of bosons in mode
i. Hence we must have s1 + · · ·+ sm = n. We denote by S, the tuple (s1, · · · ,sm) such
that s1 + · · ·+ sm = n and with Sm,n the set of all such tuples S. We notice that the










where aS ∈ C such that: ∑S∈Sm,n |aS|2 = 1.
The action of the linear optics network can be expressed using a matrix A ∈ Um,n
(where Um,n is the set of m×n matrices whose columns are orthonormal).
Then we construct the matrix AS as a function of the network description A∈Um,n and
a basis state S = (s1, · · · ,sm) in the following way: AS is the n× n matrix where for
i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}, we take si copies of the i-th row of A.
New we assume that m ≥ n, and that for the initial state of the system denoted by
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|1n〉 we have one boson in each of the first n locations (and 0 in the remaining m− n
locations):
|1n〉= |1〉⊗ · · ·⊗ |1〉⊗ |0〉⊗ · · · |0〉 (3.16)
Then, it can be proven [AA11] that the target output distribution DA over Sm,n, indi-
cating the probability to a specific basis state S, after the photons passed through the
network described by matrix A, and after measuring the number of photons in each
mode, is described by:
PrDA[S] =
|Per(AS)|2
s1! · s2! · · · · · sm!
(3.17)







and Σn is the set of all permutations of {1, · · · ,n}.
As a result Exact Boson sampling is the problem of sampling from the distribution DA
defined by PrDA[S] when given the input A.
This problem is known to be hard for classical computers and we will present next one
of the arguments that support this statement. But first we need to introduce a result
known as Stockmeyer approximate counting method:
Theorem 3.2.1. [From [Sto83]] Let f : {0,1}n → {0,1} be a predicate that can be






Then, for all g≥ 1+ 1poly(n) , there exist a BPP
NP algorithm that can compute p within
a multiplicative factor of g: output p̃, such that pg ≤ p̃≤ pg.
Then, by contradiction suppose there exist a probabilistic polynomial time algo-
rithm M that can solve the Exact Boson Sampling. This is equivalent to M given the
input A (the description of the network) can output a sample from the distribution DA.
M being a BPP algorithm can be seen as a deterministic polynomial-time computable
function F that when given the input A and an additional string r ∈ {0,1}poly(n) sam-
pled uniformly at random (r can be thought as the internal random coins of M), will
output a basis state S = (s1, · · · sm) such that PrDA[S] =
|Per(AS)|2





[F(A,r) = S] =
|Per(AS)|2
s1! · s2! · · · · · sm!
(3.20)
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Consider now the initial state of the system |1n〉. We can compute the probability




[F(A,r) = |1n〉] = |Per(A|1n〉)|2 (3.21)
We will define the following predicate f :
f (A,r) =
0, if F(A,r) 6= |1n〉1, if F(A,r) = |1n〉 (3.22)
Now, using this predicate f we can express the probability of outputting |1n〉, as the









Next, we can observe that the predicate f can be computed in polynomial time,
since F can be computed in polynomial time and then we just need to check whether
the output of F is |1n〉.
Then using Stockmeyer Theorem, we can approximate the probability that F(A,r)
outputs |1n〉 up to multiplicative error using a BPPNP algorithm.
In other words, there exist a BPPNP algorithm for computing |Per(A|1n〉)|2.
On the other hand in [AA11], it is shown that any matrix M ∈ {−1,0,1}n×n can be
embedded into the input matrix A (using only an extra polynomial overhead) such that
|Per(A|1n〉)|2 is proportional to |Per(M)|2.
As a result, there exist a BPPNP algorithm that for any matrix M with elements in
{−1,0,1}, can compute a multiplicative estimate of the permanent of M. But this
problem belongs to the class #P. Additionally, BPPNP is contained within the third
level of the polynomial hierarchy. Then using Toda’s theorem, this implies that the PH
would collapse at the third level, which ends the contradiction proof.
3.2.2 GES for Exact Boson Sampling
Having a GES for a general sampling problem means that the Client’s input A is a
description of a probability distribution DA : {0,1}poly(|A|) → [0,1]. Then the Client
would interact with the Server for a polynomial number of rounds m and finally she
would apply the decryption algorithm to obtain: z := D(s̄m,k,A). Then the outcome z
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should, with probability at least 12 +
1





[D(s̄m,k,A) = z] = Pr[z←DA] (3.24)
From a security point of view, the GES should hide from the Server in an information-
theoretic sense everything about A, but its size.
Looking at our case, for the Exact Boson Sampling with m modes and n photons, the
input is represented by the m× n column orthonormal matrix A describing the linear
optics network. And the target distribution described by A is DA , whereas the Client’s
output S is a sample from DA such that: PrDA[S] =
|Per(AS)|2
s1!·s2!·····sm! .
The sample S is essentially a particular configuration of the n bosons in the m output
locations.
From Lemma 3.1.5, we know that any decision function f that can be delegated in
a GES must belong to the class MA/rpoly. The proof of Lemma 3.1.5 can be applied
for sampling problems as well.
As a result, if a Client can securely delegate exact sampling from DA to a Server using
GES, then there exist an MA/rpoly algorithm for exactly sampling from DA.
But, very importantly, the result of Lemma 3.1.4 according to which MA/rpoly =
NP/poly applies only to decision problems, and hence we cannot say this algorithm is
equivalent to an NP/poly sampling algorithm.
In our case, using the fact that MA/rpoly⊆ BPPNP/rpoly, instead of working with the
class MA/rpoly it will be simpler to consider the sampling algorithm as a BPPNP/rpoly
algorithm (due to the connection with Stockmeyer theorem, and the complexity of per-
manent, as we will see later). In other words, the existence of a GES for sampling
problems implies the existence of a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm with ac-
cess to an NP oracle and to a randomized polynomial-sized advice that can solve the
target sampling problem.
In order to connect this implication concerning the secure delegation of Exact Boson
Sampling with the complexity of computing the matrix permanent we must first show
some intermediate results about the latter in the next section.
3.2.3 Circuits for the Permanent
The aim of the following intermediate results concerning the analysis of the matrix per-
manent is to finally show that using an oracle for estimating the squared permanent of
a n×n matrix with values in {−1,0,1}, we can construct a polynomial time algorithm
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having random access to nO(n) bits of advice that can exactly compute the permanent.
We would use this result together with the assumption that using a GES a Client can
delegate the exact sampling from the Boson Sampling distribution and the result of
Björklund [Bjö16], to prove our main implication about the existence of GES for sam-
pling problems.
We first introduce the notation: given a matrix A, we will denote with Ai, j the matrix
obtained from A by eliminating the row i and the column j and with A(i1,i2),( j1, j2) the
matrix obtained from A by eliminating the rows i1 and i2 and the columns j1 and j2.
Lemma 3.2.2. Consider am n×n matrix X = (xi, j) ∈ {−1,0,1}n×n. Then there exists
an (n+2)× (n+2) matrix Z = (zi, j) ∈ {−1,0,1}(n+2)×(n+2) such that:
1. zn+2,n+2 = 0
2. Per(Z) =−Per(X)
3. Per(Zn+2,n+2) = Per(X1,1)
Proof. We give the following construction of the matrix Z:
Z =

xn,n xn,n−1 · · · xn,1 0 0
xn−1,n xn−1,n−1 · · · xn−1,1 0 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
x2,n x2,n−1 · · · x2,1 0 0
x1,n x1,n−1 · · · x1,1 1 −1
0 0 · · · 1 0 1
0 0 · · · −1 −1 0

(3.25)
For Per(Zn+2,n+2) using the Laplace development along the last row of Zn+2,n+2,
and then along the last column of Z(n+2,n+1),(n+2,n) we have:
Per(Zn+2,n+2) = 1 ·Per(Z(n+2,n+1),(n+2,n)) = Per(X1,1) (3.26)
For Per(Z) using the Laplace development along the last row we have:
Per(Z) =−Per(Zn+2,n+1−Per(Zn+2,n) (3.27)
But for Per(Zn+2,n using the development along the lost row we obtain: Per(Zn+2,n =
Per(X1,1) and similarly for Per(Zn+2,n+1) we obtain: Per(Zn+2,n+1)=Per(X)−Per(X1,1).
Therefore, Per(Z) = −Per(X)+Per(X1,1)−Per(X1,1) = −Per(X) which concludes
the proof.
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Lemma 3.2.3. Consider the matrices X =(xi, j)∈{−1,0,1}n×n, Z =(zi, j)∈{−1,0,1}m×m,
such that zm,m = 0 and m≥ 2 and the matrix W = (wi, j) ∈ {−1,0,1}(m+n−1)×(m+n−1)
constructed in the following way:
W =

z1,1 z1,2 · · · z1,m 0 · · · 0
z2,1 z2,2 · · · z2,m 0 · · · 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
zm−1,1 zm−1,2 · · · zm−1,m 0 · · · 0
zm,1 zm,2 · · · x1,1 x1,2 · · · x1,n
0 0 · · · x2,1 x2,2 · · · x2,n
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·




Per(W ) = Per(Z) ·Per(X1,1)+Per(Zm,m) ·Per(X) (3.29)
Proof. We will prove this relation by induction over m.
For the base case m = 2, we have:
W =

z1,1 z1,2 0 · · · 0
z2,1 x1,1 x1,2 · · · x1,n
0 x2,1 x2,2 · · · x2,n
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
0 xn,1 xn,2 · · · xn,n

(3.30)
In this case we have Per(Z) = z1,2 · z2,1 and Per(Z2,2) = z1,1.
For W if we use Laplace expansion for the first row, we have:
Per(W ) = z1,1 ·Per(X)+ z1,2 ·Per(W 1,2)
= z1,1 ·Per(X)+ z1,2 · z2,1 ·Per(X1,1)
= Per(Z2,2) ·Per(X)+Per(Z) ·Per(X1,1)
(3.31)
For the inductive step, we assume that the relation holds for m and we want to prove
it for dimension m+ 1. We will denote with Z′ the matrix for the m+ 1 case (of size
(m+ 1)× (m+ 1) and with W ′ the corresponding matrix (of size (m+ n)× (m+ n))
using Z′.
Then, by using Laplace expansion along the first row for W ′ we get:
Per(W ′)= z1,1Per(W ′
1,1
)+· · ·+z1,m−1Per(W ′1,m−1)+z1,mPer(W ′1,m)+z1,m+1Per(W ′1,m+1)
(3.32)
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But for any i ∈ {1, ...,m} the matrix obtained by eliminating the first row and column
i is of the same form and dimension as the matrix W , and therefore we can apply the











































But we know that Per(Z′m+1,m+1) = ∑mi=1 z1,i ·Per(Z′(1,m+1),(i,m+1)) (by using Laplace












Now, we take separately the terms from this expression.
W ′1,m+1 =

z2,1 z2,2 · · · z2,m 0 · · · 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
zm,1 zm,2 · · · zm,m 0 · · · 0
zm+1,1 zm+1,2 · · · zm+1,m x1,2 · · · x1,n
0 0 · · · 0 x2,2 · · · x2,n
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
0 0 · · · 0 xn,2 · · · xn,n

(3.35)




z2,1 z2,2 · · · z2,m
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
zm,1 zm,2 · · · zm,m




zm+1,m x1,2 · · · x1,n
0 x2,2 · · · x2,n
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
0 xn,2 · · · xn,n

(3.36)
62Chapter 3. Complexity Limitations of Classical Client Delegated Quantum Computing
Using again the induction hypothesis, we have that:
Per(W ′1,m+1) = Per(Z̄) ·Per(X̄1,1)+Per(Z̄m,m) ·Per(X̄) (3.37)
But by decomposing Per(X) after the first column we have that:
Per(X̄) = zm+1,m ·Per(X1,1)
Additionally, we observe that X̄1,1 = X1,1, and therefore we have that:
Per(W ′1,m+1) = Per(Z̄) ·Per(X1,1)+ zm+1,m ·Per(Z̄m,m) ·Per(X1,1)
= Per(X1,1)[Per(Z̄)+ zm+1,m ·Per(Z̄m,m)]
(3.38)
And now, if we analyze the Z̄ component, we have:




z2,1 z2,2 · · · z2,m
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
zm,1 zm,2 · · · zm,m
zm+1,1 zm+1,2 · · · zm+1,m
 (3.39)















Thus by combining the 3 previous equations we get:
Per(Z′1,m+1) = Per(Z̄)+ zm+1,m ·Per(Z1,m) = Per(Z̄)+ zm+1,m ·Per(Z̄m,m) (3.41)
Then by replacing this in Equation 3.38, we obtain:
Per(W ′1,m+1) = Per(X1,1) ·Per(Z′1,m+1) (3.42)
Now, finally we can go back to Per(W ′) and by replacing in Equation 3.34 the previous
expression of Per(W ′1,m+1), we derive:





















= Per(X1,1) ·Per(Z′)+Per(X) ·Per(Z′m+1,m+1)
(3.43)
which concludes the inductive proof.
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Using 2 general results about permanents we can now show that by having an
oracle that gives us a multiplicative approximation of the squared permanent of an
(n×n) matrix, we can construct a polynomial-time algorithm with nO(n) bits of advice
that can exactly compute the permanent of the matrix.
The proof of the following implication is inspired from the result of Aaronson and
Arkhipov (Thm. 4.3 of [AA11]). However, in their case the oracle was outputting a
multiplicative approximation of the squared permanent of a matrix with arbitrary real
elements, while in our case the matrices are restricted to elements from {−1,0,1}.
Theorem 3.2.4. Consider O an oracle such that when queried with input a matrix
X ∈ {−1,0,1}n×n, it outputs a value O(X) satisfying:
Per(X)2
g
≤O(X)≤ gPer(X)2 , where g ∈ [1, poly(n)] (3.44)
Then for any matrix X ∈ {−1,0,1}n×n we can compute the permanent of X, using a
polynomial time algorithm which has access to nO(n) bits of advice and that can makes
poly(n) queries to O.
Proof. We will proceed with a proof by induction over n.
For the base case n= 1, we have Per(X) = X and thus the algorithm can directly output
the input X .
For the inductive step we assume for any matrix X ∈ {−1,0,1}n×n there exist an algo-
rithm A using nO(n) bits of advice and making poly(n) queries to O, that can compute
Per(X). And we want show that for any X ′ ∈ {−1,0,1}n×n, we can construct an algo-
rithm A ′ that using (n+1)O(n+1) bits of advice and poly(n+1) queries to O that can
output Per(X ′).
Now let us examine how we can computer Per(X ′).
Firstly, if we query O and we obtain O(X ′) = 0, then this happens if and only if
Per(X ′) = 0 (Per(X
′)2
g ≤ 0, with g≥ 1, hence Per(X ′) = 0) and we are done.
Secondly, we will query O for all matrices X ′i, j to obtain all minors of order n. Now,
as Per(X) 6= 0, then there must exist a minor different from 0: exists i, j ∈ {1, · · ·n+1}
such that Per(X i, j) 6= 0 (and therefore O(X i, j)).
Then, as the permanent is invariant under the permutation of rows and columns, we
can consider (i, j) = (1,1). Therefore, we have Per(X ′) 6= 0 and Per(X ′1,1) 6= 0.
Now, if we take a matrix Z ∈ {−1,0,1}m×m, with m ≥ 2 and zm,m = 0, then from
Lemma 3.2.3, we know there exists a matrix W ∈ {−1,0,1}(m+n)×(m+n) such that:
Per(W ) = Per(Z) ·Per(X ′1,1)+Per(Zm,m) ·Per(X ′) (3.45)
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If Per(W ) = 0 and Per(Zm,m) 6= 0, then we have:




We first show there exist matrices W and Z such that Equation 3.45 holds and such
that Per(W ) = 0 and Per(Zm,m) 6= 0.
From Lemma 3.2.2 we know that there exists a matrix Z ∈ {−1,0,1}(n+3)×(n+3) such
that zn+3,n+3 = 0 and:
Per(Z) =−Per(X ′)
Per(Zn+3,n+3) = Per(X ′1,1)
(3.47)
where as Per(X ′) and Per(X ′1,1) are non-zero, then Per(Z) 6= 0 and Per(Zn+3,n+3) 6= 0.
If we set m = n+3 and by using this Z in the construction this Z in the construction of
W , we have:
Per(W ) =−Per(X ′) ·Per(X ′1,1)+Per(X ′1,1) ·Per(X ′) = 0 (3.48)
Then, we know that for any X ′ ∈ {−1,0,1}(n+1)×(n+1) there exist matrices
Z ∈ {−1,0,1}(n+3)×(n+3), with Per(Zn+3,n+3) 6= 0 such that:
Per(X ′) =−Per(X1,1) · Per(Z)
Per(Zn+3,n+3)
(3.49)
The algorithm A ′ will search for a matrix Z, it will construct the corresponding matrix
W (as in Lemma 3.2.3) and use the oracle O to test if Per(W ) = 0.
Then if Per(W ) = 0, then we can compute Per(X ′) using Equation 3.49.
To compute Per(X1,1) we will use A from the induction hypothesis, but the main ques-
tion is how to search for the matrix Z and how to compute the factor Per(Z)
Per(Zn+3,n+3) .
Here is where the advice steps in.













, where Z(i) are matrices, Z(i) ∈{−1,0,1}n+3,n+3,





6= 0. But now, we need to see how to
choose these matrices Z(i) and how many would be needed to be part of advice.









≤ (n+ 3)!. Using that 2(n+ 3)! < nO(n), we have that there are at
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) can take at most nO(n) different values.
As a result, the matrices Z(i) that constitute the advice will be chosen such that all pos-











, fi) is at most nO(n). Each tuple requires 2(n+3)2+[log(2(n+3)!)]+
[log(2(n+3)!(n+2)!)] = O(n2). As a result the size of the advice will be nO(n) ·
O(n2) = nO(n).
Furthermore, we place the tuples in the advice in ascending order with respect to fi.
Then for a given input X ′, our algorithm A ′, will search for the advice in order to find
a matrix Z(i) such that Per(W (i)) = 0 (constructed as in Lemma 3.2.3), which A ′ will
test by running O(W (i)) = 0.
Then, when such a matrix Z(i) is found we will use the corresponding fi to compute
the permanent of X ′ as:
Per(X ′) =−Per(X1,1) · fi (3.50)
Finally, to computer Per(X1,1), as X1,1 is an n×n matrix, we can run the algorithm A
from the inductive hypothesis.
Therefore, the last thing we need to take care of, is how to search in the advice for a
matrix Z(i) such that Per(W (i)) = 0.






for any i ∈ {1 · · · , l}, we have:
Per(W (i)) = Per(Z(i)) ·Per(X ′1,1)+αi ·Per(X ′) (3.51)
Equivalent to:
Per(W (i)) = αi( fi ·Per(X ′1,1)+Per(X ′)) (3.52)
Then, by running O(W (i)) we obtain a multiplicative approximation of Per(W (i))2:
Per(W (i))2
gi







And hence as αi is part of the advice, we can obtain a multiplicative approximation of











≤√gi| fi ·Per(X ′1,1)+Per(X ′)| (3.54)
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If we consider the function h(i) := Per(X ′)+ fiPer(X ′
1,1) as a function of index i ∈
{1, · · · , l}, then as fi is an increasing sequence, this means that h is a strictly increas-
ing function if Per(X ′1,1) > 0 and strictly decreasing otherwise. Hence h is a strictly
monotone and thus injective function. As we showed before, in Equation 3.49 there
exists ī such that h(ī) = 0. As h is injective it means that this solution is unique.
Therefore our goal is to find the unique ī ∈ {1, · · · , l} such that h(ī) = 0. We have





function will be strictly decreasing between 1 and ī and strictly increasing between ī
and l. We search ī using binary search as follows: we choose 2 middle points v and w
that divide the interval [1, l]. If t(v) = 0 or t(w) = 0 then we are done. Otherwise, if
t(v) < t(w), then we search on the interval [2,v], otherwise on the interval [w+ 1, l].
And we repeat this recursively, until the minimum is found.
Given that the number of tuples is nO(n), the algorithm will query O at most O(n log(n))
times. Additionally, the construction of each matrix W (i) requires O(n2) operations and
since this computation is performed O(n log(n)) times, the complexity of this step is
O(n3 log(n)). Then A ′ calls A once to computer Per(X). A in turn requires nO(n) bits
of advice and performs poly (n) queries to O. Thus, A ′ uses nO(n) bits of advice and
queries O for poly (n) times, which concludes the proof.
Theorem 3.2.5. If there exists a BPP/rpoly algorithm that can sample exactly from
the Boson Sampling distribution, then for any matrix X ∈ {−1,0,1}n×n, there exist





, making polynomially many queries to an NP oracle for
computing Per(X).
Proof. The starting point of the proof is a result of Björklund according to which for
any k≤ n, the permanent of an n×n matrix X can be expressed as a linear combination
of poly (n) · 2n−k many permanents of k× k matrices. It should be noted, that while
these k× k matrices are not necessarily minors of the original matrix X , they can still
be computed efficiently given X .
Our task is to compute all of these poly (n)2n−k permanents and then compute their
linear combination to obtain the permanent of X .
To do so, we will use the result of Theorem 3.2.4 together with the assumption of
this theorem that there exists a BPP/rpoly for Exact Boson Sampling, to show that
the permanent of any k× k matrix can be computed in polynomial time using random
access to kO(k) bits of advice and polynomially-sized queries to an NP oracle.
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Crucially, the kO(k)-sized advice will be the same for all k× k matrices. This mean
that to compute all the k× k permanents, and thus to compute Per(X), we can do it in
poly (n)2n−k time with access to kO(k) bits of advice.
The explicit value of k as a function of n will be determined later.
Consider a k× k matrix M and a parameter ε ∈ (0,1). We will embed εM, a scaled
version of M, as a submatrix of a Boson Sampling input AεM, as shown in [AA11].
In other words, AεM ∈Cm×k, with m = poly (k). Then, the probability of obtaining the
state |1k〉 in the output mode is:
p = Per(εM)2 = ε2k ·Per(M)2 (3.55)
Since Per(M)2 ≤ (k!)2, from p≤ 1, we require ε≤ 1k√k! , hence we can choose ε =
1
k .
If a BPP/rpoly algorithm can solve Exact Boson Sampling with the input network
description AεM, then there exists a BPP algorithm A and a probability distribution
Dk = {qy}y∈{0,1}poly(k) which only depends on k, such that:
∑
y∈{0,1}poly(k)




where y represents the rpoly advice sampled according to Dk.
It is clear that if we can estimate the probability p with multiplicative error in polyno-
mial time (potentially using an NP oracle and kO(k) bits of advice then we can simulate
the behaviour of the oracle O from Theorem 3.2.4 and then compute Per(M) using a
polynomial time algorithm with kO(k) bits of advice and making poly (k) queries to O.
Now, as M has elements in {−1,0,1}, then PerM ∈ Z and −k! ≤ Per(M) ≤ k!. If







Moreover, as p = Per(M)
2
k2k , p can take at most (k!)
2 < kO(k) different values.
Then, the advice string S will consist of kO(k) samples from Dk together with their
probabilities: S = {(yi,qyi)}1≤i≤kO(k) . Using this advice we can define:
pest = ∑
y∈S
qy ·Pr{A(AεM,y) = |1k〉} (3.58)
as a multiplicative estimate of p. Since A is a BPP algorithm, then as before, we
can view it as a deterministic polynomial-time computable function fA that receives
as input AεM,y and an additional random string r ∈ {0,1}l(k), with l polynomial. The
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qy · fA(AεM,y,r) (3.60)
However, it can be seen that computing pest requires summing kO(k)2l(k) terms, each of
them being computed efficiently in polynomial time using the deterministic function
fA and the advice.
Therefore, we will use Stockmeyer Theorem (Thm 3.2.1) in order to obtain a mul-
tiplicative estimate of pest . Consequently, there exists a BPPNP algorithm that can
compute pest up to a multiplicative error. This will then also yield a multiplicative
approximation of p.
More specifically, we showed that to compute the multiplicative estimate of a k× k
matrix M, we can use a BPP algorithm having access to kO(k) bits of advice and to
an NP oracle (for Stockmeyer counting). But then, this algorithm can be seen as an
implementation of the oracle O.
Therefore, from Theorem 3.2.4, we have an algorithm for computing the permanent of
M exactly, running in polynomial time using kO(k) bits of advice and access to an NP
oracle.
But very importantly, as the advice is the same for all k× k matrices, we can then re-
peat the same procedure for all poly (n) ·2n−k permanents.
This yields that in order to compute Per(X) we require poly (n) ·2n−k ·poly (k) opera-
tions and access to kO(k) bits of advice and to an NP oracle.
Finally, we need to convert this algorithm into a circuit.
We can now choose k conveniently that would minimize both the number of operations
poly (n) ·2n−k ·poly (k) and the size of the advice kO(k).
Then if we choose k = c · nlogn , for some constant c > 0 , we have:



































bits of advice we
consider that the gates have unbounded fan-in. Hence, the advice bits are hardcoded
into the circuit and fed whenever the algorithm A uses them. Since only polynomially
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many bits of advice are used at any given step of the algorithm, this will increase the






, concluding the proof.
We are now ready to show our main result about the secure delegation of the Boson
Sampling problem.
Theorem 3.2.6. If Exact Boson Sampling admits a GES then for any matrix X ∈





making poly-sized queries to an
NPNP oracle for computing Per(X).
Proof. If Boson Sampling admits a GES then as shown in subsection 3.2.2 this im-
plies that there exist a BPP algorithm with access to an NP oracle and to a randomized
poly-sized advice that can sample from the Boson Sampling distribution DA.
The result of Theorem 3.2.5 relativises with respect to an NP oracle. More specifi-
cally, this implies that if a BPPNP/rpoly algorithm can sample exactly from the Boson






making poly-sized queries to an NPNP oracle that can compute the perma-




Secure delegated quantum computation between a classical client and a quantum server
with information theoretic security is implausible given our results in the previous
chapter. As a result, we turn our attention to achieving the same task under more
restricted levels of security. Specifically, the question we address in this chapter is
obtaining classical delegation of quantum computations with post-quantum computa-
tional security against a malicious Server.
To achieve this task, the key is a primitive that allows us to replace the need
for (a particular) quantum communication channel with a computationally (but post-
quantum) secure generation of secret and random qubits using exclusively classical
resources. This can be used by classical clients to achieve blind quantum computing
but also, because of the modularity of the functionality, can be used in a number of
other applications too (such as multi-party quantum computation).
We call this primitive classical client remote state preparation (CC−RSP), where
a classical client can instruct the preparation of a sequence of random qubits at some
distant party. Their classical description is (computationally) unknown to any other
party (including the distant party preparing them) but known to the client. We em-
phasize the unique feature that no quantum communication is required to implement
CC−RSP. This enables classical clients to perform a class of quantum communica-
tion protocols with only a public classical channel between the classical clients and a
quantum server. One of the main example is in fact our goal, purely classical-client
(computational) secure delegation of quantum computations.
In this chapter we will give a concrete protocol called HBC−QFactory imple-
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menting CC−RSP, using the Learning-With-Errors problem to construct a trapdoor
one-way function with certain desired properties (quantum-safe, two-regular, collision-
resistant). We then prove the security in the game-based framework, in the semi-honest
setting.
The CC−RSP primitive, viewed as a resource, by replacing the need for quantum
channel between parties in certain quantum communication protocols with trade-off
that the protocols become computationally secure (against quantum adversaries), has a
wide range of applications. Here we will present a general overview of the applications
of CC−RSP.
The first category of applications concerns a large class of delegated quantum com-
putation protocols, including blind quantum computation and verifiable blind quan-
tum computation. These protocols are of great importance, enabling information-
theoretically secure (and verifiable) access to a quantum cloud. However, the require-
ment for quantum communication limits their domain of applicability. This limitation
is removed by replacing the off-line preparation stage with our QFactory protocol.
Concretely, we can use QFactory to implement the blind quantum computation pro-
tocol of [BFK09], as well as the verifiable blind quantum computation protocols (e.g.
those in [FK17, Bro15b, FKD17]), in order to achieve classical-client secure and veri-
fiable access to a quantum cloud.
The second category of applications refers a more general family of protocols for which
their quantum communication consists of random single qubits similar to those pro-
vided by our protocol HBC−QFactory, such as: quantum-key-distribution [BB14],
quantum money [BOV+18], quantum coin-flipping [PCDK11], quantum signatures
[WDKA15], etc.
In this chapter our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We define the primitive Classical Client Remote State Preparation (CC−RSPθ1)
in section 4.2. CC−RSPθ can replace the need for quantum channel between
parties in certain quantum communication protocols with trade-off that the pro-
tocols become computationally secure (against quantum adversaries).
2. We give a basic protocol (HBC−QFactory) that achieves this functionality from
a correctness point of view, given a trapdoor one-way function that is quantum-
1the parameter θ refers to the set of quantum states produced by this primitive, which are the quan-
tum states {|+θ〉}θ∈{0,··· ,7π/4}
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safe, two-regular and collision resistant in section 4.3 and prove its correctness.
3. We prove the security of the HBC−QFactory against Honest-But-Curious server
(server follows the protocol specifications, but can try to infer any information
about the secret from the classical transcripts) or against any malicious third
party using a game based security definition. To show the security we prove that
the classical description of the generated qubits is a hard-core function (follow-
ing a reduction similar that of the Goldreich-Levin Theorem) in section 4.4.
4. While the above-mentioned results do not depend on the specific function used,
the existence of such specific functions (with all desired properties) makes the
CC−RSPθ a practical primitive that can be employed as described in this paper.
In section 4.5, we first give methods for obtaining two-regular trapdoor one-way
functions with extra properties (collision resistant or second preimage resistant)
assuming the existence of simpler trapdoor one-way functions (permutation trap-
door or homomorphic trapdoor functions). We use reductions to prove that the
resulting functions maintain all the properties required. Furthermore, we give
in subsection 4.5.3 an explicit family of functions that respect all the required
properties based on the security of the Learning-With-Errors problem as well as
a possible instantiation of the parameters. This function is also quantum-safe,
and thus directly applicable for our setting. Note, that other functions may also
be used, such as the one in [BCM+18] or functions based on the Niederreither
cryptosystem and the construction in [FGK+10].
5. Finally, we implement HBC−QFactory on the quantum computer IBM Quan-
tum Experience using a toy function (given the current limited number of avail-
able qubits we consider a 2-regular function acting on a small number of bits,
consequently, it cannot be post-quantum secure). Hence, we provide in addition
to the theoretical results, an experimental evidence of the correctness and output
distribution of the HBC−QFactory Protocol on a real quantum device.
4.1 Overview of the Protocol and Proof
The general idea is that a classical client gives instructions to a quantum server to per-
form certain actions (quantum computation). Those actions lead to the server having
as output a single qubit, which is randomly chosen from within a set of possible states
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of the form |+θ〉 := 1/
√
2(|0〉+ eiθ |1〉), where θ ∈ {0, π4 , · · · , 7π4 }. The randomness of
the output qubit is due to the (fundamental) randomness of quantum measurements that
are part of the instructions that the client gives. Moreover, the server cannot guess the
value of θ any better than if he had just received that state directly from the client (up to
negligible probability). This is possible because the instructed quantum computation
is generically a computation that is hard to (i) classically simulate and (ii) to reproduce
quantumly because it is unlikely (exponentially in the number of measurements) that
by running the same instructions the server obtains the exact same measurement out-
comes twice. On the other hand, we wish the client to know the classical description
and thus the value of θ. To achieve this task, the instructions/quantum computation
the client uses are based on a family of trapdoor one-way functions with certain extra
properties2. Such functions are hard to invert (e.g. for the server) unless someone (the
client in our case) has some extra “trapdoor” information tk. This extra information
makes the quantum computation easy to classically reproduce for the client, which can
recover the value θ, while it is still hard to classically reproduce for the server. Sending
random qubits of the above type, is exactly what is required from the client in most of
the protocols and applications given earlier, while with simple modifications our pro-
tocol could achieve other similar sets of states.
Our HBC−QFactory protocol can heuristically be described in the next steps:
Preparation. The client randomly selects a function fk, from a family of trapdoor
one-way, quantum-safe, two-regular and collision resistant functions. The choice of fk
is public (server knows), but the trapdoor information tk needed to invert the function
is known only to the client.
Stage 1: Preimages Superposition. The client instructs the server (i) to apply Hadamard(s)
on the control register, (ii) to apply U fk on the target register i.e. to obtain ∑x |x〉⊗
| fk(x)〉 and (iii) to measure the target register in the computational basis, in order to
obtain a value y. This collapses his state to the state (|x〉+ |x′〉)⊗|y〉, where x,x′ are
the unique two preimages of y 3.
Remarks. First we note that each image y appears with same probability (therefore,
2The functions should also be two-regular (each image has exactly two preimages), quantum safe
(secure against quantum attackers) and collision resistant (hard to find two inputs with the same image).
3The uniqueness of the 2 preimages is due to the fact that the function is two-regular.
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obtaining twice the same y happens with negligible probability). We now consider the
first register |x〉+ |x′〉= |x1 · · ·xn〉+ |x′1 · · ·x′n〉, where the subscripts denote the different









|0 · · ·0〉G + |1 · · ·1〉G
)
where Ḡ is the set of bits positions where x,x′ are identical, G is the set of bits positions
where the preimages differ, while we have suitably changed the order of writing the
qubits. It is now evident that the state at the end of Stage 1 is a tensor product of iso-
lated |0〉 and |1〉 states, and a Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state with random
X’s applied. The crucial observation is that the connectivity (which qubit belongs to
the GHZ and which doesn’t) depends on the XOR of the two preimages x⊕ x′ and is
computationally impossible to determine, with non-negligible advantage, without the
trapdoor information tk.
Stage 2: Squeezing. The client instructs the server to measure each qubit i (except the
output) in a random basis {|0〉±eiαiπ/4 |1〉} and return back the measurement outcome
bi. The output qubit is of the form |+θ〉= 1/
√








(xi− x′i)(4bi +αi) mod 8 (4.1)
Intuitively, measuring qubits that are not connected has no effect to the output,
while measuring qubits within the GHZ part, rotates the phase of the output qubit (by
a (−(1)xiαi + 4bi)π/4 angle). The above intuition shows that our HBC−QFactory
protocol is correct, as fully proven in Theorem Theorem 4.3.1.
Security. The protocol is secure, if we can prove that the server (or other third parties)
cannot guess (obtain noticeable advantage in guessing) the classical description of the
state, i.e. the value of θ. We consider an honest-but-curious server which means that
he essentially follows the protocol and the security reduces in proving that the server
cannot use his classical information to obtain any advantage in guessing the classical
description of the (honest) quantum output.
The server does not know the two preimages x,x′ and needs to guess θ (which is a
three-bit string) from the value of the image y. The key technical part of the security
proof is showing a variant of the Goldreich-Levin theorem [GL89], that (informally)
states that the predicate represented by the inner product of the preimage of a one-way
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function with a random vector, taken modulo 2, is indistinguishable from a random bit.
In our case, θ has a similar expression (4.1) as it can be expressed as the inner product
between the XOR of two preimages and a random vector taken modulo 8. We prove
in Theorem 4.4.4 that if a computationally bounded server could obtain non-trivial
advantage in guessing θ, then he could also break the property of “second preimage
resistance” which we requested4 for our function fk. To prove this theorem we first
express each of the 3 bits of θ as a XOR between a Goldreich-Levin type of predicate
and some extra functions. Each of these predicates, instead of having a preimage in
the inner product, they have the (bitwise) XOR of the two preimages. We therefore
show that guessing any of those predicates would break the (stronger) assumption of
collision resistance, reaching a contradiction. Then, to connect the hardness of com-
puting the bits of θ (each of the three predicates) with the hardness of computing θ,
we use the theorem [VV85] to address the issue of possible correlations. The technical
hardest part of Theorem 4.4.4 is on the one hand that we fix all but one variable in the
expression of each predicate (bit of θ), with an extra cost that is an inverse polynomial
probability and on the other hand that we then use a “disentangling” trick to express
the bits as the XOR between a Goldreich-Levin predicate and an extra function (now
independent of the other variables).
Using the property of θ mentioned above, we then prove the full security of the
HBC−QFactory protocol by showing the game-based security holds through a reduc-
tion to the hardcore function property of θ in Theorem 4.4.3. More specifically, we
show that if the server runs honestly the protocol, but keeps a record of the classical
transcript of the protocol together with the measurement outcomes he performs, then
it is hard for him to correlate this internal view of the protocol with the protocol output
(θ, |+θ〉).
The function. Our protocol relies on using functions that have a number of proper-
ties (one-way, trapdoor, two-regular, collision resistant (see Remark 4.1.1)), quantum
safe). Any function satisfying those conditions is suitable for our protocol. While in
first thought some of these appear hard to satisfy jointly (e.g. two-regularity and colli-
sion resistance), we give two constructions that achieve those properties from simpler
functions: one from injective, homomorphic trapdoor one-way function and one from
bijective trapdoor one-way function. Both constructions define a new function that has
4We actually request the strongest collision-resistance property that implies the second preimage
resistance.
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domain extended by one bit, and the value of that bit “decides” whether one uses the
initial basic function or not.
More specifically, for the first construction, let us denote the injective, homomor-
phic, trapdoor one-way function by gk, with k the public description of the function
and tk the trapdoor - used for the inversion of the function gk. Then, we pick at random
an element x0 from the domain of gk. The public description k′ of the new desired
function f will be k along with gk(x0) and the corresponding trapdoor tk′ of f would
be tk along with x0.
Then, the function f , which is evaluated by the server, is described as: fk′(x,c) =
gk(x)+ c · gk(x0), which due to the homomorphic property of g, can be rewritten as:
fk′(x,c) = gk(x+ c · x0). Now, we can see the 2-regularity property of f as, since gk
is injective, f will always have exactly 2 preimages of the form: x and x+ x0, which
can always be efficiently computed from the image of f using tk′ . The one-wayness
and quantum-safety of f are then proved by reduction to the one-wayness, respectively
quantum-safety of g and finally, we prove the collision-resistance of f , by reducing it
to the one-wayness of g.
For the second construction, we denote by g, a bijective, trapdoor one-way function.
Then, in order to construct f , we will basically use 2 such functions g: the public de-
scription k′ of f will consist of k0 and k1 – the public descriptions of gk0 and gk1 and
the trapdoor of fk′ will consist of the pair tk′ = (tk0, tk1) – the trapdoors of gk0 and gk1 .
Then, the function f , evaluated by the server, is described as: fk′(x,c) = gkc(x). Now,
we can see the 2-regularity property of f as, since gk is bijective, every y from the
image of f , will have 2 preimages, namely the unique preimage of gk0 and the unique
preimage of gk1 , which can be both computed from y using tk′ . Then, in section A.2
we prove the one-wayness and quantum-safety of f by reduction to one-wayness and
quantum-safety of g and finally, we prove the second preimage-resistance of f by re-
duction to the one-wayness of one of the 2 functions g.
We then give a real implementation of the required function f based on the first
type of construction, starting from the injective trapdoor one-way function defined in
[MP12], which is derived from the Learning-With-Errors problem : gK(s,e)= stK+et ,
where s ∈ Znq and K ∈ Zn×mq , so using the above notation, we have x = (s,e) and x0 =
(s0,e0). This function also seems to satisfy the homomorphic property with respect
to addition modulo q: gK(s,e) + gK(s0,e0) mod q = (stK + et + st0K + e
t
0) mod q =
gK((s+ s0) mod q,e+ e0). Unfortunately, things are not so simple, because the do-
main of the error vector e ∈ Zm is such that each component of e is bounded by some
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value µ, in order for g to be injective and correctly inverted using the trapdoor. This
implies that g is homomorphic as long as e+ e0 is also bounded (in infinite norm) by
µ. In our case, this means that e+e0 may not be small enough to lie within g’s domain,
so it may be possible to have only one preimage for some image y. To overpass these
problems, we do the following:
When we are constructing the trapdoor for the function f , in particular when we are
sampling x0 = (s0,e0) from the domain of g, we will in fact sample e0 from a smaller
set, such that when it will be added together with a random input e, the total noise vec-
tor will still be small enough to lie within the domain of g with some good probability.
What we prove is that as long as e0 is sampled from a subset of the domain of g
such that e0 is now bounded by µ′ =
µ
m , we will get that with at least a constant proba-
bility, e+e0 is inside the domain of g, or in other words that f is now 2-regular with at
least a constant probability. What remains to be proven is that when e0 is restricted to
this smaller domain, gK(s0,e0) still cannot be inverted by an adversary. Therefore, as
a final step we prove that there exists an explicit choice of parameters such that both g
and the restriction of g to the domain of e0 are one-way functions and such that all the
other properties of g are preserved.
As a result, under this choice of parameters, we obtain our desired function f ,
satisfying all required properties: one-wayness, trapdoor, collision-resistance and 2-
regularity (with at least constant probability), where the hardness of inverting f is
proven by reduction to worst-case hardness of approximating short vectors problems,
with polynomial approximation factor, which is the current standard in lattice-based
cryptosystems.
Remark 4.1.1. It appears that the second preimage resistance property will be enough
to prove the security of our scheme in the honest-but-curious setting. However, as soon
as the server can be malicious, the collision resistance property will be very important,
else the server might forge known valid states, which would break the security.
4.2 CC−RSPθ Primitive
In many distributed protocols the required communication consists of sending se-
quence of single qubits prepared in random states that are unknown to the receiver
(and any other third parties). What we want to achieve is a way to generate remotely
single qubits that are random and (appear to be) unknown to all parties but the client
that gives the instructions.
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. We define the set of states:
R := {|+θ〉} where θ ∈ {0,π/4,π/2, · · · ,7π/4} (4.2)
By including magic states (
∣∣+π/4〉), this set of states can be viewed as a “univer-
sal” resource, as applying Clifford operations on those states is sufficient for universal
quantum computation. Furthermore, it is sufficient to implement both Blind Quantum
Computation (e.g.[BFK09]) and Verifiable Blind Quantum Computation (e.g.[FKD17]).
We emphasize that the aim of defining an ideal functionality is to highlight the task
we want to achieve (in terms of correctness) with our protocol HBC−QFactory, rather
than using it in a simulation or composable security definition.
Protocol 1 Primitive: Clasical Channel Remote State Preparation (CC−RSPθ)
Requirements: Client is a purely classical party with no access to quantum resources.
Public Information: A distribution on pairs of lists M, intuitively containing the values of the
classical variables used by the client and by the server.
Trusted Party:
– With some probability p returns to both parties abort, otherwise:
– Samples (mC,mS)←M
– Samples θ←{0,1}3 · π4
– Prepares a qubit in state |+θ〉
Outputs:
– Either returns abort to both client and server
– Or returns (mC,θ) to the client, and (mS, |+θ〉) to the server
Remark 4.2.2. (i) The outcome of this primitive is the client “sending” the qubit |+θ〉
(that she knows) to the server, thus simulating a quantum channel. (ii) We note that
there is an abort possibility and some auxiliary classical messages (mC,mS), both
included to make the primitive general enough to allow for our construction. Further-
more, the classical description of the qubit, θ, and the classical messages (mC,mS) are
totally uncorrelated (as θ is chosen randomly for each (mC,mS). (iii) While the server
can learn something about the classical description (e.g. by measuring the qubit), this
information is limited and is the exact same information that he could obtain if the
client had prepared and send a random qubit.
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4.3 The Real Protocol
We assume the existence5 of a family { fk : {0,1}n→{0,1}m}k∈K of trapdoor one-way
functions that are two-regular and collision resistant (or the weaker second preimage
resistance property, see Remark 4.1.1) even against a quantum adversary. For any y,
we will denote by x(y) and x′(y) the two unique different preimages of y by fk (if the
y is clear, we may remove it from x(y) and x′(y) and denote the 2 preimages as x and
x′). Note that because of the two-regularity property m ≥ n−1. We use subscripts to
denote the different bits of the strings.
Protocol 2 Real HBC−QFactory Protocol
Requirements:
Public: A family F = { fk : {0,1}n→{0,1}m} of trapdoor one-way functions that are quantum-
safe, two-regular and collision resistant (or second preimage resistant, see Remark 4.1.1)
Input:
– Client: uniformly samples a set of random three-bits strings α = (α1, · · · ,αn−1) where
αi←{0,1}3, and runs the algorithm (k, tk)←GenF (1n). The α and k are public inputs (known
to both parties), while tk is the “private” input of the Client.
Stage 1: Preimages superposition
– Client: instructs Server to prepare one register at⊗nH |0〉 and second register initiated at |0〉m
– Client: returns k to Server and the Server applies U fk using the first register as control and the
second as target
– Server: measures the second register in the computational basis, obtains the outcome y and
returns this result y to the Client. Here, an honest Server would have a state (|x〉+ |x′〉)⊗|y〉
with fk(x) = fk(x′) = y and y ∈ Im fk.
Stage 2: Squeezing





basis. Server obtains the outcomes b = (b1, · · · ,bn−1) and returns the
result b to the Client.
– Client: using the trapdoor tk computes x,x′. Then check if the n-th bit of x and x′ (corre-
sponding to the y received in stage 1) are the same or different. If they are the same, returns
abort, otherwise, obtains the classical description of the Server’s state.
Output: If the protocol is run honestly, when there is no abort, the state that Server has is |+θ〉,








(xi− x′i)(4bi +αi) mod 8 (4.3)
5See section 4.5 for our function. With that choice, we are guaranteed that the last bits of the two
preimages are always different, and thus no need for an abort. We keep the protocol general so that
different functions can be used.
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Remarks: The first thing to note is that the server should not only be unable to guess θ
from his classical communications, but he should also be unable to distinguish it from
a random string with probability greater than negligible. We will prove this later, but
for now it is enough to point out that θ depends on the preimages x and x′ of y (which
the Client can obtain using tk).
The second thing to note is that while our expression of θ resembles the inner
product in the Goldreich-Levin (GL) theorem, it differs in a number of places and
our proof (that θ is a hard-core function), while it builds on GL theorem proof, is
considerably more complicated. Details can be found in the security proof, but here we
simply mention the differences: (i) our case involves three-bits rather than a predicate,
and the different bits, if we view them separately, may not be independent, (ii) we have
a term (x−x′) rather than a single preimage, so rather than the one-way property of the
function we will need the second preimage resistance and (iii) for the same reason, if
we view our function as an inner product, it can take both negative and positive values
((x− x′) could be negative).
A third thing to note is that we have singled-out the last qubit of the first register,
as the qubit that will be the output qubit. One could have a more general protocol
where the output qubit is chosen randomly, or, for example, in the set of the qubits that
are known to have different bit values between x and x′, but this would not improve
our analysis so we keep it like this for simplicity. Moreover, while the “inner product”
normally involves the full string x that one tries to invert, in our case, it does not include
one of the bits (the last) of the string we wish to invert. It is important to note, that it
does not change anything to our proofs, since if one can invert all the string apart from
one bit with inverse polynomial probability of success, then trivially one can invert the
full string with inverse polynomial probability (by randomly guessing the remaining
bit or by trying out both values of that bit). Therefore, all the proofs by contradiction
are still valid and in the remaining, for notational simplicity, we will take the inner
products to involve all n bits.
4.3.1 Correctness and intuition
Theorem 4.3.1. If both the Client and the Server follow Protocol 2, the protocol aborts
when xn = x′n, while otherwise the Server ends up with the output (single) qubit being
in the state |+θ〉, where θ is given by Eq. (4.3).
Proof. In the first stage, before the first measurement, but after the application of U fk ,
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the state is ∑x |x〉⊗ | fk(x)〉. What the measurement does, is that it collapses the first
register in the equal superposition of the two unique preimages of the measured y =
fk(x) = fk(x′), in other words in the state (|x〉+ |x′〉)⊗|y〉. It is not possible, even for
malicious adversary (not considered here), to force the output of the measurement to
be a given y (see [Aar05] for relation of PostBQP with BQP). This completes the first
stage of the protocol. Before proceeding with the proof of correctness we make three
observations.
By the second preimage resistance property of the trapdoor function, learning x is
not sufficient to learn x′ but with negligible probability, and intuitively, by the stronger
collision resistance property, even a malicious server cannot forge a state |x〉+ |x′〉
(with f (x) = f (x′)) fully known to him.
Then, we examine what happens if the last bit of x and x′ are the same and see why
the protocol aborts. In this case, in the first register, the last qubit is in product form
with the remaining state, and therefore any further measurements in stage 2 do not
affect it, leaving it in the state |xn〉. Because of this, the output state is not of the form
of Eq. (4.3), while including this states in the set of possible outputs would change
considerably our analysis.
Finally, we should note that the resulting state is essentially a Greenberger-Horne-
Zeilinger (GHZ) state [GHZ89]: let G be the set of bits positions where x and x′ differ
(which include n – output qubit), while Ḡ is the set where they are identical. The state
is then (where we no longer keep the qubits in order, but group them depending on






∣∣x j〉+⊗ j∈G ∣∣x j⊕1〉) (4.4)









|0 · · ·0〉G + |1 · · ·1〉G
)
(4.5)
It is now evident that the state at the end of Stage 1 is a tensor product of isolated
|0〉 and |1〉 states, and a GHZ state with random X’s applied.
The important thing to note, is that the set G, that determines which qubits are in
the GHZ state and which qubits are not, is not known to the server (apart from the
fact that the position of the output qubit belongs to G since otherwise the protocol
aborts). Moreover, this set denotes the positions where x and x′ differ, which is given
by the XOR of the two preimages x⊕ x′ := (x1⊕ x′1, · · · ,xn⊕ x′n). Because of second
preimage resistance of the function, the server should not be able to invert and obtain
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x⊕ x′ apart with negligible probability (without access to the trapdoor tk). This in
itself does not guarantee that the Server cannot learn any information about the XOR
of the preimages, but we will see that the actual form of the state is such that being
able to obtain information would lead to invert the full XOR and thus break the second
preimage resistance.
Now let us continue towards Stage 2. Measuring a qubit (other than the last one)
in Ḡ has no effect on the last qubit (since it is disentangled). When the qubit index is
in G, then measuring it at angle αiπ/4 gives a phase to the output qubit of the form
(−(−1)xiαi+4bi)π/4 as one can easily check6. Therefore, adding all the phases leads
to the output state being:











Because θ is defined modulo 2π and −4 = 4 mod 8, we can express the output angle














Note that because the angles are defined modulo 2π, one can represent this angle as
a 3-bits string B̃ (interpreted as an integer) such that θ := B̃× π4 and eventually remove
the (−1)xn if needed by choosing the suitable convention in defining x and x′.
A final remark is that in an honest run of this protocol, the measurement outcomes
bi and y are uniformly chosen from {0,1} and Im( fk) respectively. This justifies why
in the honest-but-curious model we can view the protocol as sampling randomly the
different α,y,b’s.
4.4 Security of HBC−QFactory
Here we will prove the security of HBC−QFactory (Protocol 2) against Honest-But-
Curious adversaries in the game-based security model. Before proceeding further, it is
worth stressing that this security level has three-fold importance. Firstly, the Honest-
But-Curious model concerns any application of CC−RSPθ that involves a protocol
6The (−1)xi -term arises because of the commutation of Xxii with the measurement angle, and the
final Xxnn gate gives an overall (−1)xn to the angle of deviation
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where the adversaries are third parties that have access to the classical communica-
tion and nothing else. In this case, we can safely assume that the quantum part of the
protocol is followed honestly and we only require to prove that the third parties learn
nothing about the classical description of the state from the classical public communi-
cation. Second case of interest is scenarios where the “server” does not intend to sabo-
tage/corrupt the computation but may be interested to learn (for free) extra information.
In such case, the protocol should be followed honestly, since any non-reversible devi-
ation other than copying classical information could corrupt the computation. Finally,
the Honest-But-Curious case, as in the classical setting, is a first step towards proving
the full security against malicious adversaries.
4.4.1 Game-Based Security Definition
Definition 4.4.1. In the following, HBC−QFactory is said to be secure if for all QPT















k̃, α̃, ỹ, b̃,θ(c), |+
θ(c)〉
c̃
Adversary A wins the game Gsec if and only if c = c̃.
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) = c]≤ 1
2
+negl (n) (4.9)
Remark 4.4.2. Note that a stronger game could have been defined, where the |+θ〉




, along with θ(c). This would be closer
to the actual view of an honest but curious adversary, but it is not possible to prove









in the basis θ(c) and
output c̃ = 0 only if the measurement outcome was 0.
The case c = 0 corresponds to the adversary receiving a transcript of the protocol




) matching to this tran-
script. The case c = 1 corresponds to adversary receiving a transcript of the protocol




). The game ensures that an
adversary cannot distinguish these two views. The security of Gsec tries to capture the
following idea: If an adversary (server) runs honestly the protocol and keeps a record
of the measurements he performs together with the transcripts he receives during the
protocol, it must be hard for him to correlate this internal view with the output of the
protocol (θ, |+θ〉). This is why in the game we ask the adversary to distinguish whether
he has access to either a correlated or an uncorrelated θ.
4.4.2 Game-Based Security of HBC−QFactory
Theorem 4.4.3. For any QPT adversary A , the game Gsec can be won with probability
at most ≥ 12 +negl (n).
To prove that HBC−QFactory is secure according to Definition 4.4.1 we will rely
on the following result, proven in Section 4.4.3:











as was defined in Protocol 2, is a hard-core function with respect to fk.
NB: here the collision resistance is not needed and is replaced by the weaker second
preimage resistance property.
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Proof of Theorem 4.4.3. The main idea would be to use a reduction to the hardcore
property of the state description θ. We will assume that there exists an adversary A
that can win Gsec with probability 12 + p and we will construct an adversary A
′ that can
break the hard-core function property of θ with probability 18 +
p
4 . This implies that if
the game Gsec can be won with inverse polynomial probability, the same applies to the
hard-core function property, and hence we reach a contradiction.
More specifically, let us assume that the adversary A can win with probability
1
2 + p0 when c = 0 and with probability
1
2 + p1 when c = 1. Then, we have:
Pr[A wins Gsec] = Pr[c̃ = c] = Pr[c̃ = 0 |c = 0] ·
1
2
+Pr[c̃ = 1 |c = 1] · 1
2
So we have: Pr[c̃ = 0 |c = 0]+Pr[c̃ = 1 |c = 1] = 1+2p.
By denoting Pr[c̃ = 0 |c = 0] = 12 + p0 and Pr[c̃ = 1 |c = 1] = 12 + p1, we obtain:
p0 + p1 = 2p.
Now we can define the following adversary A ′ that will attack the hardcore prop-
erty of the state description using the adversary A for the game Gsec. Namely, A ′ will
receive the tuple (y,b,k) - representing the messages that an adversary has during an
honest run of HBC−QFactory and will try to determine the underlying state descrip-
tion θ.
A ′(y,b,k,α)
1 : φ←${0,1}3 · π
4
2 : Sends (k,α,y,b,φ,
∣∣+φ〉) to A
3 : c̃← A(k,α,y,b,φ,
∣∣+φ〉)
4 : if (c̃ == 0) then
5 : θ̃← φ
6 : elseif (c̃ == 1) then
7 : θ̃←${0,1}3 · π
4
−{φ}
8 : return θ̃
Now we want to determine the probability that the output of the adversary A is
equal to the “true” θ(y,b,k,α) that is obtained by Inv(tk,y,b,α).
We will consider separately two cases, namely: (i) φ = θ(y,b,k,α) and (ii) φ 6=
θ(y,b,k,α). Since φ is chosen randomly from the eight possible angles, it is clear that
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case (i) occurs with probability 1/8 and case (ii) occurs with probability 7/8.
(i) A receives the “true” state (c = 0), so to win the game he needs to return c̃ = 0.
By definition this happens with 12 + p0, and in this case A
′ also wins (since he
outputs the correct state). The overall probability that all this happens, i.e. that





(ii) A receives one of the “false” states (c = 1), and thus to win Gsec he needs to
return c̃ = 1. By definition this happens with probability 12 + p1. Now, in this
case, A ′ has essentially ruled-out one of the eight possible states. His random
guess, after ruling-out one state, succeeds with probability 17 . Combining all this





More explicitly, the probability that A ′ breaks the hardcore property of θ is (where we
denoted the “true” θ(y,b,k,α) by simply θ):
Pr[A ′(y,b,k,α) = θ] = Pr[A ′(y,b,k,α) = θ |φ = θ] ·Pr[φ = θ]+




·Pr[A ′(y,b,k,α) = θ |φ = θ]+ 7
8




Pr[c̃ = 0 |c = 0]+ 7
8

































We showed that Adversary A ′ succeeds with probability 18 +
p
4 in guessing θ(y,b,k,α),
where p is the advantage A has in Gsec. However, we will prove in Theorem 4.4.4, that
A can’t win with probability better than 1/8+negl (n). Contradiction.
4.4.3 Hardcore Function θ
Proof Sketch of Theorem 4.4.4. In Protocol 2, the adversary (Server) can only use the
classical information that he possesses (k,y,α,b) in order to try and guess with some
probability the value of θ in the case that there is no abort. Since the adversary follows
the honest protocol, the choices of y,b are truly random (and not determined by the
adversary as he could in the malicious case).
Outline of proof sketch: We first express the classical description of the state into
expressions for each of the corresponding three bits. The aim is to prove that it is
impossible to distinguish the sequence of these three bits from three random bits with
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non-negligible probability. To show this we follow five steps. In Step 1 we express
each of the the bits as a sum mod two, of an inner product (of the form present in GL
theorem) and some other terms. In Step 2 we show that guessing the sum modulo two
of the two preimages breaks the second preimage resistance of the function and thus
is impossible. We assume that the adversary can achieve some inverse polynomial ad-
vantage in guessing certain predicates and in the remaining steps we show that in this
case he can obtain a polynomial inversion algorithm for the one-way function fk, and
thus reach the contradiction. In Step 3 we use the Vazirani-Vazirani Theorem 2.3.11
to reduce the proof of hard-core function to a number of single hard-core bits (pred-
icates). In Step 4 we use a result that allows us to fix all but one variable in each
expression, with an extra cost that is an inverse polynomial probability and therefore
the (fixed variables) guessing algorithm still needs to have negligible success proba-
bility. Finally, in Step 5, we reduce all the predicates in a form of a known hard-core
predicate XOR with a function that involves variables not included in that predicate.
Using the previous step, it reduces to guessing the XOR of a hard-core predicate with a
constant, which is bounded by the probability of guessing the (known to be hard-core)
predicate.
Here we give the sketch described above, while the full proof can be found in the
section A.1. Let us start by defining:








where B̃i are single bits. Moreover, we treat x,x′ as vectors in {0,1}n; we define
α( j) = (α
( j)
1 , · · · ,α
( j)
n−1) the vector that involves the j ∈ {1,2,3} bit of each of three-bit
strings α, and we define x̃ := x⊕ x′. We define z as a vector in {−1,0,1}n defined as
the element-wise differences of the bits of x and x′, i.e. zi = xi− x′i. Finally, as in GL
theorem, we will denote the inner product of 2 vectors a and b each with n−1 elements
as: 〈a,b〉= ∑n−1i=1 aibi.
We will prove that any QPT adversary A having all the classical information that









where for simplicity we denote the function f instead of fk. This means that the ad-
versary A cannot distinguish B̃ from a random three-bit string with non-negligible
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probability.
Step 1: We decompose Eq. (4.12) into three separate bits, and use the variable x̃,z
defined above.
B̃3 = 〈x̃,α(3)〉 mod 2
B̃2 = 〈x̃,α(2)〉 mod 2⊕h2(z,α(3))
B̃1 = 〈x̃,α(1)〉 mod 2⊕h1(z,α(3),α(2),b) (4.14)
where the derivation and exact expressions for the functions h1,h2 are given in sec-
tion A.1. We notice from Eq. (4.14) that each bit includes a term of the form 〈x̃,α(i)〉 mod
2 which on its own is a hard-core predicate following the GL theorem.
Step 2: By the second preimage resistance we have:
Pr
x←{0,1}n
[A(1n,x) = x′ such that f (x) = f (x′) and x 6= x′]≤ negl (n)⇒
Pr
x←{0,1}n
[A(1n,x) = x′⊕ x = x̃]≤ negl (n) (4.15)
For each bit j ∈ {1,2,3}, separately we assume that the adversary can achieve an
advantage in guessing B̃ j which is 12 +ε j(n). Then, similarly to GL theorem, we prove
that if this ε j(n) is inverse polynomial, this leads to contradiction with Eq. (4.15) since
one can obtain an inverse-polynomial inversion algorithm for the one-way function f .
Step 3: While each bit includes terms that on its own it would make it hard-core predi-
cate (as stated in Step 1), if we XOR the overall bit with other bits it could destroy this
property. To proceed with the proof that B̃ is hard-core function we use the Vazirani-
Vazirani theorem which states that it suffices to show that individual bits as well as
combinations of XOR’s of individual bits are all hard-core predicates. In this way one
evades the need to show explicitly that the guesses for different bits are not correlated.
To proceed with the proof, we use a trick that “disentangles” the different variables.
Step 4: We would like to be able to fix one variable and vary only the remaining, while
at the same time maintain some bound on the guessing probability.
The advantage ε j(n) that we assume the adversary has for guessing one bit (or a
XOR) is calculated “on average” over all the random choices of (x̃,α(i),b). Using
Lemma 4.4.5 we can fix one-by-one all but one variable (applying the lemma itera-
tively, see section A.1). With suitable choices, the cardinality of the set of values that
satisfies all these conditions is O(2nε j(n)) for each iteration. Unless ε j(n) is negligi-
ble, this size is an inverse polynomial fraction of all values. This suffices to reach the
contradiction. The actual inversion probability that we will obtain is simply a product
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of the extra cost of fixing the variables with the standard GL inversion probability. This
extra cost is exactly the ratio between the cardinality of the Good sets (defined below)
and the set of all values.
Lemma 4.4.5. Let Pr
(v1,··· ,vk)←{0,1}n×···×{0,1}n
[Guessing] ≥ p+ ε(n), then for any vari-
able vi, there exists a set Goodvi ⊆ {0,1}n of size at least ε(n)2 2n, such that for all
vi ∈ Goodvi , we have:
Pr
(v1,··· ,vi ,··· ,vk)←{0,1}n×···×{0,1}n
[Guessing]≥ p+ ε(n)
2
where the latter probability is taken over all variables except vi.
Step 5: If the expression we wish to guess involves XOR of terms that depend on dif-
ferent variables, then by using Step 4 we can fix the variables of all but one term. Then
we note that trying to guess a bit (that depends on some variable and has expectation
value close to 1/2) is at least as hard as trying to guess the XOR of that bit with a
constant. For example, if the bit we want to guess is 〈x̃,r1〉 mod 2⊕ h(z,r2,r3)] and
we have a bound on the guessing probability where only r1 is varied, then we have: 7
Pr
r1←{0,1}n
[A( f (x),r1,r2,r3) = 〈x̃,r1〉 mod 2⊕h(z,r2,r3)]≤
Pr
r1←{0,1}n
[A( f (x),r1,r2,r3) = 〈x̃,r1〉 mod 2]
(4.16)
We note that all bits of B̃ and their XOR’s can be brought in this form. Then using
this, we can now prove security, as the r.h.s. is exactly in the form where the GL
theorem provides an inversion algorithm for the one-way function f . For details, see
section A.1.
4.5 Function Constructions
For our Protocol 2 we need a trapdoor one-way function that is also quantum-safe,
two-regular and second preimage resistant (or the stronger collision resistance prop-
erty). These properties may appear to be too strong to achieve, however, we give here
methods to construct functions that achieve these properties starting from trapdoor
one-way functions that have fewer (more realistic) conditions, and we specifically give
one example that achieves all the desired properties. In particular we give:
7Here and in the full proof, when we compare winning probabilities for QPT adversaries, it is
understood that we take the adversary that maximises these probabilities.
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• A general construction given either (i) an injective, homomorphic (with respect
to any operation8) trapdoor one-way function or (ii) a bijective trapdoor one-way
function, to obtain a two-regular, second preimage resistant9, trapdoor one-way
function. In both cases the quantum-safe property is maintained (if the initial
function has this property, so does the constructed function).
• (taken from [MP12]) A method of how to realise injective quantum-safe trap-
door functions derived from the LWE problem, that has certain homomorphic
property.
• A way to use the first construction with the trapdoor from [MP12] that requires
a number of modifications, including relaxation of the notion of two-regularity.
The resulting function satisfy all the desired properties if a choice of parameters
that satisfy multiple constraints, exists.
• A specific choice of these parameters, satisfying all constraints, that leads to a
concrete function with all the desired properties.
4.5.1 Obtaining two-regular, collision resistant/second preimage
resistant, trapdoor one-way functions
Here we give two constructions. The first uses as starting point an injective, homo-
morphic trapdoor function while the second a bijective trapdoor function. While we
give both constructions, we focus on the first construction since (i) we can prove the
stronger collision-resistance property and (ii) (to our knowledge) there is no known
bijective trapdoor function that is believed to be quantum-safe.
Theorem 4.5.1. If G is a family of injective, homomorphic, trapdoor one-way func-
tions, then there exists a family F of two-regular, collision resistant, trapdoor one-
way functions. Moreover the family F is quantum-safe if and only if the family G is
quantum-safe.
From now on, we consider that any function gk ∈G has domain D and range R and
let +D be the closed operation on D and +R be the closed operation on R such that gk
is the morphism between D and R with respect to these 2 operations:
gk(a)+R gk(b) = gk(a +D b) ∀a,b ∈ D
8in particular it is only required to be homomorphic once for this operation
9In (i) we prove the stronger collision-resistant property.
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We also denote the operation −D on D, the inverse operation of +D, specifically:
a +D b−1 = a −D b ∀a,b ∈ D and 0D be the identity element for +D.
Then, the family F is described by the following PPT algorithms:
FromInj.GenF (1n)
1 : (k, tk)←$ GenG (1n) / k is an index of a function from G and tk is its associated trapdoor
2 : x0←$ D\{0D} / x0 6= 0D to ensure that the 2 preimages mapped to the same output are distinct
3 : k′ := (k,gk(x0)) / the description of the new function
4 : t ′k := (tk,x0) / the trapdoor associated with the function fk′
5 : return k′, t ′k
The Evaluation procedure receives as input an index k′ of a function from F and
an element x̄ from the function’s domain (x̄ ∈ D×{0,1}):
FromInj.EvalF (k′, x̄)
return fk′(x̄)
where every function from F is defined as:
fk′ : D×{0,1}→ R
fk′(x,c) =
gk(x), if c = 0gk(x)+R gk(x0) = gk(x +D x0)10 , if c = 1
FromInj.InvF (k′,y, t ′k)
1 : / y is an element from the image of fk′ , k′ = (k,gk(x0)), t ′k = (tk,x0)
2 : x1 := InvG (k,y, tk)
3 : x2 := x1−D x0
4 : return (x1,0) and (x2,1) / the unique 2 preimages corresponding to
5 : / an element from the image of fk′
Proof. To prove Theorem 4.5.1 we give below five lemmata showing that, the family
F of functions defined above, satisfies the following properties: (i) two-regular, (ii)
trapdoor, (iii) one-way, (iv) collision-resistant and (v) quantum-safe.
Lemma 4.5.2 (two-regular). If G is a family of injective, homomorphic functions, then
F is a family of two-regular functions.
10The last equality follows since each function gk from G is homomorphic
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Proof. For every y ∈ Im fk′ ⊆ R, where k′ = (k,gk(x0)):
1. Since Im fk′ = Imgk and gk is injective, there exists a unique x := g−1k (y) such
that fk′(x,0) = gk(x) = y.
2. Assume x′ such that fk′(x′,1) = y. By definition fk′(x′,1) = gk(x′ +D x0) = y,
but gk is injective and gk(x) = y by assumption, therefore there exists a unique
x′ = x−D x0 such that fk′(x′,1) = y
Therefore, we conclude that:
∀ y ∈ Im fk′ : f−1k′ (y) := {(g−1k (y),0),(g−1k (y) −D x0,1)} (4.17)
Lemma 4.5.3 (trapdoor). If G is a family of injective, homomorphic, trapdoor func-
tions, then F is a family of trapdoor functions.
Proof. Let y ∈ Im fk′ ⊆ R. We construct the following inversion algorithm:
InvF (k′,y, t ′k)
1 : / t ′k = (tk,x0), k′ = (k,gk(x0))
2 : x := InvG (k,y, tk)
3 : return (x,0) and (x −D x0,1)
Lemma 4.5.4 (one-way). If G is a family of injective, homomorphic, one-way func-
tions, then F is a family of one-way functions.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. We assume that there exists a QPT adversary A
that can invert a function in F with non-negligible probability P (i.e. given y ∈ Im fk′
to return a correct preimage of the form (x′,b) with probability P). We then construct a
QPT adversary A ′ that inverts a function in G with the same non-negligible probability
P reaching a contradiction, since G is one-way by assumption.
From Eq. (4.17) of Lemma 4.5.2 we know the two preimages of y are: (i) (g−1k (y),0)
and (ii) (g−1k (y)−D x0,1). We see that information on g−1k (y) is obtained in both cases,
i.e. obtaining any of these two preimages, is sufficient to recover g−1k (y) if x0 is known.
We now construct an adversary A ′ that for any function gk : D→ R, inverts any output
y = gk(x) with the same probability P that A succeeds.
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A ′(k,y)
1 : x0←$ D\{0D}/ A ′ knows x0, but is not given to A
2 : k′ := (k,gk(x0))
3 : (x′,b)← A(k′,y)
4 : if ((b == 0)∧ (gk(x′) == y) then
5 : / equivalent to A succeeded in returning the first preimage
6 : return x′
7 : elseif ((b == 1)∧ (gk(x′ +D x0)) == y) then
8 : / A succeeded in returning the second preimage
9 : return x′ +D x0/ A ′ uses x0 known from step 1
10 : else / A failed in giving any of the preimages (happens with probability 1−P)
11 : return 0
Lemma 4.5.5 (collision-resistance). If G is a family of injective, homomorphic, one-
way functions, then any function f ∈ F is collision resistant.
Proof. Assume there exists a QPT adversary A that given k′ = (k,gk(x0)) can find
a collision (y,(x1,b1),(x2,b2)) where fk′(x1,b1) = fk′(x2,b2) = y with non-negligible
probability P. From Eq. (4.17) we know that the two preimages are of the form
(x,0),(x4x0,1) where gk(x) = y. It follows that when A is successful, by comparing
the first arguments of the two preimages, can recover x0.
We now construct a QPT adversary A ′ that inverts the function gk with the same
probability P, reaching a contradiction:
A ′(k,gk(x))
1 : k′ := (k,gk(x))
2 : (y,(x1,b1),(x2,b2))∧ x1 6= x2← A(k′)/ where y is an element from the image of fk′
3 : if f (x1,b1) == f (x2,b2) == y
4 : return x := x1 −D x2
5 : else / A failed to find collision of fk′ ; happens with probability (1−P)
6 : return 0
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Lemma 4.5.6 (quantum-safe). If G is a family of quantum-safe trapdoor functions,
with properties as above, then F is also a family of quantum-safe trapdoor functions.
Proof. The properties that require to be quantum-safe is the one-wayness and colli-
sion resistance. Both these properties of F that we derived above were proved using
reduction to the hardness (one-wayness) of G . Therefore if G is quantum-safe, its
one-wayness is also quantum-safe and thus both properties of F are also quantum-
safe.
Theorem 4.5.7. If G is a family of bijective, trapdoor one-way functions, then there ex-
ists a family F of two-regular, second preimage resistant, trapdoor one-way functions.
Moreover ,the family F is quantum-safe if and only if the family G is quantum-safe.
The family F is described by the following PPT algorithms, where each function
gk ∈ G has domain D and range R:
FromBij.GenF (1n)
1 : (k1, tk1)←$ GenG (1n)
2 : (k2, tk2)←$ GenG (1n)
3 : k′ := (k1,k2)
4 : t ′k := (tk1 , tk2)
5 : return k′, t ′k
FromBij.EvalF (k′, x̄)
return fk′(x̄)
where every function from F is defined as:
fk′ : D×{0,1}→ R
fk′(x,c) =
gk1(x), if c = 0gk2(x), if c = 1
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FromBij.InvF (k′,y, t ′k)
1 : / y is an element from the image of fk′ , k′ = (k1,k2), t ′k = (tk1 , tk2 )
2 : x1 := InvG (k1,y, tk1)
3 : x2 := InvG (k2,y, tk2)
4 : return (x1,0) and (x2,1) / the unique 2 preimages corresponding to
5 : / an element from the image of fk′
The proof of Theorem 4.5.7, using the family of function defined above, follows
same steps as of Theorem 4.5.1 and is given in the section A.2.
4.5.2 Injective, homomorphic quantum-safe trapdoor one-way func-
tion based on LWE (from [MP12])
We outline the Micciancio and Peikert [MP12] construction of injective trapdoor one-
way functions, naturally derived from the Learning-With-Errors problem. At the end
we comment on the homomorphic property of the function, since this is crucial in order
to use this function as the basis to obtain our desired two-regular, collision resistant
trapdoor one-way functions.
The algorithm below generates the index of an injective function and its corre-
sponding trapdoor. The matrix G used in this procedure, is a fixed matrix (whose exact
form can be seen in [MP12]) for which the function from the family G with index G
can be efficiently inverted without any trapdoor.
LWE.GenG(1n)
1 : A′←$Zn×m̄q
2 : R←$ Dm̄×knαq / element-wise gaussian distribution with mean 0, standard deviation αq on m̄× kn matrices
3 : A := (A′,G−A′R) / concatenation of matrices A′ and G−A′R, representing the index of the function
4 : return (A,R)/ A - public function index, R - trapdoor
where the parameters k, α, q and m̄ are defined in Theorem 4.5.11.
The actual description of the injective trapdoor function is given in the Evaluation
algorithm below, where each function from G is defined on: gK : Znq×Lm→Zmq , and L
is the domain of the errors in the LWE problem (the set of integers bounded in absolute
value by the parameter µ):
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LWE.EvalG(K,(s,e))
1 : y := gK(s,e) = stK + et
2 : return y
The inversion algorithm returns the unique preimage (s,e) corresponding to bt ∈
Im(gK). The algorithm uses as a subroutine the efficient algorithm InvG for inverting
the function gG, with G the fixed matrix mentioned before.
LWE.InvG(K, tK,bt)





2 : (s′,e′) := InvG(b′)
3 : s := s′
4 : e := b−Kts
5 : return s,e
We examine now whether the functions gK are homomorphic with respect to some
operation.
We first define the domain and the range as D := Znq×Lm and R := Zmq . Then, given
a = (s1,e1) ∈ Znq×Lm and b = (s2,e2) ∈ Znq×Lm, the operation +D is defined as:
(s1,e1) +D (s2,e2) = (s1 + s2 mod q,e1 + e2)
Given y1 = gK(a) ∈ Zmq and y2 = gK(b) ∈ Zmq , the operation +R is defined as:
y1 +R y2 = y1 + y2 mod q
Then, we can easily verify that:
gK(s1,e1)+gK(s2,e2) mod q = s1tK + e1t + s2tK + e2t mod q =
(s1 + s2 mod q)tK +(e1 + e2)t = gK((s1 + s2) mod q,e1 + e2)
However, the sum of two error terms, each being bounded by µ, may not be bounded
by µ. This means that the function is not (properly) homomorphic. Instead, what we
conclude is that as long as the vector e1 + e2 lies inside the domain of gK , then gK
is homomorphic. To address this issue, we will need to define a weaker notion of 2-
regularity, and a (slight) modification of the FromInj construction to provide a desired
function starting from the trapdoor function of [MP12].
4.5. Function Constructions 97
4.5.3 A suitable δ-2 regular trapdoor function
Using the injective trapdoor function of Micciancio and Peikert [MP12] and the con-
struction defined in the proof of Theorem 4.5.1, we derive a family F of collision-
resistant trapdoor one-way function, but with a weaker notion of 2-regularity, called
δ-2 regularity:
Definition 4.5.8 (δ-2 regular). A family of functions ( fk)k←GenF is said to be δ-2 regular,
with δ ∈ [0,1] if:
Pr
k←GenF ,y∈Im( fk)
[ | f−1k (y)|= 2 ]≥ δ
Given this definition, we should note here that in Protocol 2 we need to modify the
abort case to include the possibility that the image y obtained from the measurement
does not have two preimages (something that happens with at most probability (1−δ)).
Theorem 4.5.9 (Existence of a δ-2 regular trapdoor function family). There exists a
family of functions that are δ-2 regular (with δ at least as big as a fixed constant),
trapdoor, one-way, collision resistant and quantum-safe, assuming that there is no
quantum algorithm that can efficiently solve SIVPγ for γ = poly (n).
Proof. To prove this theorem, we define a function similar to the one in the FromInj
construction, where the starting point is the function defined in [MP12]. Crucial for
the security is a choice of parameters that satisfy a number of conditions given by
Theorem 4.5.11 and proven in section A.3. The proof is then completed by providing
a choice of parameters given in Lemma 4.5.12 that satisfies all conditions as it is shown
in section A.4.
Definition 4.5.10. For a given set of parameter P chosen as in Theorem 4.5.11, we
define the following functions, that are similar to the construction FromInj, with the
difference that the key generation requires the trapdoor error to be sampled from a
smaller subdomain (α′ < α):
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REG2.GenP(1n)
1 : (A,R)← LWE.GenG (1n)
2 : s0← Zn,1q
3 : e0←Dm,1α′q / α′ < α
4 : b0 := LWE.Eval(A,(s0,e0))
5 : k := (A,b0)
6 : tk := (R,(s0,e0))
7 : return (k, tk)
REG2.EvalP((A,b0),(s,e,c))
1 : / s is a random element in Zn,1q , c ∈ {0,1}
2 : / e is sampled uniformly and such that
3 : / each component is smaller than µ
4 : return LWE.Eval(A,(s,e))+ c ·b0
REG2.InvP((A,R,(s0,e0)),b)
1 : (s1,e1) := LWE.Inv(R,b)
2 : if ||e1− e0||∞ ≤ µ then return ⊥
3 : return ((s1,e1,0),(s1− s0 mod q,e1− e0,1))
Note, that the pairs (s,e) and (s0,e0) correspond to x and x0 of the FromInj con-
struction of subsection 4.5.1. The idea behind this construction is that the noise of
the trapdoor, e0, is sampled from a set which is small compared to the noise of the
input function. That way, when we will add the trapdoor (s0,e0) together with an input
(s,e), the total noise will still be small enough to lie in the set of possible input noise
with good probability, mimicking the homomorphic property needed in Theorem 4.5.1.
Note that the parameters need to be carefully chosen, and a trade-off between proba-
bility of success and security exists.
We first introduce the following notation: for all n,q,µ ∈ Z,µ′ ∈ R, let us define:
• k := dlog(q)e
• m̄ = 2n
• ω = nk
• m := m̄+ω = 2n+nk
• α′ = µ′√mq
• α = mα′
• C the constant in Lemma 2.9 of [MP12] which is around 1√
2π
• B = 2 if q is a power of 2, and B =
√
5 otherwise.
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Theorem 4.5.11 (Requirements on the parameters). If for all security parameters n
(dimension of the lattice), there exist q (the modulus of LWE) and µ (the maximum
amplitude of the components of the errors) such that:
1. m is such that n = o(m) (required for the injectivity of the function (see e.g.
[Vai]))
2. 0 < α < 1
3. µ′ = O(µ/m) (required to have constant probability to have two preimages)
4. α′q≥ 2√n (required for the LWE to SIVP reduction)
5. n
α′ is poly (n) (representing, up to a constant factor, the approximation factor γ


















(required for the correctness of the inversion algorithm - rmax represents the
maximum length of an error vector that one can correct using the [MP12] func-
tion11, and the last term is needed in the proof of collision resistance to ensure
injectivity even when we add the trapdoor noise, as illustrated in Figure 4.1)
then the family of functions of Definition 4.5.10 is δ-2 regular (with δ at least as big as
a fixed constant), trapdoor, one-way and collision resistant (all these properties hold
even against a quantum attacker), assuming that there is no quantum algorithm that
can efficiently solve SIV Pγ for γ = poly (n).
Proof. The proof follows by showing that the function with these constraints on the
parameters is: (i) δ-2 regular, (ii) collision resistant, (iii) one-way and (iv) trapdoor. In
section A.3 we give and prove one lemma for each of those properties. For an intuition
of the choice of parameters see also Figure 4.1.
11We chose to use the computational definition of [MP12], but this theorem can be easily extended
to other definitions of the same paper, or even to other construction of trapdoor short basis)







Figure 4.1: The red circle represents the domain of
the error term from the trapdoor information, which
is being sampled from a Gaussian distribution. The
orange square is an approximation of this domain,
which must satisfy that its length is much smaller (by
a factor of at least m – the dimension of the error)
than the length of the blue square, used for the ac-
tual sampling from the domain of the error terms,
for which it is known that the trapdoor function is in-
vertible, domain represented by the green circle (in-
cluding the dashed part). The dashed part, repre-
senting the distance between the maximum domain
for which the function is invertible (green circle) and
the actual domain used for sampling (blue square) is
needed to ensure that if there is a collision (x1,x2),
then x1 = x2± x0.
4.5.4 Parameter Choices
















and α,α′,C are defined like in Theorem 4.5.11.
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The proof is given in section A.4. As a final remark, we stress that other choices of
the parameters are possible (considering the trade-off between security and probability
of success) and we have not attempted to find an optimal set.
4.6 Implementation of HBC−QFactory on IBM Quan-
tum Cloud
Finally, in this section we provide the first proof-of-principle demonstration of a clas-
sical remote state preparation protocol. Very importantly, this implementation is not
secure against a quantum adversary. The reason is that, as our 2-regular trapdoor func-
tion needs to be hard to invert this requires the size of the function to be sufficiently
large, but at the same time we need to implement on server’s quantum computer the
unitary corresponding to this function. Therefore, given the current limited number of
available qubits, we choose a 2-regular function that can be easily inverted by brute-
force attacks. The scope of this implementation is to demonstrate the correctness and
the randomness of the HBC−QFactory protocol.
For the implementation we use the IBM Quantum Experience service and will run
all the experiments to prove the correctness and randomness of the protocol using both
the simulator “ibmq qasm simulator” (32 available qubits) and the IBM real devices:
“ibmq athens” (5 available qubits) and “ibmq melbourne” (16 available qubits).
4.6.1 Function Construction for Simulation
We will construct a specific 2-regular function (which given the limitations of the num-
ber of available qubits cannot be LWE-based or one-way). More specifically, we define
the following 2-regular family of functions fA,B : {0,1}3→ {0,1}2, where the public












where by ‖ we denote the concatenation of the 2 bits.
To construct the Key Generation Algorithm, we will proceed as follows. We first
sample uniformly at random the trapdoor information, (d0,e) ∈ {0,1}2, and we will
construct the public key (A,B) as a function of the trapdoor in the following way:
Ae+1,e+1 = A2−e,3 = B3,3 = 1,B2−e,2−e = d0, and all others elements are 0 (4.19)
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For the Inversion Algorithm, we proceed in the following way:
Given a function image y=(y1,y2)∈{0,1}2, we compute its 2 preimages x=(x1,x2,x3)∈
{0,1}3 and x′ = (x′1,x′2,x′3) ∈ {0,1}3 as:
x2−e = 0, x1+e = y1, x3 = y2
x′2−e = 1, x
′
1+e = y1⊕ y2⊕d0, x′3 = y2⊕d0
(4.20)
We emphasize that by constructing f in this particular way, we have the structure
required for HBC−QFactory. Moreover, the circuit to implement the unitary U fA,B , it
is simple to derive from A and B as we just need to implement a Toffoli gate (or CNOT
if i = j) between i-th input qubit, j-th input qubit and the first output qubit whenever
Ai j = 1, and similarly with the second output qubit whenever Bi j = 1.
4.6.2 Randomness Results
We first want to indicate the randomness of the output of the HBC−QFactory protocol.
By this we mean that we want to show that the quantum output is a |+θ〉 state, where
θ is uniformly sampled from a set of 8 possible values: {0, π8 , · · · , 7π8 }.
The following plot indicates the distribution of θ, can be seen in Fig. 4.2a.
We run the protocol 1000 number of times, where the distribution is taken over the
randomness of the 2 measurements: y (image register) and b (the final measurement -
the preimage register) and over the uniform distribution of the measurement angles α.
The same protocol, run 5000 times shows an even closer to uniform distribution of θ,
as seen in Fig. 4.2b.

















Illustration of the randomness of the output angle
(a) 1000 runs of HBC−QFactory using
function fA,B described in Section 4.6.1. Plot
depicts resulting output distribution.

















Illustration of the randomness of the output angle
(b) 5000 runs of HBC−QFactory
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4.6.3 Correctness Results
For the correctness of the protocol we want to show 2-fold:
• The Server always obtains a |+θ〉 type of state on his side;
• The Client, by knowing the preimages of each image y, can always efficiently
compute this θ;
Additionally, we will actually run 2 different types of experiments: using the sim-
ulator and a real quantum device. We proceed in the following two different manners.
When running the simulator we check that the state description the Client obtained
and the quantum state resulted on the Server’s side correspond to the same value of θ,
in the following manner: For Client we run the algorithm described in HBC−QFactory
and we compute the value θ. And now to check that Server obtained exactly the state
|+θ〉, the Simulator allows us to get the description of the corresponding final quantum
output state (as a vector), and we are therefore able to check that it matches perfectly.
Therefore, the first correctness evidence is showed in Fig. 4.3, which depicts the values
of θA obtained by Client and the the values of θB , where |+θB〉 is obtained by Server.
As observed θA = θB for all the runs of our protocol.



















Illustration of the correctness of the protocol when run on the simulator
Alice Bob
Figure 4.3: Values of θA (written as multiples of π4 ) obtained by Client and the corre-
sponding θB obtained by Server for 29 different runs of HBC−QFactory on the simu-
lator, illustrating the correctness of the protocol.
For the run on the actual quantum device, Client obtains the value of θ in the same
way. However, we are no longer able to get the vector description of the quantum state
of Server, because now it corresponds to an actual physical qubit. Now, the only way
to see what state Server has on his side is to perform a final measurement on the output
qubit of the Server, which we will denote by |ψout〉.
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One way would be to measure the output state |ψout〉 in the {|+θ〉 , |−θ〉} basis, where
θ would be the angle obtained by Client through her classical computations, and in this
way for correctness we should have always outcome 1 for this measurement. Unfortu-
nately, this is not possible, because the IBM Quantum Experience framework does not
allow for intermediate measurements. Therefore, the way we will proceed for this is
as follows. At the beginning of the protocol we pick a random θr and then we measure
the final state of the Server |ψout〉 in the basis {|+θr〉 , |−θr〉}. Then, once we receive
all the measurement outcomes (preimage, image registers and |ψout〉) we first compute
(using Client’s algorithm) the actual θ and then we check:
• If θ = θr, we should obtain measurement outcome 0 with probability 1;
• If θ = θr±π we should obtain 1 with probability 1;
• if θ = θr± π2 we should get 1 with probability 12 ;




• In general the probability of the outcome 0 is equal to: p(0) = 12 +
cos(θ−θr)
2
Therefore, in Fig.4.4a, we can see the expected probability of the measurement out-
come to be 0 - which corresponds to the “ideal” quantum computer case. Then in
Fig.4.4b we have the actual probability of outcome 0, as a result of running it on the
“noisy” real quantum device - which corresponds to the real run.






















Expected Prob (without noise) 12 +
cos(θ−θr)
2
(a) Ideal Case: θ is the honest angle ex-
pected by Client, θr is the random angle used
to measure the state obtained by Server.





















Probabilities obtained on Athens computer, 10240 runs
(b) Real Case: θ is the honest angle expected
by Client, and θr is the random angle used to
measure the state obtained by Server.
Chapter 5
QFactory against Malicious Server
In chapter 4, we described the primitive of classical-client remote state preparation as
a method to enable fully classical parties to participate in secure quantum computation
and communications protocols at the cost of relying on post-quantum computational
security. The idea is to replace the quantum channel (used in many different proto-
cols implementing blind or verifiable quantum computation) with a module running
between a classical client and a quantum server. To achieve this, a classical party (the
Client) is instructing a quantum party (the Server) to generate a qubit on the Server’s
side that is random and unknown to the Server, but known to the Client. Such a task can
be accomplished under computational assumptions, but implausible to achieve with
information-theoretic security as indicated by our results in chapter 3. In the previous
chapter we showed how a classical client could implement this module (referred to as
HBC−QFactory) in order to achieve secure delegated universal quantum computing,
but potentially also, other functionalities such as multi-party quantum computation.
While the HBC−QFactory Protocol guaranteed the secure preparation of {|+θ〉}θ∈{0,··· , 7π4 },
in this contribution, we define a basic primitive consisting of BB84 states.
But more importantly, the security proof of HBC−QFactory was shown in a weak
Honest-but-Curious model. In this work we extend the security proof, by giving a
classical-client remote state preparation protocol that is secure against the strongest
possible adversary (an arbitrarily deviating malicious Server). All our proofs are made
using reductions to hardness assumptions (namely the Learning-With-Errors problem),
and the simplicity of the main protocol suggests that an extension to a composable
framework such as Constructive Cryptography [MR11] should be possible to analyze.
Following the modularity of HBC−QFactory we present in this chapter a universal,
yet minimal functionality module that is fully secure, and can be used as a black box in
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other Client-Server applications to replace the need for a reliable long-distance quan-
tum communication network. The price one has to pay is a reduction from information-
theoretic security (achievable using quantum communication) to post-quantum com-
putational security via our modules.
In Chapter 4 we defined the primitive of classical-client remote state preparation
(CC−RSP) that can replace the need for quantum channel between parties in certain
quantum communication protocols, with the only trade-off being that the protocols
would become computationally secure (against quantum adversaries). However, the
proof of security was done in a weak model called “honest-but-curious”.
In this chapter our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We present a new protocol called Malicious 4-states QFactory in section 5.2
that implements the CC−RSP primitive for the generation of the quantum states
{|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} (known as the BB84 states), given 2 cryptographic functions:
1) a trapdoor one-way function that is quantum-safe, two-regular and collision
resistant and 2) a homomorphic, hardcore predicate. The novelty of this new pro-
tocol reflects in both simplicity of construction and proof, as well as enhanced
security, namely the protocol is secure against any arbitrarily deviating adver-
sary. The target output qubit set is one of the four BB84 states, states that form
the core requirement of any quantum communication protocol.
Then, in subsection 5.2.3, we present the security of the Malicious 4-states QFac-
tory against any fully malicious server, by proving that the basis of the generated
qubits are completely hidden from any adversary, using the properties of the two
functions, the security being based on the hardness of the Learning-With-Errors
problem.
2. While the above-mentioned results do not depend on the specific function used,
the existence of such functions (with all desired properties) makes the function-
ality a practical primitive that can be employed as described in this paper. In
section 5.3, we describe how to construct the two-regular, collision resistant,
trapdoor one-way family of functions and the homomorphic, hardcore predicate.
Furthermore, we prove using reductions in subsection 5.3.2 that the resulting
functions maintain all the required properties.
3. In order to demonstrate the modular construction of the basic Malicious 4-states
QFactory, we also present in section 5.4, a secure and efficient extension to the
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functionality of generating 8 states, called the Malicious 8-states QFactory pro-
tocol (where the security refers to the fact that the basis of the new state is com-
pletely hidden). The set of output states
{
|+θ〉 |θ ∈ {0, π4 , ..., 7π4 }
}
(no longer
within the Clifford group) are used in various protocols, including protocols for
verifiable blind quantum computation.
4. While the protocol introduced in section 5.2 requires (for the security proof)
a family of functions having 2 preimages with probability super-polynomially
close to 1, we also define in section 5.5 a protocol named Malicious-Abort 4-
states QFactory, that is secure when the functions have 2 preimages with only a
constant (greater than 1/2) probability. Indeed, even if the parameters used for
the first category of functions are implicitly used in some protocols [Mah18],
the second category of functions is strictly more secure and more standard in
the cryptographic literature [Bra18]. The Malicious-Abort 4-states QFactory
protocol is proven secure also for this second category of functions, assuming
that the classical Yao’s XOR lemma also applies for one-round protocols (with
classical messages) against quantum adversaries.
5.1 Overview of Protocols and Proof Techniques
The Protocol. The general idea is that a classical client communicates with a quantum
server instructing him to perform certain actions. By the end of the interaction, the
client obtains a random value B = B1B2 ∈ {00,01,10,11}, while the server (if he fol-
lowed the protocol) ends up with the state HB1XB2 |0〉, i.e. with one of the BB84 states.
Moreover, the server, irrespective of whether he followed the protocol or how he de-
viated, cannot guess the value of the (basis) bit B1 any better than making a random
guess (more details in subsection 5.2.3).
This module is sufficient to perform (either directly or with simple extensions) mul-
tiple secure computation protocols including blind quantum computation. To achieve
such a task, we require three central elements. Firstly, the quantum operations per-
formed by the server should not be repeatable, in order to avoid letting the (adversar-
ial) server run multiple times these operations and obtain multiple copies of the same
output state. That would (obviously) compromise the security since direct tomography
of a single qubit is straightforward. This can be achieved if the protocol includes a
measurement of many qubits, where the probability of getting twice the same outcome
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would be exponentially small. The second element is that the server should not be able
to efficiently classically simulate the quantum computation that he needs to perform.
This is to stop the server from running everything classically and obtaining the explicit
classical description of the output state. This is achieved using techniques from post-
quantum cryptography and specifically the Learning-With-Errors problem. Lastly, the
computation has to be easy to perform for the client, since she needs to know the output
state. This asymmetry (easy for client and hard for server) can be achieved in the com-
putational setting, where the client has some extra trapdoor information. The protocol
requires the following cryptographic primitives defined formally in Definition 5.2.1:
• F : a family of 2-regular, collision resistant, trapdoor one-way functions (that
can be constructed from a family of injective, homomorphic, trapdoor one-way
functions G);
• d0(tk): a hardcore predicate of the index of the functions in F . More precisely,
every function fk ∈ F has an associated hardcore bit d0 that is hard to guess
given only k, but easy to compute given the trapdoor tk;
• h: a predicate such that h(x)⊕h(x′) = d0 for any x,x′ with fk(x) = fk(x′)
Given these functions, the protocol steps are as follows.
The client sends the descriptions of the functions fk (from the family F ) and h. The
server’s actions are described by the circuit given in Figure 5.1 (see section 5.2), clas-
sically instructed by the client: prepares one register at ⊗nH |0〉 and second register at
|0〉m; then applies U fk using the first register as control and the second as target; mea-
sures the second register in the computational basis, obtains the outcome y. Through
these steps server produces a superposition of the 2 preimages x and x′ of y for the
function fk, i.e. |x〉+ |x′〉. Next, server is instructed to apply the unitary corresponding
to function h (targeting a new qubit |0〉) and to measure all but this new qubit in the
Hadamard basis (the measurement outcomes will be denoted as b), which will be the
output of the protocol. This last step intuitively magnifies the randomness of all the
qubits to this final output qubit.
Essentially, this differs from the construction of HBC−QFactory in 2 points: the use
of the function h that can be thought of as a privacy amplifier and secondly, the last
set of measurement is performed in the Hadamard basis (as opposed to |±α〉 basis, for
random α chosen by client in the HBC−QFactory case).
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Then, it can be proven that, in an honest run, this output state is:
|out〉= HB1XB2 |0〉 , where
B1 = h(x)⊕h(x′) = d0(tk) =: d0
B2 = (d0 · 〈b , (x⊕ x′)〉)⊕h(x)h(x′)
where x⊕ x′ denotes the bitwise xor of x and x′ and 〈α , β〉 denotes the inner product
between the strings α and β: 〈α , β〉= ∑i αi ·βi.
Therefore, the client can efficiently obtain the description of the output state, namely
B1 and B2 by inverting y, to obtain the 2 preimages x and x′ using her secret trapdoor
information tk.
Security. Informally speaking the desired security property of the module is to prove
that the server cannot guess better than randomly the basis bit B1 of what the client
has, no matter how the server deviates or what answers he returns. In other words, we
prove that given that the client chooses k randomly, then no matter which messages y
and b the server returns, he cannot determine B1.
Specifically, using the properties of the 2 cryptographic functions, we show that the
basis of the output state is independent of the messages sent by server and essentially,
the basis is fixed by the client at the beginning of the protocol.
Here it is important to emphasize that the simplicity of our modular construction
allow us to make a direct reduction from the above security property to the crypto-
graphic assumptions of our primitives functions F , d0 and h. Indeed, from the ex-
pression above, we can see that at the end of the interaction the client has recorded as
the basis bit the expression B1 = h(x)⊕ h(x′) = d0(tk), which is a hardcore bit and is
therefore hard to guess given only k.
The Primitive Construction. In order to use this module in practise, it is crucial to
have functions that satisfy our cryptographic requirements, and explore the choices
of parameters that ensure that all these properties are jointly satisfied. Building on
the function construction from chapter 4 we gave specific choices that achieve these
properties. The starting point is the injective, trapdoor one-way family of functions Ḡ
from [MP12], where the hardness of the function is derived from the Learning-With-
Errors problem.
More precisely, to sample a function fk, we first sample a matrix K ∈ Zm×nq using
the construction of [MP12] (that provides an injective and trapdoor function), a uni-
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form vector s0 ∈ Znq, an error e0 ∈ Zmq according to a small Gaussian1 and a random bit
d0, and we compute
y0 = Ks0 + e0 +d0 ·
(
q
2 0 . . . 0
)T
mod q (5.1)
The hardcore property of d0 will directly come from the fact that under LWE assump-
tion, no adversary can distinguish a LWE instance Ks0 + e0 from a random vector, so
it is not possible to know if we added or not a constant vector. The function fK,y0 will
then be defined as follow:
fK,y0(s,e,c,d) = Ks+ e+ c · y0 +d ·
(
q
2 0 . . . 0
)T
mod q (5.2)
Note that c and d are bits, and the error e is chosen in a bigger space2 than e0 to ensure
that the function fK,y0 has two preimages with good probability. Moreover, if we define
h(s,e,c,d) = d, it is easy to see that for all preimages x,x′ with f (x) = f (x′), we have:
h(x)⊕h(x′) = d0
The Extended Protocol. In order to use the above protocol for applications such
as blind quantum computing [BFK09], we need to be able to produce states taken
from the (extended) set of eight states {|+θ〉 ,θ ∈ {0, π4 , ..., 7π4 }}. Importantly, we still
need to ensure that the bits corresponding to the basis of each qubits produced, remain
hidden. Here we prove how given two states produced by the basic protocol described
previously, which we denote as |in1〉 and |in2〉, we can obtain a single state from the
8-states set, denoted |out〉, ensuring that no information about the bits of the basis of
|out〉 is leaked3.
To achieve this, we need to find an operation (see Figure 5.2 in Section 5.4.1),
that in the honest case maps the indices of the inputs to those of the output using a
map that satisfies certain conditions. This relation (inputs/output) should be such that
learning anything about the basis of the output state implies learning non-negligible
information for the basis of (one) input. This directly means, that any computationally
bounded adversary that can break the basis blindness of the output, can use this to
construct an attack that would also break the basis blindness of at least one of the
inputs, i.e. he would break the security guarantees of the basic module that was proven
earlier.
1but big enough to make sure the function is secure
2but small enough to make sure the partial functions f (·, ·,c, ·) are still injective
3Note that one of the input states is exactly the output of the basic module, while the second comes
from a slightly modified version (essentially rotated in the XY-plane of the Bloch sphere).
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Other Properties. To further improve the practicality of the black box call of the
QFactory we also present the security against abort scenario that could be achieved
based on a quantum version of Yao’s XOR Lemma.
Before, describing the main protocol, we first need to introduce some notation used
in the remaining of the chapter.
5.1.1 Notations
For a state |+θ〉= 1√2(|0〉+ e





Additionally, as L is a 3-bit string, we write it as L= L1L2L3, where L1,L2,L3 represent
the bits of L.
As a result when we refer to the basis of the |+θ〉 state, it is equivalent to referring to
the last 2 bits of L, thus saying that nothing is leaked about the basis of this state, is
equivalent to saying nothing is leaked about the bits L2 and L3.
For a set of 4 quantum states {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}, we denote the index of each state
using 2 bits: B1,B2, with B1 = 0 if and only if the state is |0〉 or |1〉, and B2 = 0 if and
only if the state is |0〉 or |+〉, i.e. HB1XB2 |0〉. We will use interchangeably the Dirac
notation and the basis/value notation.
In the following sections, we will consider polynomially bounded malicious ad-
versaries, usually denoted by A . The honest clients will be denoted by π, and both
honest parties and adversaries can output some values, that could eventually be used
in other protocols. To denote that two parties πA and A interact in a protocol, and
that πA outputs a while A outputs b, we write (a,b)← (πA‖πB) (we may forget the
left hand side, or replace variables with underscores “ ” if it is not relevant). We can
also refer to the values of the classical messages sent between the two parties using:
Pr [a = accept | (πA‖A)], and this probability is implicitly over the internal random-
ness of πA and A . To specify a two-party protocol, it suffices to specify the two honest
parties (πA,πB). Moreover, if the protocol consists of a single round of communica-
tion, we will write y←A(x) with x the first message sent to A , and y the messages sent
from A . Finally, a value with a tilde, such as d̃, represents a guess from an adversary.
We are considering protocols secure against quantum adversaries, so we assume
that all the properties of our functions hold against a general Quantum Polynomial
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Time (QPT) adversary. We will denote D the domain of the functions, while D(n) is
the subset of strings of length n.
5.2 The Malicious 4-states QFactory Protocol
5.2.1 Requirements and protocol
The Malicious 4-states QFactory Protocol described in Protocol 3 uses a family of
cryptographic functions F and a function h having the following properties (see sec-
tion 5.3 to see how this family of functions can be constructed from a family of injec-
tive, trapdoor and (pseudo) homomorphic functions):
Definition 5.2.1 (2-regular homomorphic-hardcore family). A family F = { fk : D ′→
R }k∈K is said to be a 2-regular homomorphic-hardcore family with respect to hk :
D ′→{0,1} and d0 : T →{0,1} (T is the set of trapdoors tk) if:
• it is 2-regular, collision resistant and trapdoor;
• for all k, hk can be described by a polynomial classical circuit;
• d0 is a hardcore predicate for Pub, i.e. given a random index k = PubF (tk), it is
impossible to obtain d0 := d0(tk) with probability better than 1/2+negl (n), i.e.
for any QPT adversary A:




• for all k ∈K and x,x′ ∈D ′ such that fk(x) = fk(x′), we have:
hk(x)⊕hk(x′) = d0 (5.4)
Note that in our specific construction h does not depend on k, so we might omit the
subscript k, and just use h, for simplicity.
We also extend this definition to δ-2-regular homomorphic-hardcore family, when the
function is δ-2-regular, i.e. 2-regular with probability δ (see Definition B.4.2 for a
formal definition).
Then the protocol can be described as follows:
Protocol 3 Malicious 4-states QFactory Protocol: classical delegation of BB84 states
Requirements:
Public: A δ-2-regular homomorphic-hardcore family F with respect to {hk} and d0, as de-
scribed above. For simplicity, we will represent the sets D ′ (respectively R ) using n (respec-
tively m) bits strings: D ′ = {0,1}n, R = {0,1}m. In this protocol, we require δ to be negligibly
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close to 1, see section 5.5 for an extension to a constant δ.
Stage 1: Preimages superposition
– Client: runs the algorithm (k, tk)← GenF (1n).
– Client: instructs Server to prepare one register at ⊗nH |0〉 and a register initiated at |0〉m.
– Client: sends k to Server and the Server applies U fk using the first register as control and the
second as target.
– Server: measures the second register in the computational basis, obtains the outcome y. Here,
in an honest run, the Server would have a state (|x〉+ |x′〉)⊗|y〉 with fk(x) = fk(x′) = y and
y ∈ Im fk.
Stage 2: Output preparation
– Server: applies Uhk on the preimage register |x〉+ |x′〉 as control and another qubit initiated at
|0〉 as target. Then, measures all the qubits, but the target in the { 1√
2
(|0〉± |1〉)} basis, obtain-
ing the outcome b = (b1, ...,bn). Now, the Server returns both y and b to the Client.
– Client: using the trapdoor tk computes the preimages of y:
• if y does not have exactly two preimages x,x′ (the server is cheating with overwhelming
probability), defines B1 = d0(tk), and chooses B2 ∈ {0,1} uniformly at random
• if y has exactly two preimages x,x′, defines B1 = hk(x)⊕ hk(x′) = d0(tk), and B2 as
defined in Theorem 5.2.2.
Output: If the protocol is run honestly, the state that the Server has produced is (with
overwhelming probability) the BB84 state |out〉 = HB1XB2 |0〉, having the basis B1 = hk(x)⊕
hk(x′) = d0 (see Theorem 5.2.2 for the exact value of B2). The output of the Server is |out〉,
and the output of the Client is (B1,B2).
5.2.2 Correctness of Malicious 4-states QFactory
In an honest run, the description of the output state of the protocol depends on mea-
surement results y ∈ Im fk and b, but also on the 2 preimages x and x′ of y.
The output state of Malicious 4-states QFactory belongs to the set of states
{|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} and its exact description is the following:
Theorem 5.2.2. In an honest run, with overwhelming probability the output state |out〉
of the Malicious 4-states QFactory Protocol (Protocol 3) is a BB84 state whose basis
is B1 = hk(x)⊕hk(x′) = d0, and:
• if d0 = 0, then the state is |hk(x)〉 (computational basis, also equal to |hk(x′)〉)
• if d0 = 1, then if ∑i bi · (xi⊕x′i) = 0 mod 2, the state is |+〉, otherwise the state is
|−〉 (Hadamard basis).
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i.e.
|out〉= HB1XB2 |0〉 (5.5)
with
B1 = hk(x)⊕hk(x′) = d0 (5.6)
B2 = (d0 · 〈b , (x⊕ x′)〉)⊕h(x)h(x′) (5.7)
(the inner product is taken modulo 2, and x⊕ x′ is a bitwise xor)












MZ ⇒ y· · ·
|0〉
Figure 5.1: The circuit computed by the Server













∣∣x′〉)⊗|y〉 Ũh⊗I2⊗m−−−−−→ (|h(x)〉⊗ |x〉+ ∣∣h(x′)〉⊗ ∣∣x′〉)⊗|y〉 I2⊗M⊗nX ⊗I2⊗m−−−−−−−−→
|out〉⊗ |b1〉 ...⊗|bn〉⊗ |y〉 ⇒ |out〉= Hd0X (d0·〈b·(x⊕x
′)〉)⊕h(x)h(x′) |0〉
where Ũh is a “swapped” Uh, acting on the first register as target and input register as
control: |0〉 |x〉 Ũh−→ |h(x)〉 |x〉.
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The server initially prepares the state |0n〉⊗|0m〉, where we will call the first regis-
ter the preimage register, and the second one the image register.
After applying U fk we obtain the state ∑x∈D |x〉 | fk(x)〉. Using the 2-regularity property
of fk, after measuring the second register (in the computational basis) and obtaining the
measurement result y ∈ Im( fk), the state can be expressed as (|x〉+ |x′〉)⊗|y〉, where x
and x′ are the 2 unique preimages of y. By omitting the image register and by initializ-
ing another qubit in the |0〉 state and using the above notation, the input to the unitary
Ũh can be written as:
(|x〉+
∣∣x′〉)⊗|0〉 (5.8)




As a final step, we measure all but the last qubit of this state in the { 1√
2
(|0〉± |1〉)}
basis (obtaining the measurement result string b), which is equivalent to applying H⊗n
on the input register, and then measuring it in the computational basis. Thus, after

















• if h(x) = h(x′) (i.e. d0 = h(x)⊕h(x′) = 0, using Equation 5.4), we have |out〉=
|h(x)〉= Hd0Xh(x) |0〉
• if h(x) 6= h(x′) (i.e. d0 = h(x)⊕h(x′) = 1) we have |out〉= |+〉 iff 〈b,(x⊕x′)〉=
0 mod 2, and |−〉 otherwise. Thus, |out〉= Hd0X 〈b,(x⊕x′)〉 |0〉
Hence, |out〉= HB1XB2 with B1 = d0 = h(x)⊕h(x′), and
B2 = (1⊕h(x)⊕h(x′))h(x)+(h(x)⊕h(x′)) · 〈b,(x⊕ x′)〉 mod 2
= h(x)+h(x)2 +h(x)h(x′)+d0 · 〈b,(x⊕ x′)〉 mod 2
= h(x)+h(x)+h(x)h(x′)+d0 · 〈b,(x⊕ x′)〉 mod 2
= h(x)h(x′)⊕d0 · 〈b,(x⊕ x′)〉 mod 2
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It can be noticed that, in an honest run of the protocol, using y and the trapdoor
information of the function fk, the Client obtains x and x′ and thus can efficiently
determine what is the output state that the Server has prepared.
In the next section, we prove that no malicious adversary can distinguish between the 2
possible bases {|0〉, |1〉} and {|+〉, |−〉} of the output qubit, or equivalently distinguish
whether B1 is 0 or 1.
5.2.3 Security of Malicious 4-states QFactory
In any run of the protocol, honest or malicious, the state that the client believes that the
server has is given by Theorem 5.2.2. Therefore, the task that a malicious server wants
to achieve, is to be able to guess, as good as he can, the description of the output state
that the client (based on the public communication) thinks the server has produced. In
particular, in our case, the server needs to guess the bit B1 (corresponding to the basis)
of the (honest) output state.
Note that we want to make sure that the server cannot guess the basis bit B1
(for most applications ([BFK09, FK17]) basis blindness is sufficient as indicated in
[DK16]), and we do not care about the value bit B2 simply because it is not possible
to say that B2 cannot be guessed with probability better than random. Indeed, even
in the honest case, or in the “perfect” case with a quantum channel, the server can al-
ways measure the qubit |out〉 he has to extract the value bit (for example by measuring
it in a random basis (computational or Hadamard) and outputting the outcome of the
measurement, he will succeed with probability 12 · 12 + 12 ·1 = 34 > 1/2). Additionally,
partial blindness of B2 is implicit in our work, since learning B2 leads to leaking par-
tial information about B1, in the case that the server possesses the honest output state
HB1XB2 |0〉. Optimal bounds for B2’s leakage are not known if the server is malicious
and without verification, is non-trivial and will be studied as a future work.
Definition 5.2.3 (4 states basis blindness). We say that a protocol (πA,πB) achieves
basis-blindness with respect to an ideal list of 4 states
S = {SB1,B2}(B1,B2)∈{0,1}2 if:
• S is the set of states that the protocol outputs, i.e.:
Pr [|φ〉= SB1B2 ∈ S | ((B1,B2), |φ〉)← (πA‖πB)]≥ 1−negl (n)
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• No information is leaked about the index bit B1 of the output state of the protocol,
i.e for all QPT adversary A:
Pr
[
B1 = B̃1 | ((B1,B2), B̃1)← (πA‖A)
]
≤ 1/2+negl (n)
Theorem 5.2.4 (Malicious 4-states QFactory is secure). Protocol 3 satisfies 4-states
basis blindness with respect to the ideal list of states
S = {HB1XB2 |0〉}B1,B2 = {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}.
Proof. The advantage of our construction is that this theorem is now a direct applica-
tion of the definition of the family F ( Definition 5.2.1). Indeed, let us suppose that
there exists a QPT adversary A such that:
Pr
[




where πA is the honest Client and A is the malicious Server in Protocol 3.
From Theorem 5.2.2, we notice that the value of B1 is always equal to d0(tk). More-
over, our adversary is a one-round adversary, so we can rewrite the previous equation
as:
Pr [d0(tk) = A(k) | (k, tk)← GenF ]≥ 1/2+
1
poly (n)
But d0 is a hardcore predicate, so this contradicts Equation 5.3. So no QPT adversary
A can guess the basis B1 with probability better than 1/2+negl (n).
Remark 5.2.5. In the run of the Malicious 4-states QFactory protocol, the adversary
(server) has no access to the abort/accept bit, specifying whether the Client wants to
abort the protocol after receiving the image y from the server (the abort occurs when y
does not have exactly two preimages). So this is why this first protocol is correct with
overwhelming probability only when the function fk is 2-regular with overwhelming
probability (δ > 1− negl (n)). See section 5.5 to see how we address this issue for
constant δ.
5.3 Function Implementation
5.3.1 Generic construction of 2-regular homomorphic-hardcore
To complete the construction of Malicious 4-states QFactory, we must find functions
F , h, and d0 satisfying the properties described in Definition 5.2.1. We first explain
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a general method to construct a 2-regular function from an injective homomorphic
function (the generalisation to δ-2-regularity from pseudo-homomorphic functions is
treated in section B.4), and we give in the next section a candidate that achieves the two
other properties required in our definition (homomorphic-hardcore predicate) whose
security is based on the cryptographic problem LWE.
Lemma 5.3.1. It is possible to construct a family of functions F : { fk : D×{0,1} →
R }, hk and d0 that are a 2-regular homomorphic-hardcore family (Definition 5.2.1)




and such that for every gk′ there exists a homomorphic hardcore predicate h′k′ .
5
Proof. Because G is homomorphic, there exist 2 operations ”+D ” acting on D and
”+R ” acting on R such that:
gk′(z1 +D z2) = gk′(z1)+R gk′(z2) ∀k′ ∀z1,z2 ∈D (5.11)
The hardcore predicate h′ : D→{0,1} is homomorphic, hence we have:
h′(z1)⊕h′(z2) = h′(z2 +D z1) ∀z1,z2 ∈D (5.12)
And because we are working modulo 2 it is easy to see that:
h′(z1)⊕h′(z2) = h′(z2−D z1) ∀z1,z2 ∈D, (5.13)
where ”−D” is the inverse of the operation ”+D”.
Then, the functions F , hk, d0 are constructed as follow. First, to generate a private
key, we generate a private key of G , and we pick a random element z0 from D:
4We only require G to be homomorphic with good probability for a single application of the oper-
ation +D and this would result in F being 2-regular with good probability, as proven in section B.4.
5We will omit the subscript k′ and simply denote the hardcore predicate by h′ - as we will see in the
next section the instantiation of h is independent of k′.
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GenF (1n)
1 : (k′, t ′k′)←$ GenG (1n)
2 : z0←$ D
3 : y0← gk′(z0)
4 : tk = (t ′k′ ,z0)
5 : k = (k′,y0)
6 : return (k, tk)
And then we define fk : D×{0,1}→ R as:
fk(z,c) = gk′(z)+R c · y0
We also define hk : D×{0,1}→ R as:
hk(z,c) = h(z)
and d0 : T →{0,1} (where T is the sets of trapdoors tk) as
d0(tk) = h(z0)
Now we need to check the properties of F , hk and d0 from Definition 5.2.1:
• The 2-regularity of F comes directly from the injectivity of G : for any y∈ Im fk,
we have one preimage (g−1k′ (y),0) and one preimage (g
−1
k′ (y)− z0,1). The past
two formula also show the trapdoor property using the fact that G is a trapdoor
family (more details can be found in Theorem 4.5.1).
• The collision-resistant property comes from the homomorphicity , injectivity,
and one-wayness of G : if we find a collision, we can write a reduction that
breaks the one-wayness of G . Indeed by injectivity two different preimages
have a different c, i.e. fk(z,0) = fk(z′,1). Hence, gk′(z) = gk′(z′)+ gk′(z0), i.e.
z0 = z− z′. So it means that from a collision we can find z0, which contradicts
the one-wayness of gk′ .
• hk is equal to h, so it can be computed efficiently.
• d0(tk) = h(z0), and h is a hardcore predicate, so d0 is also hardcore predicate
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= d0(tk) = d0
5.3.2 Construction of δ-2-regular homomorphic-hardcore family F
We will now give an explicit implementation of a family G that is injective, trapdoor,
(pseudo) homomorphic with a homomorphic-hardcore predicate d0, and then we will
rely on a construction similar to Lemma 5.3.1 to produce a family F , h, and d0 with
the properties described in Definition 5.2.1 needed by Protocol 3 and Protocol 5. We
notice that we defined in the previous chapter a similar construction, but without the
additional homomorphic-hardcore property.
The starting point is the injective, trapdoor one-way family of functions Ḡ = {ḡK :
Znq×Em→ Zmq }K6 from [MP12] (where E defines the set of integers bounded in abso-
lute value by some “big-enough” value µ which will be defined later, and additions are
matrix additions modulo q, where q is an even integer).
ḡK(s,e) = Ks+ e
Then, to sample a function from the family G = {gk′ : Znq×Em×{0,1} → Zmq },
which will be used for construction F as in Lemma 5.3.1, we first build the public key
matrix K ∈Zm×nq along with the trapdoor matrix R using the construction from [MP12]
and additionally, we extend the domain with an extra input bit d. Now, after denoting
the constant vector v =
(
q
2 0 . . . 0
)T
, we define gk′ as:







= Ks+ e+d · v
where k′ := K and t ′k′ := R
(5.14)
6The bar on top of Ḡ denotes the version where there is not yet the hardcore bit d0
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Finally, to sample a function from the family F = { fk :Znq×Em×{0,1}×{0,1}→
Zmq }, we construct matrices K and R as before, and will sample a uniform random
vector s0 ∈ Znq, a random small error vector e0 ∈ Zmq sampled according to a “small-
enough” Gaussian distribution Dm
α′q on integers and a (uniform) random bit d0 ∈ {0,1}.
Now by defining:
y0 := Ks0 + e0 +d0 · v
the trapdoor is set to tk := (R,s0,e0,d0), and the public index is k := (K,y0).
We can already note at this step that d0 is a hardcore-predicate:
Lemma 5.3.2. The function d0(tk) := d0 is a hardcore predicate of k, i.e. for all QPT





The proof can be found in subsection B.1.1.
Now, we can define fk : Znq×Em×{0,1}×{0,1}→ Zmq as follows:
fk(s,e,c,d) = Ks+ e+ c · y0 +d · v
and h : Znq×Em×{0,1}×{0,1}→ {0,1} as:
h(s,e,c,d) = d
The idea behind this construction is similar to the general construction presented in
subsection 5.3.1. Intuitively, the first two terms Ks+e are useful for the security, the c ·
y0 term is needed to ensure the 2-regularity (the two images will differ by (s0,e0,1,d0)),
and the last term d ·v is mostly useful to provide the hardcore property. More precisely:
• This function cannot have more than 2 preimages because the partial functions
f (·, ·,c, ·) are injective (because ḡK is injective).
• h is the homomorphic-hardcore predicate required by Definition 5.2.1. Indeed,
if there is a collision, i.e. if fk(s,e,0,d) = fk(s′,e′,1,d′), it is easy to see that
d⊕d′ = d0 (q is even, and operations are modulo q), i.e.: h(x)⊕h(x′) = d0.
• Finally, for an appropriate choice of parameters (see Lemma 5.3.3), this function
is 2-regular with good probability. Indeed, if for a random element (s,e,0,d)
there exists (s′,e′,1,d′) with fk(s,e,0,d) = fk(s′,e′,1,d′), then e = e′+ e0. But
e0 is sampled from a set significantly smaller than E, so with good probability
e′ = e− e0 will belong to E.
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Note on the parameters: α′ is chosen to make sure that the sampled elements are
small compared to µ (the upper bound on E), but such that the noise is still big enough
for security. On the contrary, µ must stay small enough to ensure that the function
does not have more than two preimages. In the previous chapter we provided a set of
parameters having all the required constraints, which we recall here:
Lemma 5.3.3. The family of functions F is δ-2-regular with good (constant greater
than 1/2) probability, trapdoor, one-way and collision resistant (all these properties
are true even against a quantum attacker), assuming that there is no quantum algo-














Moreover, we can find another set of parameters such that this probability δ is negli-
gibly close to one assuming that SIVPγ is secure for a superpolynomial γ (depending
on the value of δ, you may choose Protocol 3 (δ∼ 1) or Protocol 5 (δ > 1/2)).
We can now formalize the above intuitions:
Theorem 5.3.4. The family F defined above with appropriate parameters, such as the
one defined in Lemma 5.3.3, is a δ-2-regular homomorphic-hardcore family.
Proof. Le us first show that gK is an injective function. To prove this, we will use the
injectivity property of the function ḡ.
gK(s,e,d) = ḡK(s,e)+d · v
Assume there exist 2 tuples (s1,e1,d1) and (s2,e2,d2) such that gK(s1,e1,d1) =
gK(s2,e2,d2). To prove that gK is injective we must show that (s1,e1,d1) = (s2,e2,d2).
This is equivalent to:
ḡK(s1,e1)+d1 · v = ḡK(s2,e2)+d2 · v
ḡK(s1,e1)− ḡK(s2,e2)+(d1−d2) · v = 0 (5.16)
Now, if d1 = d2, then we have that ḡK(s1,e1)− ḡK(s2,e2) = 0, and because ḡK is
injective, this would imply that s1 = s2 and e1 = e2 and thus, gK would also be injective.
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Let us suppose that d1 6= d2 and we will prove that this is impossible. Without loss of
generality we can assume that d1 = 0 and d2 = 1.
Thus, we want to show that it is impossible to have (s1,e1) and (s2,e2) such that:
ḡK(s1,e1)− ḡK(s2,e2) = v (5.17)
Using the definition of ḡK , this is equivalent to:







 mod q (5.18)
This can be rewritten as:




Ki,1(s1,1− s2,1)+ ...+Ki,n(s1,n− s2,n)+(e1,i− e2,i) = 0 mod q (5.20)
for any i ∈ {2, · · · ,m} and where s1,i and s2,i denote the i-th elements of s1 and s2
respectively and e1,i and e2,i are the i-th elements of e1, respectively e2.
Now, as the function ḡK : Znq×Em→ Zmq , where K← Zm×nq , is injective, the following
function is also injective:
ḡ1K1 : Z
n
q×Em−1 → Zm−1q , where K1 ← Zm−1×nq and where ḡ and ḡ1 have the exact
same definition:
ḡ1K1(s,e) = K1s+ e mod q (5.21)
More specifically, the only difference between the 2 functions is the change of dimen-
sion from m to m−1, but as the injectivity proof from [MP12] holds for any m = Ω(n),
then ḡ1 is also injective.
Now, consider the matrix K1 obtained from K by removing the first line. As shown
above, ḡ1K1 is an injective function, thus from Equation 5.20, we get that:
s1 = s2 (5.22)
e1,i = e2,i ∀ i = 2, ..,m (5.23)
Now as s1 = s2, from Equation 5.19, we obtain e1,1− e2,1 = q2 .
However, from the domain of ḡ, we have that: |e1,1− e2,1| < |e1,1|+ |e2,1| < 2µ < q2
(where for the last inequality we used Lemma 5.3.3). This concludes the contradiction
proof and shows us that gK is injective.
124 Chapter 5. QFactory against Malicious Server
The proofs of homomorphicity for gK and h can be found in subsection B.1.2 and
one-wayness of gK in subsection B.1.3. Finally, the Lemma 5.3.3 ensures that the
family is δ-2-regular and the hardcore property results from Lemma 5.3.2.
5.4 The Malicious 8-states QFactory Protocol
In order to use the Malicious 4-states QFactory Protocol functionality for applications
such as blind quantum computing [BFK09], we need to be able to produce states taken
from the set {|+θ〉 ,θ ∈ {0, π4 , ..., 7π4 }}, always ensuring that the bases of these qubits
remain hidden. Here we prove how by using two states produced by Malicious 4-
states QFactory Protocol, we can obtain a single state from the 8-states set, while no
information about the bases of the new output state is leaked.
To achieve this, we need to find an operation, that in the honest case maps the
correct inputs to the outputs, in such a way, that the index of the output state corre-
sponding to the basis, is directly related with the bases bits of the input states. This
relation should be such that learning non-negligible information about the basis of the
output state implies learning non-negligible information about the basis of the input
state. This directly means, that any computationally bounded adversary that breaks the
8-states basis blindness of the output, also breaks the 4-states basis blindness of at least
one of the inputs.
The protocol achieving this task is described as outlined below.
Protocol 4 Malicious 8-states QFactory
Requirements: Same as in Protocol Protocol 3
Input: Client runs 2 times the algorithm GenF (1n), obtaining (k1, t1k ),(k





– Client: runs Malicious 4-states QFactory algorithm to obtain a state |in1〉 and a “rotated”
Malicious 4-states QFactory to obtain a state |in2〉. By a rotated Malicious 4-states QFactory














on the BB84 output state.
– Client: records measurement outcomes (y1,b1), (y2,b2) and computes and stores the corre-
sponding indices of the output states of the 2 Malicious 4-states QFactory runs: (B1,B2) for
|in1〉 and (B′1,B′2) for |in2〉.
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– Client: instructs Server to apply Merge Gadget (Figure 5.2) on the states |in1〉, |in2〉.
– Server: returns the 2 measurement results s1, s2.
– Client: using (B1,B2), (B′1,B
′
2), s1, s2 computes the index L = L1L2L3 ∈ {0,1}3 of the output
state (as showed in Eq.(5.29), Eq.(5.30) and Eq.(5.31) of Theorem 5.4.1).











5.4.1 Correctness of Malicious 8-states QFactory
We prove the existence of a mapping M (which we will call Merge Gadget), from 2









to a state of the form |out〉=
∣∣∣+L· π4〉, where L = L1L2L3 ∈ {0,1}3.
Namely, as depicted in Figure 5.2, M is acting in the following way:











|in1〉 Z • |±〉 s2
|in2〉 Z |out〉
Figure 5.2: Merge Gadget
Theorem 5.4.1. In an honest run, the Output state of the Malicious 8-states QFactory
Protocol is of the form
∣∣∣+L· π4〉, where L = L1L2L3 ∈ {0,1}3.
Proof. In an honest run, using the Merge Gadget (Figure 5.2) we get:
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Thus:














Which is then equivalent to:
|out〉= R
[
π(B′2 +B2 +B1 · (s1 + s2))+
π
2






As a result, we obtain:
L1 = B′2⊕B2⊕ [B1 · (s1⊕ s2)] (5.29)
L2 = B′1⊕ [(B2⊕ s2) ·B1] (5.30)
L3 = B1 (5.31)
It can also be noticed that, in an honest run of Malicious 8-states QFactory, the
Client can efficiently determine L: using b1,b2,y1,y2 and the trapdoors t1k , t
2
k , she first
obtains (B1,B2) and (B′1,B
′
2), and after receiving s1,s2, she determines the description
of the state prepared by the Server.
5.4.2 Security against Malicious Adversaries of Malicious 8-states
QFactory
In any run of the protocol, honest or malicious, the state that the client believes that the
server has, is given by Theorem 5.4.1.
Therefore, as in the case of Malicious 4-states QFactory, the task that a malicious
server wants to achieve, is to be able to guess, as good as he can, the index of the
output state that the client thinks the server has produced. In particular, in our case,
the server needs to guess the bits L2 and L3 (corresponding to the basis) of the (honest)
output state.
Definition 5.4.2 (8 states basis blindness). A protocol (πA,πB) achieves basis-blindness
with respect to an ideal list of 8 states S = {SL1,L2,L3}(L1,L2,L3)∈{0,1}3 if:
• S is the set of states that the protocol outputs, i.e.:
Pr [|φ〉= SL1,L2,L3 ∈ S | ((L1,L2,L3), |φ〉)← (πA‖πB)] = 1
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• No information is leaked about the “basis” bits (L2,L3) of the output state of the
protocol, i.e for all QPT adversary A:
Pr
[





Theorem 5.4.3. Malicious 8-states QFactory satisfies 8-state basis blindness with re-
spect to the ideal set of states S =
{∣∣∣+L· π4〉}L∈{0,...,7} = {|+〉 , ∣∣∣+ π4〉 , .., ∣∣∣+ 7π4 〉}.
Proof. We will prove this result by reduction showing that, if there exists a QPT adver-
sary A that is able to break the 8-states basis blindness property of Malicious 8-states




nomial function poly1(·)), then we can construct a QPT adversary A ′ that can break
the 4-states basis blindness of the Malicious 4-states QFactory protocol (determine the
basis bit with probability 12 +
1
poly2(n)
, for some polynomial function poly2(·)).
The input to A ′ should be consisting only of the F family index, k, and the description
of h. Next we show how to construct A ′ to determine the corresponding index B1 or
B′1 of the output state (of one of the 2 Malicious 4-states QFactory runs), by using as
a subroutine A that acts as follows: receives as input 2 function indices k(1) and k(2),
runs Malicious 8-states QFactory and then A is able to output the correct basis bits L2




Before we describe A ′, we need to define the following 3 values:
• P2 = probability that A guesses correctly L2;
• P3 = probability that A guesses correctly L3;
• P⊕ = probability that A guesses correctly L2⊕L3;




implies that max(P2,P3,P⊕)≥ 12 + 1poly2(n) for some polynomial poly2(·) (the proof is
presented in section B.2).
We will construct A ′ such that if P3 is the maximum, then A ′ can determine B1 (break
the basis blindness of the first Malicious 4-states QFactory run) and if P2 or P⊕ is
the maximum, then A ′ can determine B′1 (break the basis blindness of the the second
”rotated” Malicious 4-states QFactory run).
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A ′(k,h,1n)
1 : / k(1) will correspond to the input for the first run of Malicious 4-states QFactory
2 : / - with the output index (B1,B2), while k will correspond to


















7 : if P3 = max(P2,P3,P⊕)
8 : / we break the basis-blindness of the first Malicious 4-states QFactory by determining B1
9 : (y(1),y(2),b(1),b(2),s1,s2),(L̃2, L̃3)← A(k,k(1),h)
10 : / (y(1),y(2),b(1),b(2),s1,s2) represents the classical communication received from A
11 : / during the run of Malicious 8-states QFactory, and
12 : / (L̃2, L̃3) - are the guesses of A for the indices of the outcome
13 : B̃1← L̃3
14 : return B̃1/ as B1 = L3 as seen in Eq. 5.31 and





16 : else / we break the basis-blindness of the second Malicious 4-states QFactory by determining B′1
17 : (y(1),y(2),b(1),b(2),s1,s2),(L̃2, L̃3)← A(k(1),k,h)
18 : / (y(1),y(2),b(1),b(2),s1,s2) represents the classical communication received from A
19 : / during the run of Malicious 8-states QFactory, and
20 : / (L̃2, L̃3) - are the guesses of A for the indices of the outcome
21 : (z(1),z′(1))← InvF (y(1), t(1)k )
22 : B1← h(z(1))⊕h(z′(1))






24 : if P2 = max(P2,P3,P⊕)
25 : / Then B′1 = L2⊕B1 · (B2⊕ s2) as seen in Eq. 5.30
26 : B̃′1← L̃2⊕ [B1 · (B2⊕ s2)]
27 : return B̃′1
28 : if P⊕ = max(P2,P3,P⊕)
29 : B̃′1← L̃2⊕ L̃3⊕B1⊕ [B1 · (B2⊕ s2)]
30 : return B̃′1
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5.5 Malicious-abort 4-states QFactory: treating abort
case
In this section, we will discuss an extension of Malicious 4-states QFactory, whose
aim is to achieve basis blindness even against adversaries that try to exploit the fact
that Malicious 4-states QFactory can abort when there is only one preimage associ-
ated to the y returned by the server. One may think that we could just send back this
accept/abort bit to the server, but unfortunately it could leak additional information
on the hardcore bit d0 (which corresponds to the basis B1 of the produced qubit) to the
server, and as soon as the probability of acceptance is small enough, we cannot guar-
antee that this bit remains secret. On the other hand, for honest servers, the probability
of aborting is usually non-negligible, so we cannot neglect this case.
We stress out that it is also possible to guarantee that for honest servers this proba-
bility goes negligibly close to 1 by making an appropriate choice of parameters for the
function. In that case the initial protocol of Malicious QFactory defined in section 5.2
is secure, but this comes (as far as we know), at the cost of using a function which
is “less” secure. More specifically, instead of having a reduction to GAPSVP with a
polynomial γ, the reduction usually goes to GAPSVP with a super-polynomial γ. Such
function parameters have been used implicitly in other works [Mah18] ([Bra18] later
removed this assumption), and for now they are believed to be secure (the best known
polynomial algorithm cannot break GAPSVP with a γ smaller than exponential), but
nevertheless we aim to remove this non-standard assumption.
The solution we propose here uses the assumption that the classical Yao’s XOR
Lemma also applies for one-round protocols (with classical messages) against quan-
tum adversary. This lemma roughly states that if you cannot guess the output bit of
one round with probability better than η, then you cannot guess the output bit of t in-
dependents rounds with probability much better than 1/2+ηt . As far as we know, this
lemma has been proven only in the classical case (see [GNW11]).
In the following, we will call “accepted run” a run of Malicious 4-states QFactory
such that the y received from the server has 2 preimages (“probability of success” also
refers to the probability of this event when the server is honest), and otherwise we call
it an “aborted run”.
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5.5.1 The Malicious-Abort 4-state QFactory Protocol
The solution we are proposing is to run several instances of Malicious 4-states QFac-
tory, by remarking that we do not need to discard the aborted runs. Indeed, it is easy to
see that in these cases, the produced qubits will always be in the same basis ({|0〉 , |1〉}
denoted by 0). The idea is then to implement on the server side a circuit that will out-
put a qubit having as basis the XOR of all the basis of the accepted runs (without even
leaking which runs are accepted or not), and verify on client’s side that the number
of accepted runs is high enough (this will happen with overwhelming probability for
honest servers). If it is the case, the client will just output the XOR of the basis of the
accepted run, and otherwise (i.e. if the server is malicious), she will just pick a random
bit value.
Unfortunately, in practice things are a bit more complicated, and in order to prove
the security of our construction we need to divide all the t runs into nc “chunks” of size
tc, and test the chunks individually. We provide now a more detailed description of the
protocol and proof technique:
1. We run t = nc · tc parallel instances of Malicious 4-states QFactory, without re-
vealing the abort bit for any of these instances;
2. The key point to note is that for honest servers, if yi has only one preimage
then the output qubit produced by the server at the end of the protocol will be
either |0〉 or |1〉, but cannot be |+〉 or |−〉 (with one preimage we do not have a
superposition), as we show in Lemma 5.5.2. In other words, the basis is always
the {|0〉 , |1〉} basis (denoted as 0) so we do not really need to abort. Therefore,
for honest runs, at the end, the basis of the output qubits will be equal to βi =
d0,i · ai, for all i ∈ {1, · · · , t}, where ai = 1 if and only if yi has two preimages,
and ai = 0 otherwise.
3. Then, from the t qubits in the basis β1, . . . ,βt , we will produce a single qubit
belonging to the set {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} whose basis B1 is the XOR of the basis
of the t qubits, i.e. B1 =⊕ti=1βi. The construction is shown in Lemma 5.5.3.
4. Then, the client will test every chunk, by checking whether the proportion of
accepted runs in every chunk is greater than some parameter pc. If all chunks
have enough accepted runs, then the client just computes and outputs the real
value for the basis (which is the XOR of the hardcore bits of all the accepted
runs) and the value bit B2. However, if at least one chunk does not have enough
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accepted runs (which cannot happen if the server is honest), then the client just
outputs random values for the basis and value bit, not correlated with server’s
qubit (equivalent to saying that a malicious server can always throw the qubit
and pick a new qubit, not correlated with client’s state description).
5. Correctness: if the probability of F to have two preimages (given an honest
server) is at least a constant pa greater than 1/2 (the parameters we propose in
Lemma 5.3.3 guarantee this property), and if t is chosen high enough, the frac-
tion of accepted runs will be close to pa, and we can show that the probability to
have a fraction of accepted runs smaller than a given constant pb < pa is expo-
nentially (in t) close to 0 (cf Lemma 5.5.4). So with overwhelming probability,
all the chunks will have enough accepted runs, i.e. honest servers will have a
qubit corresponding to the output of the client.
6. Soundness: to prove the security of this scheme, we first prove in Lemma 5.5.7
that it is impossible for any adversary to guess the output of one chunk with a
probability bigger than a constant η < 1 (otherwise we have a direct reduction
that breaks the hardcore bit property of gK). Now, using the quantum version
of Yao’s XOR Lemma that we conjecture at Conjecture 5.5.1, we can deduce
that no malicious server is able to guess the XOR of the tc chunks/instances with
probability better than 1/2+ηtc + negl (n), which goes negligibly close to 1/2
when tc = Ω(n).
Putting everything together, the parties will run t = nc · tc Malicious 4-states QFactory
in parallel, the client will then check if ∑i ai is higher than pc · tc for all the nc chunks,
and if so, she will set B1 =⊕ti=1di ·ai (server has a circuit to produce a qubit in this basis
as well). Otherwise B1 will be set to a uniformly chosen random bit (it is equivalent
to say that a malicious server can destroy the qubit, and this is also unavoidable even
with a real quantum communication), and we still have correctness with overwhelming
probability for honest clients. The exact algorithm is described in Protocol 5, while the
security result is shown in Theorem 5.5.8.
5.5.2 Correctness and Security Malicious-Abort 4-state QFactory
In this section we will formalize and prove the previous statements.
Conjecture 5.5.1 (Yao’s XOR Lemma for one-round protocols (with classical mes-
sages) against quantum adversary).
132 Chapter 5. QFactory against Malicious Server
Let n be the security parameter, let fn : Xn×Yn→{0,1} be a (possibly non-deterministic)
family of functions (usually not computable in polynomial time), and let χn be a dis-
tribution on Xn efficiently samplable. If there exists δ(n) such that |δ(n)| ≥ 1poly(n) and
such that for all polynomial (in n) quantum adversary An : Xn→ Yn×{0,1},
Pr
[
β̃ = fn(x,y) | (y, β̃)← An(x),x← χn
]
≤ 1−δ(n)











Lemma 5.5.2 (Aborted runs are useful). If Client (πA4) and Server (πB4) are follow-
ing the Malicious 4-states QFactory protocol honestly, and if y does not have not 2
preimages, then the output qubit produced by πB4 is in the basis {|0〉 , |1〉}.
The proof can be found in section B.3.
Lemma 5.5.3 (Gadget circuit Gad⊕ computes XOR). If we denote by bi the basis of
|ini〉 (equal to 0 if the basis is 0/1, and 1 if the basis is +/−), then by running the
circuit Gad⊕ represented in Figure 5.3 on these inputs, then the basis of the output of
the circuit, |out〉 is equal to ⊕ti=1bi.
The proof can be found in section B.3.
∣∣+π/2〉 • |±〉 s1,1
|in1〉 Z • |±〉 s1,2∣∣+π/2〉 • |±〉 s2,1
|in2〉 Z • |±〉 s2,2
...
...
...∣∣+π/2〉 • |±〉 st,1
|int〉 Z • |±〉 st,2
|+〉 Z Z Z |out〉
Figure 5.3: The XOR gadget circuit Gad⊕ (performed by Server)
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We can now describe the protocol of Malicious-Abort 4-states QFactory:
Protocol 5 Malicious-Abort 4-states QFactory Protocol
Requirements:
Public: The family of functions F and h, such that the probability of having two preimages for
a random image is greater than a constant pa > 1/2.
Parameters:
• nc ∈ N - number of chunks;
• tc ∈ N - number of repetitions per chunk;
• pa ∈ (1/2,1] - lower bound on probability of accepted run in the honest protocol;
• pc ∈ (1/2,1]< pa - threshold on fraction of accepted runs per chunk;
Parameters can be chosen in such a way to have overwhelming probability of success for honest
players, and negligible advantage for an adversary trying to guess the basis.
Stage 1: Run multiple QFactories
– Client: prepares t = nc · tc public keys and trapdoors:(
(k(i, j), tk(i, j))← GenF (1n)
)
i∈{1,··· ,nc}, j∈{1,··· ,tc}
The Client then sends the public keys k(i, j) to the Server, together with h.
– Server and Client: follow Protocol 3 for t times, with the keys sent at the step before. Client
receives ((y(i, j),b(i, j)))i, j, and computes for all i, j:
a(i, j) :=
1, if | f−1(y(i, j))|= 20, otherwise (5.32)
• If a(i, j) = 1 Client computes B(i, j)1 and B
(i, j)
2 as in Protocol 3;
• Else if a(i, j) = 0, Client sets B(i, j)1 = 0 and B
(i, j)
2 = h( f
−1(y));
• Server obtains t outputs
∣∣in(i, j)〉.
Stage 2: Combine runs and output
– Server: applies circuit Gad⊕ (Figure 5.3) on the t outputs |int〉, and outputs |out〉.
– Client: checks that for every chunks i ∈ {1,nc} the number of accepted runs is high enough,
i.e.: ∑tcj=1 a
(i, j) ≥ pctc.
• If at least one chunk does not respect this condition, then Client picks two random bits
B1 (the basis bit) and B2 (the value bit) and outputs (B1,B2), corresponding to the de-
scription of the BB84 state HB1XB2 |0〉.




1 (the final basis is
the XOR of all the basis), and B2 will be chosen to match the output of Gad⊕ (Figure 5.3).
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Lemma 5.5.4 (Probability of correctness of Malicious-Abort 4-states QFactory for one
chunk). If the probability to have an accepted run in Malicious 4-states QFactory with
honest parties is greater than a constant pa > 1/2, i.e.:
Pr
[
| f−1k (y)|= 2 | (πA4‖πB4)
]
≥ pa
(where πA4 and πB4 are the honest protocols of Malicious 4-states QFactory) then
for any constant pb < pa, the probability to have in a chunk of tc runs, at least pbtc












= 1−negl (tc )
(where πtcA4⊕c and π
tc
B4⊕c are the (honest) parties of the Protocol 5 restricted on one
chunk of size tc, or, equivalently tc parallel repetitions of Protocol 3)
The proof can be found in section B.3.
Lemma 5.5.5 (Correctness of Protocol 5). Protocol 5 is correct with overwhelming
probability as soon as t = poly (n) and tc = Ω(n), i.e.
Pr
[
|out〉= HB1ZB2 | ((B1,B2), |out〉)← (πA‖πB)
]
≥ 1−negl (n)
The proof can be found in section B.3.
Definition 5.5.6. For any public key k and image y, we define:
a(k,y) :=





Then, for all tc ∈ N and pc ∈ [0,1], we define the randomized function:
βtc,pc
(
















a(k(i),y(i))< pc · tc
(5.34)
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Lemma 5.5.7 (Solving one chunk is difficult). Let pc ∈ (12 ,1]. Then, for all QPT





k(1), . . . ,k(tc),y(1), . . . ,y(tc)
)
|(




k(1), . . . ,k(tc)
)]
< η




, where the randomness is over the randomness of β, A , and over
the choices of (k(i))i and (y(i))i.
Proof. By contradiction, let us assume that there exists a QPT adversary A outputting
B̃1 and
(








where we omitted the parameters for readability.






































a(k(i),y(i))≤ pc · tc
]
(5.35)









































Therefore, we also have: α < 2(1−η).










We will show through a reduction that if A can output B with probability p, then
there exists a QPT adversary A ′ that can break the hardcore predicate property of
gk (determine the hardcore predicate d0 associated with k) with probability at least
(1−α)pc · p.
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A ′(k)
1 : Runs tc−1 times GenF obtaining {(k(i), tk(i))}tc−1i=1
2 : Calls A(k,k(1), · · · ,k(tc−1))→ (B̃1,{y,y(1), · · ·y(tc−1)})
3 : for i = 1, · · · tc−1 :
4 : Compute d(i)0 ← d0(tk(i))/ As indicated in Protocol 3
5 : Run InvF (y(i), tk(i))
6 : if y(i) has 2 preimages then
7 : a(k(i),y(i))← 1
8 : else a(k(i),y(i))← 0
9 : d̃0←⊕tc−1i=1 a(k(i),y(i)) ·d
(i)
0 ⊕ B̃1/ this will represent the guess of A ′ for d0(tk) - the hp corresponding to gk
10 : return d̃0
We can see that in order for A ′ to output the correct d0 hardcore predicate of gk, 3
things must happen: 1) A to output the correct B, 2) ∑tci=1 a(k(i),y(i))≥ pc · tc and 3) the
y outputted by A corresponding to function k has 2 preimages (and hence a(k,y) = 1).
Then, we compute the probability of success for A ′ as:
Pr
[







a(k(i),y(i))≥ pc · tc
]
· pa ≥ p · (1−α) · pc (5.37)


















































Because η and pc are constants that do not depend on n, this equality is also true








which contradicts that η = 12 +
1
4pc
and completes our proof.
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Finally, by combining all these results we obtain the correctness and security of the
full Malicious-Abort QFactory (Protocol 5).
Theorem 5.5.8 (Malicious-Abort QFactory is correct and secure). Assuming Conjec-
ture 5.5.1, and by ensuring that the probability of the family F to have two preimages
for any image is bigger than a constant pa > 1/2, then there exists a set of parameters
pc, tc and nc such that Protocol 5 is correct with probability exponentially close to 1
and basis-blind, i.e. for any QPT adversary A:
Pr
[





More precisely, we need tc ∈ (1/2, pc) to be a constant, and both tc and nc need to be
polynomial in n and Ω(n).
Proof. Firstly, the overwhelming probability of correctness is ensured by Lemma 5.5.5.
For security, using Lemma 5.5.7, we know that there exists a constant η < 1 such that
no adversary can solve a chunk (compute βtc,pc) with probability better than η.
Now, we will use Conjecture 5.5.1 in the following way. The function fn will be equal
to βtc,pc defined in Definition 5.5.6 (for each chunk). Then the input x sampled effi-
ciently from χn provided to the adversary is represented by the set of tc public keys
{k(i)}tci=1 and the outputs y given by A is the set of images {y(i)}
tc
i=1. Then, we need to
ensure that δ(n) = 1−η is at least 1poly(n) , which holds as in our case η is a constant




Then Conjecture 5.5.1 implies that for any number of chunks nc, no QPT adversary
can get the XOR of the solutions of nc chunks with probability better than 12 +η
nc +
negl (n). As η is a constant and nc = poly(n) we have that:
No QPT adversary can obtain the basis B1 of Protocol 5 with probability better than
1
2 +negl (n), which concludes our proof.
Chapter 6
Security Limitations of Classical Client
Delegated Quantum Computing
One of the central building blocks to achieve secure delegation of quantum computa-
tions, as well as other client-server functionalities is secure remote state preparation
(RSP) defined first in [DKL11]. The RSP resources enable the Client to remotely pre-
pare a quantum state on Server’s side and as a result, they are the natural candidate
to replace quantum channel resources in a modular fashion. These resources further
appear to enable a large family of composable protocols [DKL11, DFPR14], including
the Universal Blind Quantum Computation (UBQC) protocol [BFK09] used to dele-
gate a computation to a remote quantum Server who learns no information about the
ongoing computation.
However, secure delegated quantum computing is typically achieved in the settings
when both Client and Server have access to quantum resources, in particular via quan-
tum communication such that the Client can establish the necessary correlations with
the Server to securely perform this task. As a result, the question becomes relevant
whether it is possible to rely solely on classical channels between Client and Server
and still benefit from its quantum capabilities while preserving the same security level.
Motivated by this, we first introduced in chapter 4 the protocol HBC−QFactory
mimicking the remote state preparation resource over a purely classical channel, en-
abling a fully classical Client (using exclusively classical communication resources)
to remotely prepare a quantum state on Server’s side, under the assumption that the
Learning-With-Errors problem is hard to solve for quantum computers. A further ex-
ample from the family of classical-client remote state preparation protocols, denoted
in this chapter by RSPCC, is the Malicious 4-states QFactory described in chapter 5,
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with enhanced security compared to HBC−QFactory.
The important role of such classical RSP primitives as part of larger protocols,
most notably in their role of replacing quantum channels between Client and Server, is
emphasized by their ability to allow classical-server functionalities, such as delegated
quantum computing, available to classical users. Therefore, it is of utmost importance
to develop an understanding of this primitive, notably its security guarantees when
composed in larger contexts, such as in [GV19].
In this chapter we will investigate the composable security of classical client remote
state preparation. More specifically, we study what is the privacy loss when employing
RSPCC as a sub-module, and we address this question using the Constructive Cryp-
tography framework of Maurer and Renner [MR11] to provide a clear analysis of the
RSP resources from a composable perspective. To begin with, we define the goal of
RSPCC as the construction of ideal RSP resources from classical channels and most
importantly, we reveal the security limitations of using RSPCC in general, but also in
specific contexts.
Firstly, we determine a fundamental relation between the construction of ideal RSP
resources from classical channels and the task of cloning quantum states with auxiliary
information. We will prove that any classically constructed RSP resource must leak
the full description (possibly in an encoded form) of the generated quantum state,
even when we target computational security only. As a consequence, we find that the
realization of common RSP resources, without weakening their security guarantees
drastically, is impossible due to the no-cloning theorem.
Secondly, this result does not rule out that a specific RSPCC protocol can replace
the quantum channel at least in some contexts, such as the Universal Blind Quantum
Computation protocol. However, we show that the resulting classical client UBQC
protocol cannot maintain its proven composable security as soon as RSPCC is used as
a subroutine.
6.1 Overview of Contributions and Proof Techniques
In this chapter, we will cover the security of RSPCC, the class of remote state prepa-
ration protocols which use only a classical channel and the use-case that corresponds
to its arguably most important application: classical client delegated quantum compu-
tation achieved through the UBQC protocol with a completely classical Client. More
specifically, we analyze the security of UBQCCC, the family of protocols where an
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RSPCC is used in order to replace the quantum channel required for the original quan-
tum client UBQC protocol.
An example of an RSP resource is the SZ π2 resource depicted in Figure 6.1 (where
Zπ2 refers to the set of the 4 angles {0, π2 ,π, 3π2 }). This resource outputs the quantum












Figure 6.1: Ideal resource SZ π2
We will show in 6.2 a wide-ranging limitation of the composable guarantees that
any protocol in the family of protocols RSPCC can achieve. This limitation follows
from the relation between: i) the notion of classical realization of the RSP resource
and ii) the notion of describability, which is a property of resources that intuitively
measures how leaky is an RSP. This relation directly affects the amount of additional
leakage on the classical description of the quantum state. In this way, it rules out a
wide set of desirable resources, even against computationally bounded distinguishers.
Theorem 6.2.6 (Security Limitations of RSPCC). Any RSP resource, realizable by an
RSPCC protocol with security against quantum polynomial-time distinguishers, must
leak an encoded, but complete description of the generated quantum state to the server.
The importance of Theorem 6.2.6 lies in the fact that it is drawing a connection
between a computational notion - the composability of an RSPCC protocol with an
information theoretic notion - the statistical leakage of the ideal resource it is con-
structing. This allows us to use fundamental physical principles such as no-cloning
and no-signalling in the security analysis of computationally secure RSPCC protocols.
As one direct application of this powerful tool, we show that a computationally
secure implementation of the ideal resource in Figure 6.1 would give rise to the con-
struction of a quantum cloner and is hence impossible.
Proof sketch. While Theorem 6.2.6 applies to much more general RSP resources hav-
ing arbitrary behaviour at its interfaces and targeting any output quantum state, for sim-
plicity and clearance we will exemplify the main ideas of the proof of Theorem 6.2.6
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for the underlying resource SZ π2 .
The composable security of a protocol realizing SZ π2 implies by definition, the ex-
istence of an efficient (BQP) simulator σ, which turns the right interface of the ideal
resource SZ π2 (outputting |+θ〉 into a completely classical interface (given that the com-
munication between Client and Server must be entirely classical), as depicted in Figure
6.2.
Figure 6.2: D denotes the polynomial-time distinguisher having access to the left inter-
face of SZ π2 and to the classical messages sent by σ. D will run the honest Server using
the transcript from σ. A is the exponential-time algorithm that runs the same computa-
tions as the honest Server by emulating him. In this way, the classical description θ can
be extracted, resulting in the algorithm in the dashed part representing the quantum
cloner.
The polynomially-bounded quantum distinguisher will have access to this classical
interface as well as the left interface of SZ π2 and will run the protocol of the honest
server, which will allow him to reconstruct the quantum state |+θ〉 received by the
simulator from the ideal resource. Since the distinguisher has access to θ via the left
interface, he can simply perform a quantum measurement to verify that the state ob-
tained after interacting with the simulator corresponds to the classical description θ.
By the correctness of the protocol, the quantum state obtained by the distinguisher,
|+θ〉, must therefore comply with θ.
Now, since the quantum state |+θ〉 is transmitted from σ to the distinguisher over a
classical channel, the ensemble of exchanged classical messages must contain a com-
plete encoding of the description of the state, namely θ. A (possibly unbounded) al-
gorithm can hence extract the actual description of the state by means of a classical
emulation of the honest Server, as shown in Figure 6.2. This property of the ideal
resource of being able to extract the description of the underlying quantum state is
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central to our proof technique and we will call it describability.
Finally, having a full description of the quantum state produced by SZ π2 would
allow to create several copies of this state, a procedure prohibited by the no-cloning
theorem. Consequently, we conclude that the resource SZ π2 cannot be constructed from
a classical channel only.
One could attempt to modify the RSP ideal resource to incorporate some leakage
to the Server about the classical description of the state, which would be necessary
as the above result shows. However, this yields an ideal resource that is not a useful
idealization or abstraction of the real world which puts in question whether they are at
all useful in a composable analysis.
Consider for example constructions of composite protocols that utilize the (non-
leaky) ideal resource as a sub-module. These constructions require a fresh security
analysis if the sub-module is replaced by any leaky version of it, but since the modified
resource is very specific and must mimic its implementation (in terms of leakage) it
appears that this replacement does not give any benefit compared to directly using the
implementation as a subroutine and then examining the composable security of the
combined protocol as a whole. This latter way is therefore examined next.
More precisely, we might still be able to use RSPCC as a subroutine in other specific
protocols and expect the overall protocol to still construct a useful ideal functionality.
The family of protocols UBQCCC is such an application. Unfortunately, as we show
in section 6.3, UBQCCC fails to provide the expected composable security guaran-
tees once classical remote state preparation protocols are used to replace the quantum
channel between Client and Server 1. This result holds even if the distinguisher is
computationally bounded.
Theorem 6.3.10 (Impossibility of UBQCCC). No RSPCC protocol can replace the
quantum channel in the UBQC protocol while preserving composable security.
Proof sketch. We first show that the existence of any composable UBQCCC protocol, in
the sense of achieving the ideal UBQC resource, implies the existence of a composable
single-qubit UBQCCC protocol. Then, the impossibility of composable single-qubit
UBQCCC protocols is shown in 2 steps. Firstly, we show that single-qubit UBQCCC
1By composable security of UBQC we refer to the goal of achieving the established ideal function-
ality of [DFPR14], which we recall in section 6.3.
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can be turned into RSP protocols. As a result, this allows us to employ the toolbox we
developed before on RSP protocols. As a second step, we deduce that an RSP protocol
of this specific kind (leaking the classical description of the underlying quantum state
in the form of an encoded message) would imply a violation of the no-signaling prin-
ciple, therefore showing that a composable UBQCCC protocol could not have existed
in the first place.
Before presenting our main results outlined above, we need to first introduce some
notation used throughout the following sections.
6.1.1 Notations
We will denote by Zπ2 the set of the 4 angles {0, π2 ,π, 3π2 }, and Zπ4 = {0, π4 , ..., 7π4 }
the similar set of 8 angles. If ρ is a quantum state, [ρ] will represent the classical
representation (as a density matrix) of this state. We also denote the quantum state
|+θ〉 := 1√2(|0〉+e
iθ |1〉), where θ∈Zπ4 , and for any angle θ, [θ] will denote [|+θ〉〈+θ|],
i.e. the classical description of the density matrix corresponding to |+θ〉. For a protocol
P = (P1,P2) with two interacting algorithms P1 and P2 denoting the two participating
parties, let r← 〈P1,P2〉 denote the execution of the two algorithms, exchanging mes-
sages, with output r. We use the notation C to denote the classical channel resource,
that just forwards classical messages between the two parties.
6.2 Impossibility of Composable Classical RSP
In this section we proceed by defining the general notion of RSP, what it tries to
achieve in terms of resources and then we will quantify the information that an ideal
RSP resource must leak (at its interface) to the server even when the distinguisher is
computationally bounded. One would expect that against bounded distinguishers, the
resource RSP can express clear privacy guarantees, which we prove cannot be the case.
The reason can be intuitively summarized as follows: assuming that there exists a
simulator making the ideal resource indistinguishable from the real protocol, we can
exploit this fact to construct an algorithm that can classically describe the quantum
state given by the ideal resource. It is not difficult to see that there would exist an in-
efficient algorithm (i.e. running in exponential time) achieving this task. We show that
even a computationally bounded distinguisher can distinguish the real protocol from
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the ideal protocol whenever the simulator’s strategy is independent of the classical de-
scription of the quantum state sent by the ideal resource. This implies that for an RSP
protocol to be composably secure, there must exist a simulator that possesses at least a
classical transcript encoding the description of the underlying quantum state. This fact
coupled with the quantum no-cloning theorem implies that the most meaningful and
natural RSP resources cannot be realized from a classical channel alone. We conclude
the section by examining the class of imperfect (describable) RSP resources which
avoid the no-go result at the price of being “fully-leaky”, not standard, and having an
unfortunately unclear composable security.
6.2.1 Remote State Preparation and Describable Resources
We first introduce, based on the standard definitions of the Constructive Cryptography
framework, the notions of correctness and security for a two-party protocol between
an honest Client and a malicious Server, which constructs (realizes) a resource from a
classical channel resource C .
Definition 6.2.1 (Classically-Realizable Resource). An ideal resource S is said to be ε-
classically-realizable if it is realizable (in the sense of Definition 2.5.1) from a classical





A simple ideal prototype capturing the goal of RSP can be phrased as follows: the
resource outputs a quantum state (chosen at random from a fixed set of states) on one
interface to the Server and the classical description of that state on the other interface
to the Client. However, for our purposes this view is too narrow and we would like to
generalize this definition of the resource. For instance, a resource could accept some
input from the Client or could interact with the server and still be powerful enough to
comply with the above described basic behaviour, when both Client and Server follow
the protocol.
For this reason, we would like to capture than any resource can be categorized as an
RSP resource as soon as there exists a way to efficiently convert the Client and Server
interfaces to comply with the basic prototype. To formalize, this we would need to
introduce the following converters that will ensure this:
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1. Converter A will output (to the Client), after interacting with the ideal resource2,
a classical description [ρ] which is one of the following:
(a) A density matrix corresponding to a quantum state ρ.
(b) The null matrix, in order to denote the fact that we detected some deviation
that should not happen in an honest run.
2. A converter Q , whose goal is to output (to the Server) a quantum state ρ′ as close
as possible to the state ρ output by A .
3. A converter P , whose goal is to output a classical description [ρ′] of a quantum
state ρ′ which is on average “close”3 to ρ.
An RSP must meet 2 central criteria:
1. Accuracy of the classical description of the obtained quantum state. More specif-
ically, we require that the quantum state ρ described by A’s output to be close to
Q ’s output ρ′, in terms of trace distance.
2. Purity of obtained quantum state. Since the RSP resource aims to replace a
noise-free quantum channel, it is desirable that the quantum state output by Q to
admit a high degree of purity, i.e. that trace of ρ′2 to be close to 1. Since ρ′ is
required to be close to ρ, this implies a high purity of ρ as well.
These 2 conditions on the states ρ and ρ′ can be unified and equivalently captured
by requiring that the quantity Tr(ρρ′) to be close to 1 as shown in Lemma C.1.3.
We can also gain a more information theoretical intuition of RSP by considering
that an RSP resource together with the converters A and Q ) can be understood not only
as a box that produces a quantum state together with its description, but also a box who
accuracy can be easily and precisely tested. For example, if such a box produces a state
ρ′ and claims that the description of that state corresponds to a quantum state |φ〉 (i.e.
[ρ] = [|φ〉〈φ|]), then the natural way to test the box, would be to measure ρ′ by doing a
projection on |φ〉. This test will pass with probability ps = 〈φ|ρ′ |φ〉, and thus if the box
is perfectly accurate (i.e. if ρ′= |φ〉〈φ|), the test will always succeed. On the other hand,
2A is allowed to interact with the ideal resource in a non-trivial manner. However, A will often be
the trivial converter in the sense that it simply forwards the output of the ideal resource to the Client, or
– when the resource waits for a simple activation input – picks some admissible value as input to the
ideal resource and forwards the obtained description to its outer interface.
3The closeness is defined in the same way in the two cases corresponding to Q and P
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when ρ′ is far from the state |φ〉〈φ| , this test is very unlikely to pass and we will have
ps much smaller than 1. We can then generalise this testing for arbitrary (eventually
non-pure) states 4 by remarking that ps = 〈φ|ρ′ |φ〉 = Tr(|φ〉〈φ|ρ′) = Tr(ρρ′). This
last expression corresponds to 5 the probability of outputting 0 when measuring the
state ρ′ according to the POVM described by the measurement operators E0 := ρ and
E1 = I− ρ. Since the classical description of ρ is known, then it is also possible to
perform this POVM and test the average accuracy of our box. This further intuition
motivates the following definition for general RSP resources.
Definition 6.2.2 (RSP resource). A resource S is said to be a remote state preparation
resource within ε with respect to converters A and Q if the following conditions hold:
1. Converters A and Q output a single message at the outer interface, where the
output [ρ] of A is classical and is either a density matrix or the null matrix, and
the output ρ′ of Q is a quantum state;






′)]≥ 1− ε (6.2)
where the probability is taken over the randomness of A , S and Q
3. For all the possible outputs [ρ] of ([ρ],ρ′) ← AS ` Q , if we define E0 = ρ,
E1 = I−ρ, then the POVM {E0,E1} must be efficiently implementable6 by any
distinguisher.
In the remaining of the chapter, when we speak of an RSP resource S, this has to
always be interpreted in a context where converters A and Q are fixed.
Additionally, to provide some intuition on the generality of this definition, the 2 con-
verters would also allow us to define as an RSP: i) a resource in which the Client is
sending the description of the state to the resource, where converter A will forward
this description from its right interface to its left interface, or ii) a more complex and
4While we emphasized that the relevant RSP resources are the ones with high purity of the produced
quantum states, our main result regarding the characterization of RSP resources hold also when the
underlying quantum state is mixed (hence for any quantum state).
5This expression measuring the closeness between the states is also equal to the squared fidelity
between ρ and ρ′, when ρ is pure.
6We could also define a similar definition when it suffices that the POVM can to be approximated
(for example because the distinguishers can only perform quantum circuits using a finite set of gates) and
the results would be similar, up to this approximation, but for simplicity we will stick to this definition.
6.2. Impossibility of Composable Classical RSP 147
interesting example would be the classical client UBQC functionality which we will
see in the next section on how it can be turned into an RSP resource.
Describable resources. We have defined that a resource qualifies as an RSP, if when
both Client and Server follow the protocol, we know how to obtain a quantum state on
the right interface and a classical description of a close state on the left interface. A
security-related question is whether it is also possible to extract, possibly in an inef-
ficient manner, from the right interface a classical description of a quantum state that
is close to the state described by the output of Client. If there exists a converter P
achieving this, we call the RSP resource describable. We formalize this as follows.
Definition 6.2.3 (Describable Resource). Let S be a resource and A a converter out-
putting a single classical message [ρ] on its outer interface (either equal to a density
matrix or the null matrix). Then we say that (S ,A) is ε-describable (or, equivalently,
that S is describable within ε with respect to A) if there exists a (possibly inefficient)
converter P (outputting a single classical message [ρ′] on its outer interface represent-






′)]≥ 1− ε (6.3)
(the expectation is taken over the randomness of S , A and P ).
Reproducible converters. To show our first main result about the characterization
of RSP resources we will encounter a crucial decoding step. The core of this decoding
element is the ability to convert the classical the classical interaction between Server
and Client - which can be seen as an encoding of the quantum state - back into an
explicit classical representation of the state prepared by the Server. More formally,
this can be phrased in the following definition.
Definition 6.2.4 (Reproducible Converter). A converter π that outputs (on the right
interface) a quantum state ρ is said to be reproducible if there exists a (possibly ineffi-
cient) converter π̃ such that:
1. The outer interface of π̃ outputs only a classical message [ρ′]
2. The converter π is perfectly indistinguishable from π̃ against any unbounded dis-
tinguisher D, up to the conversion of the classical messages [ρ′] into a quantum
state ρ′. More precisely, if we denote by T the converter that takes as input on
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its inner interface a classical description [ρ′] of a quantum state and outputs that
quantum state ρ′, we have (as shown in Figure 6.3):
Cπ≈D0 C π̃T (6.4)
Figure 6.3: Reproducible converter π
Next, we will prove that whenever we have only classical communication, it is
always possible to extract (in exponential time) the exact description of the state from
the classical transcript and the quantum instruments (circuit) used to implement the
actions of the converter. We recall from Definition 2.1.2 that a quantum instrument is
a generalization of the CPTP map allowing for both a quantum and classical output.
In the proof of this result we consider that π interacts classically with the inner interface
and then outputs a quantum state on the outer interface. In this way, we can decompose
π, as depicted in Figure 6.4, using the notation:
π := (πi)i (6.5)
Figure 6.4: Representation of an interactive protocol π into a sequence of quantum
instruments.
Each πi is associated to a round of communication and we denote with (yi,ρi+1)←
πi(xi,ρi) the output of i-th round, where xi ∈ {0,1}li is a classical input message re-
ceived from the inner interface, ρi and ρi+1 are the internal quantum state before and
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respectively after round i and yi ∈ {0,1}l
′
i ∪⊥ is a classical message sent by π to the
inner interface, when yi 6=⊥. Before the first round, we will set ρ0 = (1), which is the
trivial density matrix of dimension 1. Moreover when yi =⊥ this represents that we do
not send any message anymore to the inner interface (the last round of communication)
and instead we send ρi+1 to the outer interface and stop the protocol. Note that if we
want to let π send the first message instead of receiving it, we can simply set x0 = ⊥,
and similarly if the last message is in fact sent instead of received, we can add one
more round where we set xn+1 =⊥.
Now, we can finally show that a party producing a quantum state at the end of a proto-
col with exclusively classical communication, is reproducible.
Lemma 6.2.5. Let π = (πi)i be a converter such that:
1. π receives and sends only classical messages from the inner interfaces;
2. π outputs at the end a quantum state on the outer interface;
3. Each πi is a quantum instrument;
Then π is reproducible.
Proof. The intuition behind the proof is to argue that because the only interations of
π are classical as seen in Figure 6.4 , the internal state of π can always be simulated
(computed) in exponential time manually.
More precisely, for any i, as πi is a quantum instrument (Definition 2.1.2) there





= Tr(ρ) for any quantum state ρ;
• If we denote by ρyi =
Eyi(ρ)
Tr(Eyi(ρ))
, then we have:
Pr[π(ρ) = (yi,ρyi)] = Tr(Eyi(ρ)) for any state ρ (6.6)
And because for every yi, Eyi is completely positive, there exists a finite set of matrices
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By choosing the state ρ := |xi〉〈xi| ⊗ρi, from Eq.6.6, we obtain that with probability
pyi = Tr(Eyi(|xi〉〈xi|⊗ρi)) we have:








We remark that if we know [ρi], the elements of the density matrix ρi, then we can sim-
ulate the output probability distribution of π, by determining for all yi the probability
pyi of outputting yi and the corresponding state description [ρi+1] (the coefficients of
the density matrix ρi+1), by just doing the above classical computation. Therefore, to
construct the converter π̃ we do the following:
• For every i, we construct π̃i, which given an input (xi, [ρi]) will output (yi, [ρi+1])
with probability pyi using the formula in Eq.(6.9);
• We define π̃ as π̃ = (π̃i)i, with [ρ0] = (1).
As a result, we trivially have Cπ ≈0 C π̃T even against unbounded distinguishers, as
π̃ is exactly simulating π, except that the representation of the quantum states in π̃ are
matrices, while in π they are actual quantum states. Hence, by adding the converter T
turning [ρi] into ρi on the outer interface we obtain Cπ≈0 C π̃T .
6.2.2 Classically-Realizable RSP are Describable
Now we are able to show our main result about RSP resources, which interestingly
links a constructive computational notion (composability) with an information theo-
retic property (describability).
This directly implies the impossibility result regarding the existence of non-describable
RSPCC composable protocols secure against bounded quantum polynomial-time dis-
tinguishers. While this no-go does not rule out all the possible RSP resources, it shows
that the “useful” RSP resources are impossible. This is because the describability
property is usually not a desirable property, as it implies that an unbounded adversary
could learn the description of the state he received from an ideal resource. To illustrate
the implication of this theorem, we will show in subsection 6.2.3 the impossibility of
classical protocols implementing specific RSP resources and in subsubsection 6.2.4.1
we will see examples of “imperfect” resources escaping the impossibility result.
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Theorem 6.2.6 (Classically-Realizable RSP are Describable). If an ideal resource
S is both an ε1-remote state preparation with respect to some A and Q and ε2-
classically-realizable (including against only polynomially bounded distinguishers),
then it is (ε1 +2ε2)-describable with respect to A . In particular, if ε1 = negl (n) and
ε2 = negl (n), then S is describable within a negligible error ε1 +2ε2 = negl (n).
Proof. Let S be an ε1-remote state preparation with respect to some converters A
and Q which is also ε2-classically-realizable. Then from Definition 6.2.2 and Defi-






′)]≥ 1− ε1 (6.10)
πACπB ≈ε2 S ` (6.11)
and
πAC ≈ε2 Sσ (6.12)
From Eq.(6.11), we also have:
AπACπBQ ≈ε2 AS ` Q (6.13)
In other words we cannot distinguish between AS ` Q and AπACπBQ with an advan-
tage better than ε2 (i.e. with probability better than 12(1+ ε2)).
But consider the following efficient distinguisher:
1. Runs ([ρ],ρ′)← AS ` Q ;
2. Then measures ρ′ using the POVM {E0,E1}, where E0 = ρ and E1 = I − ρ
(which is efficient to perform from the definition of remote state preparation);
Then, from Eq.(6.10), distinguisher will obtain outcome 0 (corresponding to E0) with
probability at least 1− ε1.
This means that by replacing AS ` Q with AπACπBQ , the probability to obtain out-
come 0 (E0) when ([ρ],ρ′)← AπACπBQ , should also be close to 1− ε1. More pre-






′)]≥ 1− ε1− ε2 (6.14)
Assume by contradiction that the above probability is less than 1− ε1− ε2.
Then we can construct a distinguisher D to distinguish between AS `Q and AπACπBQ .
Essentially, D is defined as above: will simply measure the state ρ′ using POVM
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{E0,E1}. Then D will output the measurement outcome (0 for E0 and 1 for E1). Then,
by denoting measurement outcome with m and the case AS `Q with a= 0 and the case
AπACπBQ with a = 1, the probability of D to distinguish AS ` Q from AπACπBQ is
equal to:


























Therefore, distinguisher D has an advantage greater than ε2, which is in contradiction
with Equation 6.13.
Now, from Eq.(6.12), we also have:
AπACπBQ ≈ε2 ASσπBQ (6.19)
Similarly, we will construct a distinguisher D ′ between AπACπBQ and ASσπBQ : gets
([ρ],ρ′) and measures ρ′ with POVM E0,E1 and outputs the measurement outcome. As











′)]− ε2 ≥ 1− ε1−2ε2 (6.20)
We will now use the converter πBQ to construct a B that can describe the state
given by the ideal resource S . Because πBQ interacts only classically with the inner
interface (with the simulator σ) and outputs a quantum state on the outer interface, then
using Lemma 6.2.5, this implies that πBQ is reproducible. This means that there exists
an inefficient converter B such that:
CπBQ ≈0 CBT (6.21)
Therefore, we also have in particular ASσCπBQ ≈0 ASσC BT , and because C is a






′)]≥ 1− ε1−2ε2 (6.22)






′)]≥ 1− ε1−2ε2 (6.23)
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Finally, by defining the converter P as P := σB , we obtain that (S ,A) is (ε1 + 2ε2)-
describable (where P is the converter describing the quantum state), which concludes
the proof.
6.2.3 RSP Resources Impossible to Realize Classically
In the previous section we show that if an RSP functionality is classically-realizable
(secure against polynomial quantum distinguishers), then this resource is describable
by an unbounded adversary having access to the right interface of that resource.
This main result directly implies that as soon as there exists no unbounded adver-
sary that, given access to the right interface, can find the classical description given
on the left interface, then the RSP resource is impossible to classically realize (against
bounded BQP distinguishers). Very importantly, this no-go result shows that the only
type of RSP resources that can be classically realized are the ones that leak on the right
interface enough information to allow an (possibly unbounded) adversary to determine
the classical description given on the left interface. From a security point of view, this
property is highly non-desirable, as the resource must leak the secret description of the
state at least in some representation.
We now present some examples of RSP resource impossible to classically realize.
Definition 6.2.7 (Ideal Resource SZ π2 ). SZ π2 is the verifiable RSP resource (RSP which
does not allow any deviation from the server), that receives no input, that internally
picks a random θ← Zπ2 , and that sends θ on the left interface, and |+θ〉 on the right





Figure 6.5: Ideal resource SZ π2
Lemma 6.2.8. There exists a universal constant η > 0, such that for all 0≤ ε < η the
resource SZ π2 is not ε-classically-realizable.
Proof. The impossibility proof at its core will be a consequence of quantum no-cloning.
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We begin with defining A(θ) := [|+θ〉〈+θ|] (A just converts θ into its classical
density matrix representation) and Q the trivial converter that just forwards any mes-
sage from its inner to its outer interface. Then we have that SZ π2 is a 0-remote state









Tr(|+θ〉〈+θ| |+θ〉〈+θ|) = 1≥ 1−0 (6.24)
Then, we will show that there exists a constant η > 0 such that for all δ < η, SZ π2
is not δ-describable with respect to A .
We first prove that SZ π2 is not 0-describable with respect to A . We prove this by






′)] = 1 (6.25)
But then, because ρ = |+θ〉〈+θ| is a pure state, Tr(ρρ′) corresponds to the fidelity
of ρ and ρ′, so Tr(ρρ′) = 1⇔ ρ = ρ′. However this is impossible because P just
has a quantum state ρ as input, and if he can completely describe this quantum state
then he can actually clone perfectly the input state with probability 1. But because
the different possible values of ρ are not orthogonal, this is impossible due to the no-
cloning theorem.
This tells us that the resource SZ π2 cannot be 0-classically-realizable. Specifically, if we
assume by contradiction that SZ π2 is 0-classically-realizable and since SZ π2 is a 0-remote
state preparation, then from Theorem 6.2.6, we would have that SZ π2 is 0-describable,
reaching a contradiction.
What we want to show is something stronger, namely that SZ π2 is not negl (n)-
classically realizable.
From the optimality of quantum no-cloning [SIGA05, FWJ+14] we also know we
cannot produce two copies of ρ with a fidelity arbitrary close to 1.







Now, by contradiction, we assume that SZ π2 is ε-classically-realizable. Because
limn→∞ ε(n) = 0, there exists N ∈ N such that ε(N)< η/2.
Therefore, using Theorem 6.2.6, SZ π2 is 0+2ε(N)-describable with respect to A . From






′)]≥ 1−2ε(N)> 1−η (6.27)
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which contradicts Eq.(6.26) and completes our proof.
Next, we will describe the resource RSPV, a variant of SZ π2 introduced in [GV19].
This resource differs from SZ π2 in the following aspects: the adversary can make the
resource abort, the set of output states is larger and the client can choose the basis of
the output state.
As for SZ π2 , we will show that classically-realizable RSPV cannot be achieved. Before
presenting the details of the no-go result, we formalize the ideal resource RSPV.
Definition 6.2.9 (Ideal Resource RSPV). The ideal verifiable remote state preparation
resource RSPV, takes an input W ∈ {X ,Z} on the left interface, and no input on the
right interface. The right interface has a filtered functionality that corresponds to a
bit c ∈ {0,1}. When c = 1, RSPV outputs error message ERR on both the interfaces,
otherwise:
1. If W = Z, resource picks a random bit b and outputs b to the left interface and
the state |b〉〈b| to the right interface;
2. If W = X, resource picks a random angle θ ∈ Zπ4 and outputs θ to the left inter-
face and the quantum state |+θ〉〈+θ| to the right interface.
Corollary 6.2.10. There exists a universal constant η > 0, such that for all 0≤ ε < η
the resource RSPV is not ε-classically-realizable.
Proof. To show this we follow exactly the steps of the impossibility proof for SZ π2 . The
main difference is that we need to address the abort case occurring when c = 1. To do
this, we will change the converter A as follows: A will pick W = X and will output to
the outer interface either the classical density matrix corresponding to ρ = |+θ〉〈+θ|,
when c= 0 or the null matrix ρ= 0 when c= 1 (ERR). Q remains as in the case of SZ π2 ,
the trivial converter. Now, it is easy to see that RSPV is a 0-remote state preparation
resource with respect to converters A and Q . Moreover, RSPV cannot be ε-describable
for arbitrary small ε, as when c = 1, we have ρ = 0 thus Tr(ρρ′) is 0. Hence, from
a converter P that can also input c = 1, we can always increase the quantity Tr(ρρ′),
by considering a new converter P ′ setting c = 0. Then, we are essentially back to the
setting of SZ π2 , where we have a the set of states |+θ〉〈+θ| that are impossible to be
cloned with arbitrary small fidelity, which concludes the proof.
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Remark 6.2.11. Note that our impossibility result for classical realization of RSPV
does not contradict the result of [GV19]. Specifically, their security analysis requires
an assumption of a “measurement buffer”7 resource in addition to the classical chan-
nel in order to construct RSPV. Our result shows that the measurement buffer resource
is a strictly non-classical assumption.
6.2.4 Characterization of RSP resources
The main result in Theorem 6.2.6 rules out all resources that are impossible to be
describable with unbounded power such as SZ π2 or RSPV. More importantly, it tells
us the only type of classically-realizable RSP resources must be describable and hence
would be the ones leaking the full classical description of the output quantum state to
an unbounded adversary, which we will refer to as being fully-leaky RSP.
Fully-leaky RSP resources can be separated into two categories:
1. If the RSP is describable in quantum polynomial time, then the adversary can
learn the secret in polynomial time. This is obviously not an interesting case as
the security of protocols such as UBQC cannot be preserved if such a resource
is employed to prepare the quantum states.
2. If the RSP are only describable using unbounded power, then these fully-leaky
RSP resources are not trivially insecure, but their composable security remains
unclear. Indeed, it defeats the purpose of aiming at a proper ideal resource where
the provided security should be clear “by definition” and it becomes hard to
quantify how the additional leakage could be used when composed with other
protocols.
To complete the picture of RSP resources, we will next show an example of a
fully-leaky RSP denoted by RSP4−states,FCC , describable only with unbounded power,
together with a protocol that realizes it. This resource is inspired from the Malicious
4-states QFactory presented in chapter 5 and this protocol will be precisely the example
realizing it. As a final remark, we emphasize that this category of leaky RSP resources
is not desirable: the resources are non-standard and it looks hard to write a modular
protocol with this resource as an assumed resource. Additionally, the resource is very
specific and mimics its implementation.
7This resource forces distinguisher to give the state he is supposed to measure to the simulator,
allowing the simulator to change the state given by the distinguisher with the state sent by the ideal
resource, without letting the distinguisher know.
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6.2.4.1 Fully-Leaky RSP
Definition 6.2.12 (Ideal Resource RSP4−states,FCC ). Let F =(Gen,Enc,Dec) be a public-
key encryption scheme. Then, RSP4−states,FCC is defined as depicted in Figure 6.6.
Specifically, B1 represents the basis bit of the output state, and is guaranteed to be
random even when the server on the right interface is malicious. B2 represents the
value bit of the output state when encoded in the basis B1, and in the malicious case
(c = 1) it can be chosen by the right interface, expressed through the deviation func-
tion D (as seen in Figure 6.6)8. The resource sends to the left interface the classical
description (B1,B2) and, in an honest run, sends to the right interface the quantum
state |ψ〉 := HB1XB2 |0〉.
Figure 6.6: Ideal resource RSP4−states,FCC which prepares a BB84 state. The state |ψ〉 is
sent to the right interface only in the honest case (c= 0) and the dashed communication
is exchanged only in the dishonest case (c = 1).
Lemma 6.2.13. The Malicious 4-states QFactory protocol (Protocol 3) securely con-
structs RSP4−states,FCC from a classical channel.
Proof. We define F based on the family of functions required for the construction of
Malicious 4-states QFactory, as described in subsection 5.3.2. Concretely, we have:
1. Gen(1n)→ (K, tK), where K is the function description and tK is the trapdoor
information;
8Note that for RSP4−states,FCC the right interface (Server) can have in a malicious scenario full con-
trol over B2, but in the Malicious 4-states QFactory Protocol it is not clear what an adversary can do
concerning B2.
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2. EncK(B1)→ y0, where y0 = Ks0 + e0 +B1 · v, where s0,e0 and v are chosen as
in subsection 5.3.2;
3. DectK(y0)→ B1 - using tK we can efficiently obtain B1 from y0
From the correctness of the QFactory protocol (πA,πB), shown in Theorem 5.2.2,
we have:
πACπB ≈ε RSP4−states,FCC ` (6.28)
for some negligible ε.
We now need to show that there exists a simulator σ such that:
πAC ≈ε′ RSP4-states,FCC σ (6.29)
Simulator σ is constructed as follows: sends c = 1 to the ideal resource, then for-
wards the message (K,y0) received from the resource to its outer interface and when
receiving the measurement outcomes (y,b) from the server (as in the real protocol) it
sets the deviation function D to be the same function as Client uses in πA to obtain B1.
As a result, we trivially have: πAC ≈0 RSP4-states,FCC σ, which concludes the proof.
6.3 Impossibility of Composable Classical-Client UBQC
In the previous section we showed that it is impossible to have a useful composable
RSPCC protocol. However, a weaker RSP protocol could still be used internally in
other protocols, with the aim that the overall protocol to be composably secure. To this
end, we analyze the composable security of a well-established delegated quantum com-
puting protocol, universal blind quantum computation (UBQC), proposed in [BFK09].
The UBQC protocol allows a quantum client, Alice, to delegate an arbitrary quantum
computation to a (universal) quantum server Bob, in such a way that her input, the
quantum computation and the output of the computation are information-theoretically
hidden from Bob. The protocol requires Alice to be able to prepare single qubits of the
form |+θ〉, where θ ∈ Zπ4 and send these states to Bob at the beginning of the protocol,
the rest of the communication between the two parties being classical.
We define the family of protocols RSP8−statesCC as the RSP protocols that classically
delegate the preparation of an output state |+θ〉, where θ ∈ Zπ4 . That is, without loss
of generality, we assume a pair of converters PA, PB such that the resource R := PACPB
has the behavior of the prototype RSP resource except with negligible probability. Put
differently, we assume we have an (except with negligible error) correct RSP protocol,
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but we make no assumption about the security of this protocol. Therefore, we can
directly replace the quantum interaction with the RSP8−statesCC as indicated in the first
step of Protocol 7 presented below, and obtain a new protocol for the delegation of
quantum computations between a quantum server and an entirely classical client.
Protocol 7 UBQC with RSP8−statesCC ([BFK09])
• Client’s classical input: An n-qubit unitary U that is represented using the set of angles
{φ}i, j of a one-way quantum computation over a brickwork state/cluster state [MDF17],
of size n×m, along with the dependencies X and Z obtained via flow construction [DK06].
• Client’s classical output: The measurement outcome s̄ corresponding to the n-qubit
quantum state, where s̄ = 〈0|U |0〉.
1. Client and Server runs n×m different instances of RSP8−statesCC (in parallel) to obtain
θi, j on client’s side and
∣∣+θi, j〉 on server’s side, where θi, j ← Zπ4 , i ∈ {1, · · · ,n}, j ∈
{1, · · · ,m}
2. Server entangles all the qubits, n ·(m−1) received from RSP8−statesCC , by applying controlled-
Z gates between them in order to create a graph state Gn×m
3. For j ∈ [1,m] and i ∈ [1,n]
(a) Client computes δi, j = φ′i, j +θi, j + ri, jπ, ri, j ← {0,1}, where φ′i, j = (−1)s
X
i, j φi, j +
sZi, jπ and s
X
i, j and s
Z
i, j are computed using the previous measurement outcomes and
the X and Z dependency sets. Client then sends the measurement angle δi, j to the
Server.
(b) Server measures the qubit
∣∣+θi, j〉 in the basis {∣∣∣+δi, j〉 , ∣∣∣−δi, j〉} and obtains a mea-
surement outcome si, j ∈ {0,1}. Server sends the measurement result to the client.
(c) Client computes s̄i, j = si, j⊕ ri, j.
4. The measurement outcome corresponding to the last layer of the graph state ( j = m) is
the outcome of the computation.
Note that Protocol 7 is based on measurement-based model of quantum computing
(MBQC). This model is known to be equivalent to the quantum circuit (up to polyno-
mial overhead in resources) and does not require one to perform quantum gates on their
side to realize arbitrary quantum computation. Instead, the computation is performed
by an (adaptive) sequence of single-qubit projective measurements that steer the infor-
mation flow across a highly entangled resource state. Intuitively, UBQC can be seen as
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a distributed MBQC where the measurements are performed by the server whereas the
classical update of measurement bases is performed by the client. Since the projective
measurements in quantum physics, in general, are probabilistic in nature and therefore,
the client needs to update the measurement bases (and classically inform the server
about the update) based on the outcomes of the earlier measurements to ensure the
correctness of the computation. Roughly speaking, this information flow is captured
by the X and Z dependencies. For more details, we refer the reader to [RB01, Nie06].
In the remaining of the section we will show that the Universal Blind Quantum
Computing protocol, which is proven to be secure in the Constructive Cryptography
framework [DFPR14], cannot be composably secure, for the same ideal resource, when
the quantum interaction is replaced with a RSPCC protocol (this class of resulting pro-
tocols will be denoted as UBQCCC).
6.3.1 Impossibility of Composable UBQCCC on 1 Qubit
In order to show that there can exist no composable UBQCCC protocol, we will first
show the impossibility of a simpler setting, when the underlying quantum computation
(in UBQC) is described by a single measurement angle. The corresponding resource
that performs blind quantum computations on one qubit will be denoted by SUBQC1
and is defined as follows:
Definition 6.3.1 (Ideal resource of single-qubit UBQC). The ideal resource SUBQC1,
depicted in Figure 6.7, achieves blind quantum computation, where the computation is
specified by a single input angle φ. The input (ξ,ρ) is filtered when c = 0. ξ represents
any deviation (specified using the classical description of a CPTP map) outputting a
bit, and which can depend on the computation angle φ and on an arbitrary state ρ.
Theorem 6.3.2 (No-go composable classical-client single-qubit UBQC). Consider (PA,PB)
be a protocol interacting only using a classical channel C , such that the output of the
protocol is PA receiving classical output θ ∈ Zπ4 and PB receiving quantum output
ρB (denoted as (θ,ρB)← (PAC )PB and such that the trace distance between ρB and
|+θ〉〈+θ| is negligible with overwhelming probability. Then if we define πA and πB as
the UBQC protocol on one qubit that makes use of (PA,PB) as a sub-protocol in order
to replace the quantum channel (as depicted in Figure 6.8), then the protocol (πA,πB)
cannot be composable, i.e. there exists no simulator σ such that:
πACπB ≈ε SUBQC1 `c=0
πAC ≈ε SUBQC1σ , where ε = negl (n)
(6.30)
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Figure 6.7: Ideal resource SUBQC1 for UBQC with computation described by one angle
φ. In the case of honest server, the output s̄ ∈ {0,1} is computed by measuring the
qubits |+〉 in the {
∣∣+φ〉 , ∣∣−φ〉} basis. On the other hand, if c = 1, any malicious be-
haviour of server can be captured by (ξ,ρ), i.e. the output s̄ is computed by applying
the CPTP map ξ on the input φ and on another auxiliary state ρ chosen by the server.
Figure 6.8: UBQC with RSP8−statesCC protocol (PA,PB) on one qubit computation, when
both Alice and Bob follow the protocol honestly (See Protocol 7). M±δ represents a
measurement in the basis {|+δ〉 , |−δ〉}.
Sketch of Proof. In order to show this no-go result, we will proceed with a proof by
contradiction. Let us assume there exists a protocol (PA,PB) and a simulator σ satis-
fying the above conditions. Then, for the same resource SUBQC1 we will consider a
different protocol π′ = (π′A,π
′
B) that realizes it, but using a different filter






B ≈ε SUBQC1 `σ (6.31)
π
′
AC ≈ε SUBQC1σ′ (6.32)
9 Note that we could include this new filter `σ inside the SUBQC1 resource and then have the standard
filter `c=0, but for simplicity we will just use a different filter. Specifically, we could have defined a
functionality S ′UBQC1 that receives as input a bit c and if c = 0, then S ′UBQC1 behaves as the resource
SUBQC1 `σ and if c = 1 then it behaves as SUBQC1.
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The new filter `σ will depend on the simulator σ required for the soundness of (πA,πB),
as seen in Eq.(6.30).
Then our full proof will follow the next steps:
1. We first prove in Lemma 6.3.4 that SUBQC1 is also ε-classically-realizable by
(π′A,π
′
B) using the filter `σ.
2. We then show in Lemma 6.3.5 that the resource SUBQC1 is an RSP within negl (n)
with respect to some well chosen converters A and Q (as depicted in Figure 6.10)
and the filter `σ.
3. Then we use our main result about the characterization of RSP (Theorem 6.2.6)
to deduce that SUBQC1 is describable within negl (n) with respect to converter A
(Corollary 6.3.6).
4. Finally, we prove that if SUBQC1 is describable, then we can achieve superluminal
signaling, concluding our contradiction proof (Lemma 6.3.8).
Now, let us first define the above mentioned protocol π′ and the corresponding filter
`σ, which we will show they classically-realize the SUBQC1 resource.
Definition 6.3.3 (π′). Consider the protocol π′ = (π′A,π
′
B) defined in the following way
(as depicted in Figure 6.9):
• π′A = πA
• π′B:
1. Runs PB and obtains a state ρB ≈ |+θ〉;
2. Computes the quantum state ρ̃ := RZ(−δ)ρB, using the angle δ received
from π′A;
3. Outputs s := 0 on its inner interface (to π′A) and the state ρ̃ on its outer
interface.
Then we define the corresponding filter as `σ:= σπ′B, where σ is the simulator corre-
sponding to π (Eq.(6.30)).
Lemma 6.3.4. If SUBQC1 is ε-classically-realizable by (πA,πB) with the filter `c=0 then
SUBQC1 is ε-classically-realizable by (π′A,π′B) with the filter `σ.
6.3. Impossibility of Composable Classical-Client UBQC 163
Figure 6.9: Protocol π′ = (π′A,π
′
B)
Proof. If SUBQC1 is ε-classically-realizable with `c=0 by (πA,πB), then as seen in The-
orem 6.3.2, we have:
πACπB ≈ε SUBQC1 `c=0 (6.33)
πAC ≈ε SUBQC1σ (6.34)
Now, we can show that SUBQC1 is ε-classically-realizable by (π′A,π′B), illustrated
in Figure 6.9, together with `σ, namely that there exists a simulator σ′ such that the
following 2 conditions are satisfied:
π
′









ACπ′B = πACπ′B = (πAC )π′B
≈ε (SUBQC1σ)π′B = SUBQC1(σπ′B)
= SUBQC1 `σ
(6.36)




AC = πAC ≈ε SUBQC1σ = SUBQC1σ′ (6.37)
which concludes our proof.
Lemma 6.3.5. If SUBQC1 is negl (n)-classically-realizable with `c=0, then SUBQC1 is an
negl (n)-remote state preparation resource with respect to converters A and Q defined
in Figure 6.10, and the filter `σ.
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Figure 6.10: Converters A and Q
Proof. Given the converters A and Q defined in Figure 6.10, to show that SUBQC1 is a
remote state preparation resource we need to prove that:
E
([ρ],ρ̃)←ASUBQC1`σQ
[Tr(ρρ̃)]≥ 1−negl (n) (6.38)
Firstly, using Lemma 6.3.4, we also have:
Aπ′ACπ′BQ ≈negl(n) ASUBQC1 `σ Q (6.39)
Now let us examine the real world Aπ′ACπ′BQ . Using the description of the proto-
col and of the 2 converters we have: s̄= 0⊕r = r and therefore the classical description
output of A is:
φ
′ = φ0 + s̄π =−φ+ rπ
And the corresponding state is ρ =
∣∣+φ′〉〈+φ′∣∣= ∣∣+−φ+rπ〉〈+−φ+rπ∣∣.
Then we analyze the output of Q on the rightmost interface. From the correctness
of the protocol (PA,PB), we have that the trace distance between ρB and |+θ〉〈+θ| is
negligible and as trace distance is preserved under unitary transformations, we also
have that: ρ̃ = RZ(−δ)ρBRZ(−δ)+ is negligibly close in trace distance to the state:
RZ(−δ) |+θ〉〈+θ|RZ(−δ)+ = |+θ−δ〉〈+θ−δ|
=
∣∣+−φ−rπ〉〈+−φ−rπ∣∣ (from the definition of δ)
=
∣∣+−φ+rπ〉〈+−φ+rπ∣∣= ∣∣+φ′〉〈+φ′∣∣= ρ
As a result, we have:
E
([ρ],ρ̃)←Aπ′ACπ′BQ




[Tr(ρρ̃)] = 1− ε (6.41)
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and we will need to show that ε = negl (n).
Using a similar argument to the one given in Theorem 6.2.6, we will define the
following distinguisher D to distinguish between the ideal ASUBQC1 `σ Q and the real
world Aπ′ACπ′BQ . More specifically, D will obtain ([ρ, ρ̃]) (from the real or ideal
world) and he will measure the state ρ̃ using the POVM {E0 = [ρ],E1 = I − [ρ]}.
Then D will output the measurement outcome 1−m (m = 0 - corresponding to E0
or m = 1 - corresponding to E1). Then the probability p of D to distinguish between
ASUBQC1 `σ Q (a = 0) and Aπ′ACπ′BQ (a = 1) can be computed as:
p = Pr[m = 1−a] = 1
2
Pr[m = 1−a|a = 0]+ 1
2
























But from Eq.(6.39) we know that the probability to distinguish between ASUBQC1 `σ Q
and Aπ′ACπ′BQ is at most
1
2(1+negl (n)).














[Tr(ρρ̃)]≥ 1−negl (n) (6.44)
which concludes the proof.
Now, using our main Theorem 6.2.6 we obtain directly that if SUBQC1 is classically-
realizable and RSP with respect to the filter `σ, then it is also describable:
Corollary 6.3.6. If SUBQC1 is negl (n)-classically-realizable with respect to filter `c=0
then SUBQC1 is negl (n)-describable with respect to the converter A described above.
Lemma 6.3.7. Let Ω = {[ρi]} be a set of classical descriptions of density matrices,
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We define the following rounding operation, that for any quantum state ρ̃ rounds ρ̃ to
the closest ρr, with [ρr] ∈Ω:
[ρr] := RoundΩ([ρ̃]) := argmax
[ρr]∈Ω
Tr(ρ̃ρr) (6.45)
Then, if we consider the random variables [ρ] and [ρ̃] satisfying: [ρ] ∈ Ω and
E
[ρ],[ρ′]
[Tr(ρρ̃)]≥ 1− ε, where η > 6√ε, the following relation must hold:
Pr
([ρ],[ρ̃])
[RoundΩ(ρ̃) = [ρ]]≥ 1−
√
ε (6.46)
In particular, if ε = negl (n), and η 6= 0 is a constant, Pr(RoundΩ([ρ̃]) = [ρ]) ≥ 1−
negl (n).
Proof. Using the fact that E
[ρ],[ρ′]
[Tr(ρρ̃)] ≥ 1− ε, we can apply Markov inequality for


























Next, we will prove that if Tr(ρρ̃) ≥ 1−√ε, this implies that: RoundΩ([ρ̃]) = ρ.
In other words, we will show that if Tr(ρρ̃) ≥ 1−√ε then for any [ρi] ∈ Ω we have
Tr(ρiρ̃)≤ Tr(ρρ̃).












On the other hand, both [ρ] and [ρi] belong to Ω, so we also have:
Tr(ρiρ)≤ 1−η < 1−6
√
ε
which is a contradiction.
Therefore, using Eq.(6.47), we obtain:
Pr
([ρ],[ρ̃])
[RoundΩ([ρ̃]) = [ρ]]≥ 1−
√
ε (6.49)
which concludes the proof.
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Lemma 6.3.8. SUBQC1 cannot be negl (n)-describable with respect to converter A .
Proof. Assume by contradiction that SUBQC1 is negl (n)-describable. Then there must
exist a converter P , whose output is a classical description [ρ̃] such that:
E
([ρ],[ρ̃])←ASUBQC1P
[Tr(ρρ̃)]≥ 1−negl (n) (6.50)
In the remaining we are going to use the converters A and P , together with the
ideal resource SUBQC1 to construct a 2-party setting that would achieve signalling,
which would complete our contradiction proof. More specifically, we will define a
converter D running on the right interface of the resource SUBQC1, which will succeed
in recovering the input φ0 chosen at random by A .
Figure 6.11: Construction of the signalling game between C and D, where the input of
C is φ0 and the output of D is φ′π = φ0 mod π.
As shown in Figure 6.11, by defining C as C := ASUBQC1 and D the converter
D :=P P ′, where P ′ will be formally defined later, then the game between the 2 players
can be described as follows: C chooses a random φ0 ∈ Zπ4 and D needs to output
φ0 mod π. This is however impossible, as no message is sent from SUBQC1 to its right
interface (as can be observed in Figure 6.11), and thus no message is sent from C
to D. Consequently, guessing φ0 mod π is forbidden by the no-signalling principle
[GRW80].
Next we need to construct the converter P ′ allowing D to give the desired output
described above. First we define the set of classical descriptions Ω := {[|+θ〉〈+θ|] |θ∈
{0, π4 , · · · , 7π4 }}. For simplicity we will denote [|+θ〉〈+θ|] by [θ].
Then, we can define P ′ as:
• Given [ρ̃] received from the P , compute [φ̃] := RoundΩ([ρ̃]);
• Output φ′π := φ̃ mod π.
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To show that D can win the above game, we now need to prove that the output of
P ′, φ′π, is equal to φ0 mod π with overwhelming probability.
Let us first examine the first operation of P ′. Consider 2 different state descriptions



























from Eq.(6.50), we have that SUBQC1 is ε-describable with ε = negl (n), hence we also
have (for sufficiently large n) that η > 6
√




[RoundΩ([ρ̃]) = [ρ]]≥ 1−
√
ε = 1−negl (n) (6.52)
But using the definition of converter A we have that [ρ] = [φ′] and φ′ = φ0 + s̄π




[φ′π = φ0 mod π]≥ 1−negl (n) (6.53)
Putting things together, we have obtained a game between C = ASUBQC1 and
D = P P ′, where as explained above, C picks a random φ0 ∈ Zπ4 and D needs to output
φ0 mod π. From Eq.(6.53), we have obtained that D can win this game with over-
whelming probability, however, since there is no information transfer from C to D,
winning this game with probability better than 1/4 (guessing the 2 bits of φ0 mod π
uniformly at random) would imply signalling.
6.3.2 Impossibility of Composable General UBQCCC
From Theorem 6.3.2, we know that it is impossible to implement a composable clas-
sical client UBQC protocol performing a computation consisting of a single qubit.
In this last section, we prove that this no-go result generalizes to the impossibility of
UBQCCC on computations using an arbitrary number of qubits. To show this we will
reduce the general setting to the single-qubit case.
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Definition 6.3.9 (Ideal Resource general UBQC). The ideal resource SUBQC achieves
blind quantum computation, where the computation is specified by a set of angles
{φi, j}i∈{1,··· ,n}, j∈{1,··· ,m}. The ideal resource is defined similar to SUBQC1 with the dif-
ference that in the honest run, the resource performs an MBQC computation described
by angles {φi, j}i, j and the output on the left interface represents the classical outcome
of the computation.
Theorem 6.3.10 (No-go Composable Classical-Client UBQC). Let (PA,PB) be a proto-
col interacting only through a classical channel C such that (θ,ρB)← (PACPB) where
θ ∈ Zπ4 and such that the trace distance between ρB and |+θ〉〈+θ| is negligible with
overwhelming probability.
If we define (πGA ,π
G
B ) as the UBQC protocol on any quantum computation (de-
scribed by a graph G), that uses (PA,PB) as a sub-protocol to replace the quantum
channel, then (πGA ,π
G






B ≈ε SUBQC `c=0
π
G
A C ≈ε SUBQCσ
(6.54)
for ε = negl (n).
Proof. We will show that we can reduce this to the setting of a single qubit, specifically
where the computation is described by a single angle φ (Theorem 6.3.2).
As the graph G describing the target computation consists of at least one output
qubit, we will denote by w the index of the last output qubit. The main idea is to con-
sider a distinguisher between the real and ideal world that would conveniently choose
the client’s input in the following way: for every node i∈G, we choose φi := 0 if i 6= w
and φi := φ if i = w.
Then on the right interface (server’s side), the distinguisher will behave like the honest
πGB , except that he will not entangle the qubits produced by the sub-protocol (PA,PB).
Finally, for the output qubit ρw, instead of measuring it, he will send s := 0 on the
left interface, and he will rotate the qubit with angle −δw, ρ̃w = RZ(−δw)ρw and will
output ρ̃w, exactly as π′B in the single-qubit case.
Then it is easy to observe that for every qubit i 6= w, we have that the angle δi (received
by distinguisher from the right interface corresponding to the client) is: δi := θi + riπ
(as the qubits are not entangled and φi = 0). As a result, the distinguisher by mea-
suring |+θi〉 in the basis {|+δ〉 , |+δ〉}, obtains: MZHRZ(−δi) |+θi〉= MZH |riπ〉= |ri〉.
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Therefore, we also have that s̄i = ri⊕ ri = 0. Additionally, for all nodes i, includ-
ing w, we have that the dependency from previous measurements sXi and s
Z
i will be:
sXi = ⊕ j∈DXi s̄ j = 0 and s
Z




i are the X and Z depen-
dency sets, as described in Protocol 7). Therefore, for the output node w we have that
the angle received by distinguisher is:
δw = θw +(−1)s
X
w φw + sZwπ+ rwπ = θw +φ+ rwπ (6.55)
Consequently, we have reached exactly the single-qubit setting (as shown in Figure 6.9,




The current dissertation studies the problem of secure delegation of quantum computa-
tions between a fully classical honest client and a quantum untrusted server (CSDQC).
Our results can be summarizes as follows:
• Chapter 3 ([ACGK19]): We show that achieving information-theoretic secure
delegation of quantum computations between a fully classical client and a quan-
tum server is implausible, by showing certain complexity theoretic implications.
• Chapter 4 ([CCKW18]): We provide a solution for the CSDQC problem under
post-quantum computational security. Our solution is based on constructing a
remote state preparation primitive. However, this first candidate is only secure
in the honest-but-curious framework.
• Chapter 5 ([CCKW19]): We present a second construction for a remote state
preparation with improved security, namely achieving security against malicious
adversary. Both constructions rely on the same cryptographic primitive of trap-
door functions, which in turn rely on the learning-with-errors problem.
• Chapter 6 ([BCC+20]): We examine the composability property of the remote
state preparation primitive in a general context, but also when used as a sub-
module for the task of secure delegation of quantum computations.
Given the need for a practical solution for the CSDQC problem in order to exploit the
full potential of quantum computers, a key next step is represented by the optimisation
of the proposed schemes and bringing our theoretical results close to practice. Sec-
ondly, another future work would be investigating the use of our proposed primitive -
the classical remote state preparation - as a sub-protocol in different communication





A.1 Full proof of Theorem 4.4.4
Proof. From Eq. (4.12) we have the definition of B̃ in terms of the three corresponding
bits and we aim to prove that it is hard-core, i.e. that Eq. (4.14) is satisfied. We will
follow the five steps outlined in the main text. Before that let us define some simple
identities that will be used. For any a,b,d,e ∈ N, we have:
(a+b) mod 8 = (a mod 8+b mod 8) mod 8 (I1)
[(a+b) mod 8] mod 4 = (a mod 4+b mod 4) mod 4 (I2)
[(a+b) mod 4] mod 2 = (a mod 2+b mod 2) mod 2 (I3)
(2a) mod 4 = 2 · (a mod 2) (I4)
(2a) mod 8 = 2 · (a mod 4) (I5)
(2d + e) mod 4− e mod 2 = [2d + e− (e mod 2)] mod 4 (I6)
(2d + e) mod 8− e mod 2 = [2d + e− (e mod 2)] mod 8 (I7)
We now return to Eq. (4.12):




(xi− x′i)(4bi +αi) mod 8
where B̃ = B̃1B̃2B̃3, with B̃ j ∈ {0,1}. We also define x̃ = x⊕ x′ ∈ {0,1}n and
z ∈ {−1,0,1}n be the vector defined as: zi = xi− x′i = (−1)x
′
i x̃i , ∀ i ∈ {1,2, ...,n}.
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Step 1: We will rewrite this expression in terms of single bits and obtain the expression




zi(4bi +αi) mod 8, or equivalently:































3 bits of αi and α( j) ∈ {0,1}n are the vectors consisting of the j-th bit of all values αi,

























We also notice that under mod 2, we have that:






i mod 2 = 〈x̃,α( j)〉 mod 2 , for j ∈ {1,2,3}.
Then, we have:


















4B̃1 +2B̃2 + B̃3 = (4S0 +4S1 +2S2 +S3) mod 8 (A.1)
Applying mod 2 to Eq. (A.1), we get:
B̃3 = (4S0 mod 2+4S1 mod 2+2S2 mod 2+S3 mod 2) mod 2
B̃3 = S3 mod 2 = 〈x̃,α(3)〉 mod 2 (A.2)
If, instead we apply mod 4 to Eq. (A.1), we get:
2B̃2 + B̃3 = [4S0 mod 4+4S1 mod 4+2S2 mod 4+S3 mod 4] mod 4
2B̃2 + B̃3 = [(2S2) mod 4+S3 mod 4] mod 4. Using I4, we have:
2B̃2 + B̃3 = [2(S2 mod 2)+S3 mod 4] mod 4
















(S3 mod 4−S3 mod 2)
2
]}








B̃2 = S2 mod 2⊕
(
S3 mod 4−S3 mod 2
2
)
B̃2 = 〈x̃,α(2)〉 mod 2⊕
(




Finally, we can derive B̃1:
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 mod 2 (A.4)
Important observation: B̃1, B̃2, B̃3 all depend on the same value of x and x′ (or
x̃, or z). Therefore, to make our analysis easier, we can consider that z and x̃ are fixed.
Then, if we define the function:




























〈z,α(3)〉 mod 4−〈z,α(3)〉 mod 2
2 (A.7)
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Step 2: We see from Eq. (A.4) that each of the three bits involve a term similar to that




term), but with two the important differences.
First, there is another term, and the bits of B̃ are XORs of the GL-looking term and
that other one. The second type of terms (that involve h1,h2) depend on variables that
appear in the expressions of other bits, potentially introducing correlations among the
different bits. We will deal with the issue of correlations in Step 3, while with the
effects of having extra terms in Steps 4 and 5. Here we deal with the second important
difference, namely that the GL-looking terms (those of the form 〈x̃,r〉 mod 2) depend
on x̃ rather than x in the inner product. For the remaining Step 2, we assume that the
first issue is resolved and it all reduces to GL theorem subject to having x̃ rather than
x.
Since we have x̃ in our expression if we follow the same proof with that of the
GL theorem we can follow the proof until the point that we end up with obtaining a
polynomial number of guesses for x̃ of which one is the correct value with probability
negligibly close to unity. Now to continue with the proof we are lacking two elements.
First, in GL theorem they use the fact that computing f (x) given x is easy, and check
one-by-one the polynomial guesses to see which one (if any) is correct. We cannot do
this since we only obtain x̃ and there is no way with no extra information to check if x̃
actually corresponds to a given image y = f (x) = f (x′). The second issue, is that even
if we could check this, having obtained x̃ does not contradict the definition of one-way
function (definition 2.3.2).
We resolve both these issues with two observations.
Observation 1: We notice that because of the 2-regularity property of f , x̃ is uniquely
determined by x ( f (x) = f (x′), x̃ = x⊕ x′).
Observation 2: The assumption that our 2-regular trapdoor function f is second
preimage resistant (i.e. a QPT adversary given x, cannot find the second preimage
x′, where f (x) = f (x′)) means that:
Pr
x←{0,1}n




[A(1n,x) = x′] = Pr
x←{0,1}n




[A(1n,x) = x̃]≤ negl (n) (A.9)
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As we have mentioned, following the GL theorem proof we would obtain polyno-
mially many guesses x̃g for x̃ (where subscript g stands for guess). Now by the second
preimage resistance, if we are given x we should be unable to obtain x′ in polynomial
time. However, using our polynomially many guesses for x̃ and checking for each
guess if f (x⊕ x̃g) = f (x) we can obtain with probability negligible close to unity the
correct x̃ and therefore come to contradiction with Eq. (A.9).
Step 3: Since the different bits involve common variables, to prove that our function
is hard-core we need to consider the issue of correlations. One way to deal with this
would be to prove the independence of both the bits and of the optimal guessing algo-
rithms. We, instead, use the Vazirani-Vazirani Theorem 2.3.11, which for our case it
means that it suffices to show that: B̃1, B̃2, B̃3, B̃1⊕ B̃2, B̃1⊕ B̃3, B̃2⊕ B̃3, B̃1⊕ B̃2⊕ B̃3
are all hard-core predicates for f .
The most general expression that captures all these hard-core predicates (formed
from the subsets of {B̃1, B̃2, B̃1}) is:
E(x,r1,r2,r3) = 〈x̃,r1⊕ r2〉 mod 2⊕g(z,r2,r3) (A.10)
where g can be any binary function. Using 〈x̃,r1⊕r2〉 mod 2= 〈x̃,r1〉 mod 2⊕〈x̃,r2〉 mod
2 we can rewrite this as:
E(x,r1,r2,r3) = 〈x̃,r1〉 mod 2⊕g′(z,r2,r3) (A.11)
where g′(z,r2,r3) = 〈x̃,r2〉 mod 2⊕ g(z,r2,r3). In other words, in order to prove that
B̃1B̃2B̃3 is a hard-core function for f , it suffices to prove that E(x,r1,r2,r3) is a hard-
core predicate for f .
Step 4: In this step, we will see how we can effectively fix all but one variables, and
turn Eq. (A.11) to depend only on r1.
We want to prove that if there exists a QPT algorithm A that can guess the predicate
E as given in Eq. (A.11), A( f (x),r1,r2,r3) = E(x,r1,r2,r3) with probability non-
negligible better than 1/2, then the second preimage resistance assumption is violated
by constructing a QPT algorithm A ′ that, when given x can obtain x̃, A ′( f (x),1n) = x̃,
with non-negligible probability.
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We now assume that the advantage A has in computing is ε(n), without restrict-
ing ε(n) to be non-negligible, aiming to reach a contradiction if this ε(n) is inverse










Since the different variables (x,r1,r2,r3) are chosen randomly and independently
we can effectively “fix” one variable. We can consider the set of values of that variable
that satisfy some condition that we need and name these values “Good” values (e.g.
the guessing algorithm A to succeed with higher than negligible probability). Then
we can work with the assumption that the fixed variable is within the “Good” set, with
only caveat that at the end, whatever probability of inversion we obtain, is conditional
on the fixed variables being “Good” and thus we need to multiply that probability with
the probability that the fixed variable is “Good”. For this reason, it is important that
the probability of being “Good” (ratio between cardinality of Good values and total
number of values) should be at least inverse polynomial.
We will, therefore, be using the following Lemma:
Lemma A.1.1. Let Pr
(v1,··· ,vk)←{0,1}n×···×{0,1}n
[Guessing] ≥ p+ ε(n), then for any vari-
able vi, there exists a set Goodvi ⊆ {0,1}n of size at least ε(n)2 2n, such that for all
vi ∈ Goodvi , we have:
Pr
(v1,··· ,vi ,··· ,vk)←{0,1}n×···×{0,1}n
[Guessing]≥ p+ ε(n)
2
where the latter probability is taken over all variables except vi.
Proof.
p+ ε(n)≤ 12n ∑vi∈Goodvi Pr(v1,··· ,vi ,··· ,vk)|v j∈{0,1}n
[Guessing]+
1
2n ∑vi /∈Goodvi Pr(v1,··· ,vi ,··· ,vk)|v j∈{0,1}n
[Guessing]












2n ≤ |Goodvi| (A.14)
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∀x ∈ Goodx (A.15)
and using Lemma A.1.1 we have |Goodx| ≥ ε(n)2 2n. Note that fixing x is equivalent
with fixing x̃ or z, given the definition of the 2-regular function f . Starting with Eq.










∀x ∈ Goodx ∧ ∀r3 ∈ Goodr3 (A.16)
where using again Lemma A.1.1 we have |Goodr3 | ≥ ε(n)4 2n. Finally, we can fix r2
(conditional on x ∈ Goodx and r3 ∈ Goodr3):
Pr
r1←{0,1}n






∀x ∈ Goodx ∧ ∀r3 ∈ Goodr3 ∧ ∀r2 ∈ Goodr2 (A.17)
and again by Lemma A.1.1 we have |Goodr2| ≥ ε(n)8 2n.
Step 5: In Eq. (A.17) the only variable is r1. Using Eq. (A.11) we can see that given
that x,r2,r3 are all fixed, E(x,r1,r2,r3) = 〈x̃,r1〉⊕g′(z,r2,r3) where g′(z,r2,r3) = c is




[A( f (x),r1,r2,r3) = 〈x̃,r1〉 mod 2⊕g′(z,r2,r3)]
= Pr
r1←{0,1}n
[Ã( f (x),r1,r2,r3) = 〈x̃,r1〉 mod 2]
So, using Eq. (A.17), we obtain
Pr
r1←{0,1}n






∀x ∈ Goodx ∧ ∀r3 ∈ Goodr3 ∧ ∀r2 ∈ Goodr2 (A.18)
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which is exactly the expression in GL theorem. There, one obtains guesses for inver-
sion, i.e. to obtain x̃ with a polynomial in ε(n) probability of success, given the fixed
x,r2,r3’s. Multiplying this with the probability of actually being in Goodx and Goodr3
and Goodr2 we obtain another polynomial in ε(n). This rules out the possibility of ε(n)
being inverse polynomial, since that would break the second preimage resistance. As
we have already stated, guessing x̃ with inverse polynomial success probability does
not contradict the one-way property of the trapdoor function, but it does contradict the
second preimage resistance, since given x and x̃ one can obtain deterministically x′.
Concretely, using GL proof to construct from Ã , a QPT algorithm A ′ that obtains
x̃, A ′( f (x),1n) = x̃ for all inputs x ∈ {0,1}n, when, x ∈ Goodx, r3 ∈ Goodr3 and r2 ∈
































[x ∈ Goodx ∧ r3 ∈ Goodr3 ∧ r2 ∈ Goodr2]
We now see that:
Pr[x ∈ Goodx ∧ r3 ∈ Goodr3 ∧ r2 ∈ Goodr2] =
Pr[r2 ∈ Goodr2|r3 ∈ Goodr3 ∧ x ∈ Goodx] ·Pr[r3 ∈ Goodr3|x ∈ Goodx]×Pr[x ∈ Goodx]
By construction we have Pr[x ∈ Goodx] = |Goodx|2n and Pr[r3 ∈ Goodr3|x ∈ Goodx] =
|Goodr3 |
2n and Pr[r2 ∈ Goodr2|r3 ∈ Goodr3 ∧ x ∈ Goodx] =
|Goodr2 |
2n , which leads to


















where we can view r3 and r2 as the internal randomness of the inversion algorithm
A ′. It is clear that if ε(n) is non-negligible, it means that there exists polynomial p(n)





[A ′( f (x),1n) = x̃] ≥ 1
128(32n+1)p(n)5
(A.20)
which as explained in Step 2 breaks second preimage resistance, Eq. (A.9). Since all
the terms given in Step 3 (B̃i, B̃i⊕ B̃ j, B̃1⊕ B̃2⊕ B̃3) are of the form E(x,r1,r2,r3) as in
Eq. (A.11) our analysis suffices to prove that B̃1B̃2B̃3 is a hard-core function for f .
A.2 Proof of Theorem 4.5.7
Lemma A.2.1 (two-regular). If G is a family of bijective functions, then F is a family
of two-regular functions.
Proof. For every y ∈ Im fk′ ⊆ R, where k′ = (k1,k2):




that fk′(x,0) = gk1(x) = y.




that fk′(x,1) = gk2(x) = y.
Therefore, we conclude that:




Lemma A.2.2 (trapdoor). If G is a family of bijective trapdoor functions, then F is a
family of trapdoor functions.
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Proof. Let y ∈ Im fk′ ⊆ R. We construct the following inversion algorithm:
InvF (k′,y, t ′k)
1 : / t ′k = (tk1 , tk2 ), k′ = (k1,k2)
2 : x1 := InvG (k1,y, tk1)
3 : x2 := InvG (k2,y, tk2)
4 : return (x1,0) and (x2,1)
Lemma A.2.3 (one-way). If G is a family of bijective, one-way functions, then F is a
family of one-way functions.
Proof. We prove it by contradiction. We assume that a QPT adversary A can invert a
function in F with non-negligible probability P (i.e. given y∈ Im fk′ to return a correct
preimage of the form (x′,b) with probability P). We then construct a QPT adversary
A ′ that inverts any function in G with the same non-negligible probability P reaching
the contradiction since G is one-way by assumption.
From Eq. (A.21) we know the two preimages of y are: (i) (g−1k1 (y),0) and (ii)
(g−1k2 (y),1). We now construct an adversary A
′ that for gk : D→ R, inverts any image
y = gk(x) with the probability P/2.
A ′(kc,y)
1 : r←$ {0,1}
2 : kr := kc
3 : (kr′ , tkr′ )←$ GenG (1n)
4 : if r == 0 then
5 : k′ := (kr,kr′)
6 : else
7 : k′ := (kr′ ,kr)
8 : (x′,b)← A(k′,y)
9 : if ((b == r)∧ (gkr(x′) == y) then
10 : / A returns correct preimage that also corresponds to the challenge of A ′
11 : return x′
12 : else / A failed in giving any of the preimages (happens with probability 1−P)
13 : / or the preimage returned corresponds to the r′ that is not the challenge (happens with probability P/2)
14 : return 0
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The inversion algorithm succeeds with 1−((1−P)+P/2) = P/2 and thus reaches
a contradiction.
Lemma A.2.4 (second preimage resistance). If G is a family of bijective, one-way
functions, then, any function f ∈ F is second preimage resistant.
Proof. Assume there exists a PPT adversary B that given k′ = (k1,k2) and (y,(x,b))
such that fk′(x,b) = y can find (x′,b′) such that fk′(x′,b′) = y with non-negligible prob-
ability P. From Eq. (A.21) we know that the two preimages have different b’s. We now
construct a PPT adversary B ′ that inverts the function gkc with the same probability P,
reaching a contradiction:
B ′(kc,y)
1 : (k2, tk2)←$ GenG (1n)
2 : x2← g−1k2 (y)/ using the trapdoor tk2
3 : k′ := (kc,k2)
4 : (x,0)← B(k′,y,(x2,1))/ where y is an element from the image of fk′
5 : if fk′(x,0) == fk′(x2,1) == y
6 : return x
7 : else / B failed to find a second preimage; happens with probability (1−P)
8 : return 0
Lemma A.2.5 (quantum-safe). If G is a family of quantum-safe trapdoor functions,
with properties as above, then F is also a family of quantum-safe trapdoor functions.
Proof. The properties that require to be quantum-safe is the one-wayness and second
preimage resistance. Both these properties of F that we derived above were proved
using reduction to the hardness (one-wayness) of G . Therefore if G is quantum-safe,
its one-wayness is also quantum-safe and thus both properties of F are also quantum-
safe.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4.5.11
In the following, we will denote by f (s,e,c), the function REG2.EvalP(k,(s,e,c)) for k
the index function obtained by REG2.GenP(1n), and by s0,e0 the trapdoor information
associated with this function f .
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We now prove separately the δ-2 regularity, collision resistance, one-wayness and
trapdoor property of the function in Definition 4.5.10.
A.3.1 δ-2 regularity
Here we describe how to achieve δ-2 regularity using the construction FromInj and
specifically, the function in Definition 4.5.10.
This reduces to ensuring that the two function inputs (s,e) and (s− s0,e−e0) both
lie within the domain of the function. The input (s,e) is the result of the inversion
algorithm, so it is by definition inside the domain. Additionally, as the first element of
the domain is only required to be in Znq and as Zq is closed with subtraction mod q,
then s− s0 ∈ Znq for any s, s0 ∈ Znq. On the other hand, the second element of the
domain is required to be in Zm, such that each component is bounded in absolute value
by some value µ. In this case, we are not guaranteed that adding or subtracting two
such elements the result is still in the domain. What we want to ensure is that with (at
least) constant probability over the choice of (s,e) and (s0,e0), the result (s−s0,e−e0)
is in the domain of the function.
It is not difficult to show that if (s0,e0) is chosen arbitrarily from the domain of
the function, then (s− s0,e− e0) lies within the domain of the function only with
inverse exponential in m probability. This is why we consider restricting e0 to be
within a subset of the domain. By suitable choice of this subset we can make the
success probability (of having two preimages) – seen as a function in m – to be at
least a constant value. Firstly, we remark that the exact probability of success can be
explicitly computed. Indeed, if the trapdoor noise e0 is sampled from a Gaussian of
dimension m, and standard deviation σ, and if the noise e1 is sampled uniformly from
an hypercube C of length 2µ (both distribution being centered on 0) then the probability















However, for simplicity, and because we do not aim to find optimal parameters,
we will use a (simpler) lower bound of this probability (that will be less efficient by
a factor of
√
m). To do that, remark that using Lemma 2.5 in [Reg05], we have that
if e0 ∈ Zm, such that each component of e0 is sampled from a Gaussian distribution
with parameter α′q, then we have that every component of the vector e0 is less than
µ′ := α′q
√
m with overwhelming probability as m increases. So one can remark that,
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up to a negligible term, the Gaussian distribution with parameter α′q is “closer to 0”
than the uniform distribution on [−α′q√m;α′q√m] for sufficiently large m (i.e. for
any x, the integral between −x and x of the Gaussian distribution is bigger, up to a
negligible term, than the integral of the uniform distribution). Therefore, to obtain
a lower bound on the probability of having two preimages, we can consider that e0
is sampled according to the uniform distribution on a hypercube of length 2α′q
√
m
rather than according to the Gaussian distribution of parameter α′q. This simplifies
our analysis, and allows us to find the subset in which e0 must reside, as seen in the
following lemma. Note also that if one does not want to do any assumption on the
input distribution, and only assume that the infinity norm is smaller than µ′, then the
same Lemma applies with the constant 4 replaced by 2.
Lemma A.3.1 (Domain Addition). Let V =Rm be a vector space of dimension m, and
let Dm,µ be the uniform distribution inside the hypercube of dimension m and length
2µ centered on 0. Then, for any µ′ < µ, we have:
Pm,µ,µ′ := Pr
[








Moreover, if µ′ = O( µm) then the probability Pm,µ,µ′ becomes lower bounded by a posi-
tive constant.
Proof. As ||e0 + e1||∞ must be less than µ, which means that each component of the
sum vector must be less than µ, and as each component of the 2 vectors e0 and e1 was
independently sampled, then we can simplify our proof by considering that e0 and e1
are vectors in R, essentially determining P1,µ,µ′ and then, we can compute Pm,µ,µ′ =
P1,µ,µ′m.
Then, let us denote by E1 the random variable sampled uniformly from [−µ,µ], E0 the
random variable sampled uniformly from [−µ′,µ′] and E the random variable obtained
as E = E1 +E0. Therefore, P1,µ,µ′ = Pr[−µ≤ E ≤ µ].





fE1(e1) · fE0(e− e1)de1
where fE1 and fE0 are the probability density functions of E1 and E0 ( fE1(e1) =
1
2µ ,
when e1 ∈ [−µ,µ] and 0 elsewhere and fE0(e0) = 12µ′ , when e0 ∈ [−µ′,µ′] and 0 else-
where).
Then, we are only interested in the cases when both the values of fE1(e1) and fE0(e−
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e1) are non-zero and for this we need to consider 3 cases for e, given by the intervals:






4µµ′ de1 , e ∈ [−µ−µ′,µ′−µ]∫ e+µ′
e−µ′
1
4µµ′ de1 , e ∈ [µ′−µ,µ−µ′]∫ µ
e−µ′
1
4µµ′ de1 , e ∈ [µ−µ′,µ+µ′]













4µµ′ de = 1−
µ′
4µ .




Now, given that µ is a function of m, µ = µ(m), we want to determine the values

































= c ≥ 0, where c is a constant, as then,


















Consequently, it is clear that in order to get a positive constant lower bound for the
success probability, we must have:
µ′ = c · 4µ
m
, c≥ 0
Thus, in our case, if e1 is sampled uniformly on a hypercube of length 2µ and e0





m, what we require is that:
α
′ = c · 4α
m
, c≥ 0
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A.3.2 Collision resistance
We start by the observation that for the choices of Definition 4.5.10, no QPT adversary
can infer the trapdoor information (s0,e0), as determining s0 from k = (A,b0) would
be equivalent to solving LWEq,Ψ̄
α′q
:
Corollary A.3.2 (One-wayness of the trapdoor [Reg05, Theorem 1.1] ). Under the
SIVPγ (with γ = poly (n)) assumption, no QPT adversary can recover the trapdoor
information (s0,e0).
Lemma A.3.3 (Collision resistance). The function f defined in Definition 4.5.10 is col-
lision resistant if the parameters are chosen accordingly to Theorem 4.5.11 assuming
that SIVPγ is hard.
Proof. By contradiction, let us suppose that this function is not collision resistant.
Then there exist two pairs (s1,e1), (s2,e2) such that f (s1,e1,0) = y = f (s2,e2,1). Note
that the last bits are necessary different since the two functions that fix the last bit, are
injective when the error is smaller than rmax (according to [MP12, Theorem 5.4]). By
the definition of f , ||e1||∞ ≤ µ and ||e2||∞ ≤ µ, i.e. both e1 and e2 has Euclidean norm
smaller than
√
mµ. Then, by definition, y = f (s2,e2,1) = f (s2,e2,0)+ f (s0,e0,0) =
A(s2 + s0)+ (e2 + e0). Now, we remark that with overwhelming probability (over the
choice of the trapdoor), ||e0||2 ≤ µ′
√
m as stated in [Reg05, Lemma 2.5], so in this
case, ||e2 + e0||2 ≤
√
m(µ+ µ′) ≤ rmax (last assumption of Theorem 4.5.11). Then,
according to [MP12, Theorem 5.4], there is exactly one element (s,e) with e of length
smaller than rmax such that As+e = y. Because (s1,e1) is a solution, we then have that:
s2 + s0 = s1 and e2 + e0 = e1, i.e. e0 = e1− e2 and s0 = s1− s2 mod q. Hence, it is
possible to deduce the trapdoor information s0 and e0 from the collision pair, which is
impossible by Corollary A.3.2.
A.3.3 One-wayness
One could imagine that the one-wayness of the resulting function of Definition 4.5.10
is implied by the one-wayness of the function in [MP12] (as is the case in Lemma 4.5.4).
However, we need more care here, since in our construction the error term e is not sam-
pled from a Gaussian distribution with suitable parameters (unlike the error term e0).
1
1While other ways to prove the one-wayness are possible, we give here one proof that uses the
previous two lemmata.
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Lemma A.3.4 (Collision resistance to one-wayness). Let f : A→ B, where A is finite
and can be efficiently sampled uniformly and let C be the set of all y ∈ B that admit 2
preimages. If f is a collision resistant function that admits with non-negligible prob-
ability two preimages for any y from its image and if | f
−1(C)|
|A| is non-negligible, then f
restricted to the set f−1(C) is a one-way function.
Proof. By contradiction: suppose that f is not one-way on C, i.e. with a non-negligible
probability we can find a preimage of y for y uniformly sampled in C, and from this we
can show how to find a collision. The idea is to sample an input x ∈ A, and then com-
pute y := f (x). Then, as | f
−1(C)|
|A| is non-negligible, we know that with non-negligible
probability this y will have two preimages. Now, with non-negligible probability, this
function will be easy to invert and one gets x′. Because we sample uniformly at the
step before, we have the same probability to sample one image or the other, so with
probability 1/2, x′ 6= x, therefore, we found a collision.
Corollary A.3.5 (One-wayness from Lemma A.3.3 and Lemma A.3.4 ). The function
defined in Definition 4.5.10 is one-way for all y that admit two preimages, under the
SIVPγ hardness assumption, when the parameters are chosen accordingly to Theo-
rem 4.5.11.
A.3.4 Trapdoor
We want to prove that using the trapdoor information of the REG2 construction, which
consists of (s0,e0) and tk, the trapdoor information of the LWE function, we can effi-
ciently derive the preimages of an output b of REG2.Eval. Firstly, we notice that to
find all the preimages, we can simply run LWE.Inv on b as well as on b−b0 and if we
succeed we take only the preimages that lie in the input domain, i.e. whose error part
e is bounded in infinity norm by µ: ||e||∞ ≤ µ. Because the function is injective, these
are all the possible preimages. However, because we are interested only in the case
when there are exactly two preimages, the function REG2.Inv can also do the follow-
ing: we first run LWE.Inv on b and obtain (s1,e1). Then, the inversion is completed
by returning (s1,e1,0) and (s1− s0,e1− e0,1), which are both valid preimages, if and
only if the function has two preimages (see Lemma A.3.3 for more details).
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A.4 Proof of Lemma 4.5.12
Proof. Using the following explicit values for the parameters of the Micciancio and
Peikert injective trapdoor function [MP12], we want to prove that they fulfil all of the















and α,α′,C are defined as in Theorem 4.5.11. Now, let us prove that these parameters
satisfy all the requirements.
• The first three requirements are trivially satisfied.























































n⇔ µ≥ 2√nm√m= 2mn
√







the condition is satisfied.
• For the fifth condition, i.e. n




3/2q, and that both m and q are poly (n).
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Now, let us suppose that k := udlog(n)e+ v with u≤ 5 and v≥ 19 and we need
to find u,v such that A ≤ 2k. Note that we will include v in some constants and
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B.1 Function Construction proofs
B.1.1 Proof of Lemma 5.3.2
To prove that d0 is a hardcore predicate of k, we must prove that for any QPT adversary




[A(1n,K,gK(s0,e0,d0)) = d0(tk)]≤ 12 +negl (n) (B.1)




[A(1n,K,Ks0 + e0 +d0 · v) = d0]≤ 12 +negl (n) (B.2)
This is equivalent to proving that the distributions D1 = {K,Ks0 + e0} and D2 =
{K,Ks0 + e0 + v} are indistinguishable to any QPT adversary 1. Equivalently, by con-
sidering each of the m elements of the vectors from the 2 distributions, we need to
show that:
{Ki,〈Ki,s0〉+ e0,i}mi=1
c≈ {Ki,〈Ki,s0〉+ e0,i + vi}mi=1 (B.3)
where Ki is the i-th row of K and e0,i is the i-th element of the vector e0.
Using the decisional LWE assumption we know that for {ui}mi=1 uniformly sampled
from Zq, we have 2:
{Ki,〈Ki,s0〉+ e0,i}mi=1
c≈ {Ki,ui}mi=1 (B.4)
1It is also easy to write an explicit reduction
2this holds because the function parameters given in Lemma 4.5.12 are chosen to make Ks0 + e0
indistinguishable from a random vector by a direct reduction to LWE
192
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Then, as v is a fixed constant vector, we also have that:
{Ki,〈Ki,s0〉+ e0,i + vi}mi=1
c≈ {Ki,ui}mi=1
c≈ {Ki,〈Ki,s0〉+ e0,i}mi=1 (B.5)
which completes the proof.
B.1.2 Proof of Theorem 5.3.4, homomorphicity
To prove that gK is homomorphic, we notice that:
gK(s1,e1,d1)+gK(s2,e2,d2) = ḡK(s1,e1)+d1 · v+ ḡK(s2,e2)+d2 · v mod q
= ḡK(s1 + s2 mod q,e1 + e2)+(d1 +d2) · v mod q
= gK(s1 + s2 mod q,e1 + e2,d1⊕d2)
where for the last equality we used the fact that if d1,d2 ∈ {0,1}, then d1 · q2 + d2 ·
q
2 mod q = (d1⊕d2) ·
q
2 mod q.
We make the following remark: the proof is constructed for the case when ḡ is
perfectly homomorphic, but it also holds in the case when ḡ is homomorphic with high
probability, resulting in g being homomorphic with the same high probability.
Note also that we can easily notice the homomorphicity property of the defined
function h:
h(s1,e1,d1)⊕h(s2,e2,d2) = d1⊕d2
= h(s1 + s2 mod q,e1 + e2 mod q,d1⊕d2) (B.6)
B.1.3 Proof of Theorem 5.3.4, one-wayness
To prove the one-wayness of gK , we are going to reduce it to the one-wayness of ḡK .
Thus, we assume there exists a QPT adversary A that can invert gK with probability P
and we construct a QPT adversary A ′ inverting ḡK with probability P/2.
To show this reduction we will use the fact that gK is injective, implying that for an
image y, there exists an unique preimage (s,e,d) such that gK(s,e,d) = y.
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InvertA ′,K(y)
1 : d←${0,1}
2 : y′←$ y+d · v
3 : if (d == 0) then
4 : (s′,e′,d′)← AK(y)/ from the injectivity of gK we know that if A succeeds then d′ = 0
5 : / and (s′,e′) is the preimage of ḡ
6 : return (s′,e′)
B.2 Probability of guessing two predicates
Lemma B.2.1 (Implication of guessing two predicates).
Let (a,b) ∈ {0,1}2 be two bits sampled uniformly at random. Let f be any function of
(a,b) (eventually randomized). Then if A is an adversary such that Pr[A( f (a,b)) = (a,b)]≥
1/4+ 1poly(n) (where the probability is taken over the choice of a and b, the randomness
of f and A), then either:
• A is good to guess a, i.e.:
P1 = Pr
[
ã = a | (ã, b̃)← A( f (a,b))
]
≥ 12 + 1poly1(n)
• Or A is good to guess b, i.e.:
P2 = Pr
[
b̃ = b | (ã, b̃)← A( f (a,b))
]
≥ 12 + 1poly2(n)
• Or A is good to guess the XOR of a and b, i.e.:
P⊕ = Pr
[
ã⊕ b̃ = a⊕b | (ã, b̃)← A( f (a,b))
]
≥ 12 + 1poly3(n)
for some polynomials poly1, poly2, poly3.
Proof. Let us define the following quantities:
e1 := Pr
[












ã = a and b̃ = b | (ã, b̃)← A( f (a,b))
]
(B.7)
From the initial statement we have: e4 ≥ 14 + 1poly(n) .
Now let us assume that A is in neither of the first 2 cases, meaning that A is not good at
guessing a and not good at guessing b. We will show that in this case A must certainly
be in the third case, i.e. she must be good at guessing a⊕b.
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A is not good at guessing a implies that: e2+e4≤ 12 +negl (n) and not good at guessing
















for some polynomial poly′
(B.8)







But then the probability that A guesses correctly the XOR of a and b is defined as
e1 + e4, for which we have:















for some polynomial poly3
(B.10)
which concludes our proof.
B.3 Proof of Malicious-Abort QFactory
Proof of Lemma 5.5.2. The function fk cannot have more than two preimages by con-
struction, and in the Malicious 4-states QFactory protocol the output y is an image of
fk. So it means that y has exactly one preimage x. So after measuring the last register,
the states will be in the state |0〉⊗|x〉⊗|y〉. Then, after applying Uh, the state becomes
|d〉⊗ |x〉⊗ |y〉 with d ∈ {0,1}. We remark that the first qubit is not entangled with the
measured qubits (second and third register) and as a result, the output qubit will be |d〉,
which is indeed in the basis {|0〉 , |1〉}.
Proof of Lemma 5.5.3. The analysis of the circuit will be performed only with respect
to the basis of the states of the circuit. Let us first examine the first part of the circuit,








(with B1(1) the basis of
|in1〉) and then measure the first qubit in the |±〉 basis. We denote the resulted state
by V1.
The result of this operation is:
- if B1(1) = 0, V1 = R
(
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- if B1(1) = 1, V1 = XB
(1)
2 |0〉 ∈ {|0〉 , |1〉}








, if B1(1) = 0 and
to the basis B1 = {|0〉 , |1〉} if B1(1) = 1.
Now, we can think of the circuit as having t states Vi ∈
{









every Vi has the basis B1(i). Then, to compute the output state |out〉 of Gad⊕, for every
i ∈ {1, ..., t} we have to apply CZ between Vi and |+〉 and then measure the first qubit
in the |±〉 basis.
Let us do this step first for V1. The result is a state W1 = X s1,2HV1, thus we obtain








, if B1(1) = 0 and to the basis B2 =
{|+〉 , |−〉} if B1(1) = 1.
Next we do the same operations between V2 and W1, the result being a state W2, then
between V3 and W2 and so on, therefore, the outcome state is |out〉=Wt .
We will prove by induction that the state Wt ∈
{









basis of Wt is given by B1 = B1(1)⊕ ...⊕B1(t).
As we have proved already for the basis case t = 1, we now prove the induction step.
Suppose that Wn ∈
{








with basis B1 = B1(1)⊕ ...⊕B1(n).
To obtain Wn+1 we have to apply ∧Z between Vn+1 and Wn and then measure the first
qubit. Then after computing this, we obtain that the basis of Wn+1 is B1 if the basis of
Vn+1 is B1(n+1) = 0 and the basis of Wn+1 is 1⊕B1 if the basis of Vn+1 is B1(n+1) = 1.
In other words, the basis of Wn+1 is given by B1 = B1(1)⊕ ...⊕B1(n)⊕B1(n+1), which
concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5.5.4. Let us define {Ai}tci=1 as the (binary) random variables whose
values are 1 if and only if in the i-th run of Malicious 4-states QFactory the corre-
sponding yi has two preimages.
In the honest case, all tc runs of Malicious 4-states QFactory are independents, hence
{Ai}tci=1 are also independent.
From the hypothesis, we know that for all i, E(Ai) ≥ pa > pb. So let us consider
ε := E(Ai)− pb ≥ pa− pb.








Ai < E(Ai)− ε
]
≤ e−2ε2tc ≤ e−2(pa−pb)2tc
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Ai ≥ tc · pb
]
≥ 1−negl (tc ) (B.12)
Proof of Lemma 5.5.5. From Lemma 5.5.4, for a given chunk, the probability to have
at least pctc accepted runs is 1−negl (tc ), i.e. if tc = Ω(n), this probability is negl (n).
Then, the probability to accept all nc chunks is (1−negl (n))nc = 1−negl (n) as soon
as nc = poly (n), which is the case because t = tc×nc = poly (n). Then, when all the
chunks are accepted, the correctness of the output values is assured by Lemma 5.5.3.
B.4 Generalisation to pseudo-homomorphic functions
Definition B.4.1 ((η, Z, Z0, D)-homomorphic family of functions). Let us consider
a family of functions {gk : Z → Y ∪⊥}k∈K , as well as two symmetric binary group
relations ∗ and ?, with ∗ acting on a set containing Z and Z0, ? acting on Y ∪⊥, and
so that ∀y ∈ Y ,⊥ ? y = ⊥. We say that { fk}k∈K is an (η, Z, Z0, D)-homomorphic





[z∗ z0 ∈ Z and gk(z)?gk(z0) = gk(z∗ z0) 6=⊥]≥ η
Note that we do require that z is sampled uniformly from Z, but z0 is sampled from a
distribution D on Z0 that may not be uniform.
Definition B.4.2 (δ-2-regular family of functions). Let us consider a family of func-
tions { fk : X → Y ∪⊥}k∈K . For a fixed k, Y (2) will be the set of y having two preim-
ages: Y (2)fk = {y ∈ Y , | f
−1





[ fk(x) ∈ Y (2)fk ]≥ δ
Lemma B.4.3 ((η, Z, Z0)-homomorphicity to δ-2-regularity). Given a family of func-
tions {gk : Z → Y ∪⊥}k∈K that is both injective and an (η, Z, Z0)-homomorphic
family of functions, then it’s possible to build a family { fk′ : Z×{0,1}→ Y ∪⊥}k′∈K ′
that is δ-2-regular, with δ = η.
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Proof. Let us consider the following construction. To sample a key k′ ∈ K ′, we
first sample a key k from K , as well as an z0 ←D Z0, and we define k′ = (k,y0 :=
fk(z0)). Then, we define fk′(z,0) = gk(z) and fk′(z,1) = gk(z) ? y0, also denoted later
as fk′(z,c) = gk(z)? (c · y0) for simplicity. Now, we remark that:
Pr
k′ ←$ K ′
x←$ X














[gk(z) ∈ Y (2)f ′k ]+ Prk←$ K
z0←D Z0
z←$ Z











[gk(z) ∈ Y (2)f ′k and z∗ z
−1



































Now, we remark that when z0 ∗ z ∈ D and gk(z0) ? gk(z) = gk(z0 ∗ z) 6= ⊥, then y :=
gk(z)?gk(z0) ∈ Y (2)f ′k . More specifically:
• y ∈ Y because gk(z)?gk(z0) 6=⊥ and the ? operator is defined on Y ∪⊥
• there are at least two preimages mapping to y, because y = fk(z,1) = gk(z) ?
gk(z0) = gk(z∗ z0) = fk(z∗ z0,0).
• there are at most two preimages mapping to y: indeed gk is injective, so both
partial functions f (·,0) and f (·,1) are injective, so we cannot have more than
two preimages mapping to y.
As a result, we have: Pr k←$ K
z0←D Z0
z←$ Z
[gk(z)?gk(z0) ∈ Y (2)f ′k |C2] = 1.
Similarly, Pr k←$ K
z0←D Z0
z←$ Z
[gk(z) ∈ Y (2)f ′k |C1] = 1.
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Hence, we can rewrite the above equation as:
Pr
k′ ←$ K ′
x←$ X
















Now, as {gk}k is (η, Z, Z0)-homomorphic, we have: Pr k←$ K
z0←D Z0
z←$ Z
[C2]≥ η. By symmetry,








[z∗ z−10︸ ︷︷ ︸
ẑ





















So Prk′ ←$ K ′
x←$ X
[ fk′(x) ∈ Y (2)f ′k ]≥ η, which concludes the proof.
Appendix C
App: Composable RSP
C.1 Distance Measures for Quantum States











where the Hilbert-Schmidt norm is defined as: ‖A‖HS =
√
Tr(A∗A).
Proof. This follows directly from the relation
(ρ−σ)2 = ρ2−ρσ−σρ+σ2
and the fact that ρ and σ are hermitian.
The following lemma formalizes the following statement: If Tr(ρσ) is close to
1, then both ρ and σ must be almost pure, and ρ and σ must be close. Note that
Lemma C.1.2 holds in particular for density matrices ρ and σ, despite being stated for
a more general class of operators.
Lemma C.1.2. Let ε ≥ 0 and Tr(ρσ) ≥ 1− ε for two self-adjoint, positive semi-
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‖ρ−σ‖2HS ≤ 2(1−Tr(ρσ))≤ 2ε,
Lemma C.1.3. Let λ be a security parameter and let ρ,σ be two density matrices.









≥ 1−negl (λ) and TD(ρ−σ)≤ negl (λ),
2. Tr(ρσ)≥ 1−negl (λ),
where TD denotes the trace distance.
Proof. One direction of the equivalence follows directly from Lemma C.1.2. The
other direction follows from the formula in Lemma C.1.1 and the fact that in finite-
dimensional spaces the trace norm is equivalent to the Hilbert-Schmidt norm.
Lemma C.1.4. Let ε1,ε2 ≥ 0. Let further Tr(ρ1ρ2) ≥ 1− ε1 and Tr(ρ2ρ3) ≥ 1− ε2
for self-adjoint, positive semi-definite operators ρ1,ρ2,ρ3 with trace less than 1. Then
it holds that Tr(ρ1ρ3)≥ 1−3(ε1 + ε2).































ε2 ≤ 4(ε1 + ε2)
where we applied the inequality of the geometric mean to obtain the last bound. Using

























4(ε1 + ε2)≥ 1−3(ε1 + ε2) .
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